DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 351 229 SO 022 388

AUTHOR	Chan, Adrian
TITLE	Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking. Topic #5 in a Series of International Security and Conflict [Curricula] for Grades 9-12 and Community College.
INSTITUTION	Stanford Univ., CA. Stanford Program on International and Cross Cultural Education.
PUB DATE	90
NOTE	189p.; Latin America Project.
AVAILABLE FROM	SPICE--Stanford Program on International and Cross Cultural Education, Littlefield Center, Room 14, 300 Lasuen Street, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5013 ($35.95).
PUB TYPE	Guides - Classroom Use - Teaching Guides (For Teacher) (052)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Community Colleges; Conflict; *Foreign Policy; High Schools; *International Relations; Social Studies; Two Year Colleges; United States History; Units of Study; World Affairs
IDENTIFIERS	*Cold War; *USSR

ABSTRACT

This 12-day unit is designed for use in the social studies classroom for grades 9-12 and community college level. Students first learn about the ideological, political, and military rivalries of the United States and the Soviet Union that marked the Cold War. They are then introduced to the nuclear build-up, and they study its impact on matters of national and international security. Lessons on arms control and detente raise questions on the opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, and shift the focus from military to political issues. A final section on contemporary issues re-examines the foundations of the Soviet-American relationship in light of the momentous events of the late 1980s. This unit makes use of primary and secondary sources, cartoons, a glossary, a timeline, role plays, simulations, pre- and post-tests, and in-class activities. An on-going journal based on the timeline asked students to evaluate Soviet-American historical events in terms of national and international security and from different points of view. The pre- and post-tests and the journal can be used by the teacher for evaluation purposes. Five appendices include: (1) lists of related activities; (2) connections to social science textbooks; (3) connections to California's history/social science framework and model curriculum standards; (4) a bibliography; and (5) a statement on educational philosophy. (DB)

****
*   Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made   *
*   from the original document.   *
****

ED351229

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

COLD WAR
TO
NEW THINKING

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

- Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN **MICROFICHE ONLY** HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
JANE A. BOSTON
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SO 022 388

SPICE
Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

STANFORD PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL EDUCATION

SPICE

Littlefield Center, Room 14, 300 Lasuen Street
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305-5013
☎ (415) 723-1114

Background

The Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) represents a long-term effort by Stanford University to improve international and cross-cultural education in elementary and secondary schools. The program traces its origins to 1973 with the initiation of the Bay Area China Education Project, an effort to upgrade teaching about the People's Republic of China. Subsequently, parallel projects on Japan, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were established, and together with the China Project, became the nucleus of SPICE. SPICE also offers services in the fields of geography and foreign language.

In 1979, SPICE joined with two other international resource organizations–The World Affairs Council of Northern California and Global Educators–to form the Bay Area Global Education Program (BAGEP), an international studies resource consortium serving K-12 schools and districts in the San Francisco area. In 1986, Stanford University, in cooperation with the World Affairs Council and Global Educators, was selected to manage the California International Studies Project (CISP), a legislatively-based (AB 2543) statewide network of international resource centers for which BAGEP serves as a model. SPICE is the curriculum development and materials resource arm of CISP.

Sponsorship

SPICE is sponsored by the Institute for International Studies and the School of Education at Stanford University.

Sources of Support

SPICE receives support from federal sources, private foundations, and the Institute for International Studies.

Current Programs and Priorities

SPICE's current curricular priority is the development of lessons which enhance the study of world history, cultures and geography. In the area of staff development, SPICE's priority is to provide support for the programs of the CISP Resource Centers. SPICE also has ongoing staff development efforts through each of its individual projects, and is centrally involved in a yearly summer institute on the Stanford campus in conjunction with BAGEP.

Within the range of its existing project, SPICE will provide consultation in the development of international studies programs for elementary and secondary education on a fee for service basis.

Major Emphases

SPICE emphasizes curriculum and staff development and offers a wide variety of teaching materials and staff development programs. SPICE has strong interests in the development of university-based international studies centers, and program evaluation.

Publication of Teaching Materials

SPICE offers over 60 titles which include curriculum units, resource guides, and research reports. Write to SPICE for a free catalogue.

MAJOR CONCEPTS & EVENTS IN

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS:

COLD WAR TO NEW THINKING

Topic #5 in a Series of
International Security and Conflict
for Grades 9 - 12 and Community College

Developed by Adrian Chan

International Security and Arms Control (ISAAC) Project,
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Project,
Stanford Program on International and
Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE)

All portions unless indicated are Copyright 1990 by the Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees. Permission is given to educators to reproduce copies of student handouts for classroom use. Other questions about permission should be addressed to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Project, Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, Littlefield Center, Room 14, 300 Lasuen St., Stanford, CA 94305-5013. (415) 725-1480 or 723-1114.

Acknowledgements

The conceptual intentions of this unit have been in the making for several years. Early drafts initiated by Carlton Hayes Tucker and Felicia Wong have since been reworked in order to accommodate the "Gorbachev phenomenon." Adrian Chan, coordinator of the ISAAC project, has been the unit's author, though much is owed to the dedicated work and effort of the project's previous coordinator, Robin Riddle, the SPICE staff, and teachers and scholars listed below. Overall production assistance was provided by Dorothy Justen, Matthew Calvert, Amanda Leness, and Allison Keith.

Field-testers for this unit were Tom Frankum, Gunn High School (Palo Alto, CA); Flora Lee Ganzler, Rancho Cotate High School (Sonoma, CA); Dennis Gregg, George Washington High School (San Francisco, CA).

Reviewers for this unit were Bob Benoit, Resources in International Studies Education (Chico, CA); Dave Bernstein, Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control (Stanford, CA); Joline Bettendorf, Teacher Associate, International Security and Arms Control Project (Belmont, CA); Michael Boll, Department of National Security Affairs, Air War College (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL); Matthew Calvert, SPICE; Cathi Chrisco, Thompson Junior High School (Bakersfield, CA); Julie Cummer, California Foreign Language and International Studies Project; Herb Greenberg, North Bay International Studies Project (Santa Rosa, CA); Ron Herring, California International Studies Project (Stanford, CA); David Holloway, Stanford Department of Political Science (Stanford, CA); Anthony Kieffer, SPICE; Steven Lamy, School of International Relations, University of Southern California (Los Angeles, CA); Gregg Lance, SPICE; Jennifer Lee, Global Outlook (Palo Alto, CA); Giselle Martin, SPICE; Sigrid McLaughlin, University of California/Santa Cruz Department of Russian Studies (Santa Cruz, CA); Rex Moseley, Paradise High School (Paradise, CA); Gary Mukai, SPICE; Norman Naimark, Stanford Department of History (Stanford, CA); Lee Torliatt, Piner High School (Santa Rosa, CA); Carlton Hayes Tucker, San Francisco University High School (San Francisco, CA); Nancy van Ravenswaay, Dominican College (San Rafael, CA); Bruce Uhrmacher, SPICE; Judith Wooster, SPICE; Tuckie Yirchott, Bay Area Global Educators Project.

Funding for this unit was provided by the United States Department of Education and the United States Institute for Peace.

The author and the International Security and Arms Control Project are responsible for the final quality of this curriculum.

© SPICE

Credits

The cover was designed by Kelly Niland.

Handouts #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #9, #11, #13, #14, #15, #17, #18, #19, #20, #21, #22 and their answer keys were written by Adrian Chan for the International Security and Arms Control Project.

Handouts #3 and #5 were adapted by Adrian Chan for the International Security and Arms Control Project.

Handout #8 and its answer key were compiled by Adrian Chan for the International Security and Arms Control Project. Cartoons A-E reprinted with permission from Jules Stauber (A); Roland Topor, © Viking Penguin (B); G. Lord, © Newsday, Inc. (C); Ogonek, © Pravda (D); and Krokodil, © Pravda, (E).

The graphs contained in Handout #7 are from *Reluctant Warriors*, by Coit D. Blacker. Copyright 1987. Reprinted with the permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.

Handouts #9 and #11 were developed by Adrian Chan for the International Security and Arms Control Project.

Handout #16 has been reprinted for the International Security and Arms Control Project. (Permission to reprint government documents is not necessary.)

Overheads #1-#6 were and their answer keys were designed by Susan Equitz.

Reference #1 was reprinted with permission for the International Security and Arms Control Project.

Appendices A-E were developed by Robin Riddle and Adrian Chan for the Internation Security and Arms Control Project.

Table Of Contents

Acknowledgements i

Credits ii

Introduction

Introduction 1
Rationale 1
Goals 2
Notes 2
Suggested Sequence of Activities 3
Adaptation 7

Lesson One: The Makings of the Cold War

Lesson Plan 9
Handout #1: *Pre-test: Soviet-American Relations* 19
Handout #2: *The Cold War* 21
Handout #3: *Cold War Ideologies* 29
Handout #3: *Cold War Ideologies: Answer Key* 30
Handout #4: *Glossary* 33
Handout #5: *Evolution Timeline* 37
Handout #6: *The Bipolar World* 45
Handout #7: *The Bomb* 51

Lesson Two: The Arms Buildup

Lesson Plan 59
Handout #8: *Cartoons* 71
Handout #8: *Cartoons: Answer Key* 74
Handout #9: *Nuclear Rocks* 77
Handout #10: *Awakening to Crisis* 79

Lesson Three: Controlling the "Arms Race"

Lesson Plan 87
Handout #11: *Super Rocks* 95
Handout #12: *Events in Arms Control* 97
Handouts #13A-E: *"On the Future of Arms Control"* 99
Handout #14: *Nuclear Test* 105
Handout #15: *Detente* 107

© SPICE

Lesson Four: Detente

Lesson Plan 113
Handout #16: *Basic Principles* 119
Handout #17: *Detente to Distrust* 121

Lesson Five: Contemporary Soviet-American Relations

Lesson Plan 129
Overheads #1-#6 137
Handout #18: *Beyond the Cold War* 145
Handout #19: *Eastern Europe in Transition* 153
Handout #20: *Issues of the Day* 155
Handout #21: *Summit Agenda* 157
Handout #22: *Post-Test* 159
Handout #22: *Post-Test: Answer Key* 161

Reference #1: *"Defining One Another"* 163

Appendices

Appendix A: Related Activities 165
Appendix B: Connections to Social Science Textbooks 179
Appendix C: Connections to California's History/Social Science Framework and Model Curriculum Standards 181
Appendix D: Bibliography 185
Appendix E: Educational Philosophy 193

Topic #5
Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking

Introduction

This twelve-day unit has been designed for use in the social studies classroom for grades 9-12 and community college level. Students first learn about the ideological, political, and military rivalries of the United States and the Soviet Union which marked the Cold War. They are then introduced to the nuclear buildup, and they study its impact on matters of national and international security. Lessons on arms control and detente raise thought-provoking questions on the opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, and shift the focus from military to political issues. The final section on contemporary issues reexamines the foundations of the Soviet-American relationship in light of the momentous events of the late 1980s.

This unit makes use of primary and secondary sources, cartoons, a glossary, timeline, role plays, simulations, pre- and post-tests, and in-class activities for optimal conceptual presentation. An on-going journal based on the timeline asks them to evaluate Soviet-American historical events in terms of national and international security and from different points of views. The pre- and post-tests and the journal can be used by the teacher for evaluation purposes. For the industrious, some optional activities are given in the lesson plans. Other lesson ideas are found in Appendix A.

Though the unit is best presented in its entirety, it has been designed with teachers' time constraints in mind. Thus each lesson may be used separately. If this is the case, use of the accompanying optional activities is recommended.

Rationale

The dramatic changes which took hold of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe beginning in the late 1980s have fueled students' interests in Soviet-American relations. This unit examines the forces which underlie these relations. It proceeds chronologically, each lesson augmenting facts with a selected conceptual theme. *Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking* attempts to supply the mental tools required for both critical historical analysis and conceptual insight. This approach should enable students to understand the many perspectives on the history of Soviet-American relations.

In this unit students learn about the interconnectedness, at times even interdependence, of the United States and the Soviet Union. The two

© SPICE

countries' foreign policies are presented in the framework of the East-West dynamic, beginning with ideologies and moving into the arms buildup. The problems generated by the Cold War confronted both of these postwar superpowers. Whether they decided to approach the solutions antagonistically or cooperatively was usually dependent on their expectations of each other. Since foreign policy decisions are made in consideration of the other side's possible responses, the unit illuminates American and Soviet perceptions of one another, and seeks to explain some causes of their actions.

Goals

In this curriculum unit, students will

- become familiar with the primary ideological, political, economic, and military differences between the United States and the USSR
- examine how the character of Soviet-American relations changed over time
- study the history and impact of ideological and military threats on Soviet-American relations
- study the history of the nuclear arms buildup and arms control
- analyze strategies of deterrence and explore their rationales
- explore conflict and cooperation in their historical and theoretical contexts
- be exposed to the many problems opened up by reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
- develop a sophisticated grasp of cooperation, its strategies and implementation
- apply the historical lessons of the Soviet-American experience to contemporary Soviet-American issues
- engage in interactive classroom activities

Notes

Terms defined in the glossary are italicized the first time they appear in student handouts.

The author has tried his best to cleanse the materials in this unit of obstructive biases. Some will have slipped behind the editorial table. Others are more difficult to eliminate. Where the term "America" is used, it should be understood as the United States of America. There has been no intention to attribute the foreign policies or perceptions of the United States to the other Americas or to Native Americans.

On the whole, the unit gives principal attention to the military and political components of Soviet-American relations. One of its fundamental aims is in fact the differentiation of political and military means of conflict and conflict management. In part because they are dominated by the above characteristics of Soviet-American relations, cultural and economic ties are given less attention; this should be kept in mind.

The interpretations of Soviet-American relations within this unit are unavoidably American in nature. Given obvious space and time constraints, views more common in Europe, the "Third World," and to a great extent the Soviet Union were not presented here. The unit does, however, seek to compensate for its limitations by challenging the student to conceive of and grasp alternative views. The aforementioned shortcoming should be compensated for by the unit's analytical and conceptual depth.

Suggested Sequence Of Activities

Lesson One: The Makings of the Cold War

Preceding Day 1: In class

You may want to give the pre-test before beginning with the first day of Lesson One. To prepare for Day One, you can then assign Handout #2, *The Cold War,* as homework.

Day 1: In class

Class begins with Handout #1, a unit pre-test. After reading Handout #2, *The Cold War,* an introduction to post World War II Soviet-American relations, students are introduced to some characteristics of ideologies. With assistance from the teacher, they analyze the basic components of ideology, give personal examples of ideology, and familiarize themselves with the themes most common in some American and Soviet Cold War ideologies. Each student begins keeping a journal in which he or she writes personal evaluations of selected events in Soviet-American relations.

Day 1: Homework

Handout #4, *Glossary,* and Handout #5, *Evolution Timeline,* provide lists of key terms and events, and should be given to students for their use throughout the entire unit. Students read over Handout #3, *Cold War*

Ideologies, in preparation for Day Two. If you intend to teach Lesson Five, you can make the newspaper article assignment today.

Day 2: In class

Continuing the lesson from Day One, students break ideologies into some of their components and discuss some of the sample ideological statements contained in Handout #3.

An optional activity (Reference #1) engages students in a comparison of several Soviet and American definitions of communism, capitalism, and revolution, and asks them to consider the difference between the correctness of a definition and agreeing with a definition.

Day 2: Homework

Students read Handout #6, *The Bipolar World.*

Day 3: In class

The lesson on the Cold War continues with the discussion of the division of Europe and the emergence of a bipolar world. Discussions familiarize students with concepts of national and international security (and insecurity), national sovereignty, "roll back," and "the inevitability of conflict." Students make their journal entries.

Day 3: Homework

Students read Handout #7, *The Bomb.*

Lesson Two: The Arms Buildup

Day 4: In class

Students are introduced to issues of the nuclear age and the complexity this technology adds to Soviet-American relations. They discuss the transformation of warfare as a result of nuclear weapons. Students then break into groups and begin to study and analyze their assigned cartoon (Handout #8). Students continue their journal entries.

Day 4: No Homework

Day 5: In class

Concepts such as deterrence, mutual-assured destruction, the "arms race," parity, and the obsolescence of war are explored in group cartoon presentations and discussions. A list of questions serves as a guideline for an in-depth discussion of nuclear weapons and deterrence. Students continue their journal entries.

© SPICE

An optional game called Nuclear Rocks (Handout #9) has students construct their own deterrence strategies and test them in an imaginary crisis.

Day 5: Homework

Students read Handout #10, *Awakening to Crisis.*

Lesson Three: Controlling the "Arms Race".

Day 6: In class

Students begin class by organizing a number of components of the arms control process into distinct categories. They then answer open-ended questions asked by the teacher on the rationale and purpose of arms control. At the end of class, students work on their journals. Handout #12, *Events in Arms Control,* lists the most important arms control treaties.

Day 6: Homework

Students look over Handout #12, *Events in Arms Control.*

Day 7: In class

The teacher continues the discussion of arms control by asking three sets of questions. Each set of questions leads to one of the fundamental purposes of arms control. The discussion is preparation for Day Eight's in-class writing exercise, which students will work on for the rest of the day.

Day 7: Homework

Students should think about the columns they will be writing about arms control on Day Eight.

Day 8: In class

In groups of four, students outline an editorial column on *"The Future of Arms Control."* Each group represents the interests of either the US or Soviet military, President/Premier, or the peace movement. Handouts #13A-E, *"On the Future of Arms Control,"* are briefings on arms control written from different points of view. Groups will use both in their editorials. Teachers are encouraged to submit the articles to the school newspaper, and to present them during parent's week. At the end of the class period, students work again on their journals.

Two optional exercises may be used at the end of this lesson: Handout #14, *Nuclear Test,* can be used as a quiz on the achievements of various arms control treaties listed in Handout #12, and Handout #11, *Super Rocks,* offers an arms control variation of Nuclear Rocks.

Day 8: Homework

Students read Handout #15, *Detente.*

Lesson Four: Detente

Day 9: In class

A class discussion first expands students' notions of threat/distrust and security/trust. Students then participate in the "prisoner's dilemma," a short exercise in dis/trust and cooperation. Finally, they apply what they have learned from the activity to Soviet-American relations, using copies of the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972 (Handout #16). Again, students work on their journals.

Day 9: Homework

Students read Handout #17, *Detente to Distrust.*

Lesson Five: Contemporary Soviet-American Relations

Day 10: In class

Students are given a second chance to play the prisoner's dilemma so that they see what lessons they have learned from their first experience. Map overheads are used to show where the United States and the Soviet Union have exercised influence, and where this has erupted into regional conflicts. Students discuss the differences between direct and indirect conflicts, the variety of means used in overseas assistance, and alternatives to covert and overt wars. Students finish their journals.

Day 10: Homework

Students read Handout #18 *Beyond the Cold War.*

Day 11: In class

Students are divided into groups, and each group receives a set of questions related to the transformation of Eastern Europe and Soviet and American responses (Handout #19). They then make in-class presentations on their questions. For the rest of the class, groups prepare for their newspaper article presentations.

Day 11: Homework

Students look over Handout #20, *Issues of the Day,* and spend time at home preparing for their newspaper article presentations.

Day 12: In class

With articles they have been collecting over a period of days, students use classroom time to prepare and present their articles on contemporary Soviet-American relations. Handout #20 provides guidelines which encourage groups to reflect on what they have learned and address specific questions in the presentations. Finally, they are reevaluated with the post-test, which is then graded (Handout #22).

An optional activity has students prioritize what they think is important for the US and the Soviet Union by writing summit agendas for each of these countries (Handout #21).

Adaptation

Appendices A-E will be useful to teachers who want to adapt this curriculum unit. Appendix A supplies a list of related activities for social studies classrooms. Appendix B provides ideas for using this supplementary unit in conjunction with social sciences textbooks. Appendix C demonstrates how this unit supports California's Framework and Model Curriculum Standards for History/Social Science. Appendix D is a bibliography of related classroom and reference materials. Appendix E describes the educational philosophy of the International Security and Arms Control Project.

Each of the five lessons in this unit can be used separately in the classroom. In order to preserve the conceptual continuity of the unit, however, we encourage teachers to use it as a whole.

The Makings of the Cold War

Introduction

In this three-day lesson students study the early Cold War period (1945 to the late 1950s) in Soviet-American relations. To begin the unit, students take the pre-test. On Day One, students discuss US and Soviet political ideological declarations and break them down into some of their basic components, using some familiar examples such as films or ads for assistance. On Day Two students are asked to compare the similarities and differences between US and Soviet political ideologies. Students then consider the military tensions of Cold War Soviet-American relations. Using the history of the Cold War as a background, they also analyze some characteristics of national and international security (Day Three).

One optional activity, a comparison of terminology found in American and Soviet Encyclopedias, is included in the lesson plan (see Day Two).

Objectives

In this lesson, students will

- compare and contrast US and Soviet ideologies
- look for general characteristics of ideology in familiar examples and in US and Soviet policy statements
- explore the basic concepts of national and international security
- discuss the differences in US and Soviet definitions of communism, capitalism, and revolution (optional)
- begin keeping a journal in which they write their thoughts on selected historical events
- begin collecting newspaper and magazine articles about Soviet-American relations

Materials

Make one copy per student of

- Handout #1, *Pre-test*
- Handout #2, *The Cold War*
- Handout #4, *Glossary*

© SPICE

- Handout #5, *Evolution Timeline*

Homework

Make one copy per student of

- Handout #3, *Cold War Ideologies*
- Handout #6, *The Bipolar World*
- Handout #7, *The Bomb*

Procedures: Day 1 or the day preceding Day 1

Pre-test: 10-15 minutes

Note: If you do not intend to teach the whole unit, you might specify the questions students should answer.

1. Distribute Handout #1, *Pre-test*. Ask the students to answer as many questions as they can. Make sure students have written their names on their completed pre-tests and collect them. At the end of the unit students will take a short-answer version of the test.

2. Distribute Handouts #2, *The Cold War*, and Handout #4, *Glossary*, to each student. Handout #2 should be read as homework. Handout #4 provides definitions of terms used throughout the unit. Tell students that the study questions at the end of each homework assignment are intended as guidelines, and do not have to be answered on paper.

Procedures: Day 1

Analysis of Ideology: 30-40 minutes

1. If students have not read Handout #2, *The Cold War*, as homework, allow them the time needed to read it. The handout introduces them to Soviet-American relations during the 1940s and 1950s. The *Glossary* (Handout #4) defines terms used in the handouts and is provided as a reference.

2. Begin the discussion of ideology by reading students the following summary paragraph aloud:

> An ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, and perceptions about the character of someone or something. Ideologies are often shared by a group or society, and can be deeply rooted. They usually cause people to develop a set of views about others which is not based on real experiences or an understanding of other

points of view. Stereotypes, for example, are often obtained from ideologies.

Ask students the following questions:

- Do you think all ideologies are "bad?" Why or why not? (The defense of human rights is not usually considered "bad.")
- Where do our ideologies come from? Who believes them? How are they changed?
- How might books, films, television shows, commercials, and other ads spread or harden ideologies?

Note: To help students think about ideology, you might ask them to name a popular film, TV ad, or even music video which uses ideology. Discuss their reasons for choosing it.

Ask students the following questions:

- Who were the heros in your choice and why?
- Who were the villains and why?
- What did the heroes and villains look like? How did they behave?
- What values did the heroes and villains represent?
- Whose values belonged to your culture?

(War films and dramas often use images of "good" and "bad." Some of these use fictional Soviet-American crises, such as the Soviet invasion of the US in the film *Red Dawn*. See Appendix D for others.)

3. The following are some characteristics of Cold War ideology. Read them aloud to the class or write them on one side of the chalkboard:

   - a "two-camp" or divided view of the world
   - a free world and a totalitarian world, or a free world and an imperialistic world
   - an "us and them" characterization, with "us" in the majority and "them" in the minority

- references to forces of light and dark
- the use of terms like "advanced" and "backward"

First ask students if they can see any of these characteristics in the film, TV ads, music videos, etc., which they discussed. Then ask students to volunteer examples of these characteristics from Handout #2, *The Cold War*. (Possible responses are: The Truman Doctrine, p. 22-23; the phrase "Proletarians of all countries and oppressed nations, unite!" p. 23; the term "iron curtain," p. 26.; the oppositions of East vs. West; freedom vs. enslavement; democracy vs. totalitarianism; imperialism vs. brotherhood, p. 24.)

Journal: 10 minutes

1. Distribute one copy of Handout #5, *Evolution Timeline,* to each student. Allow students time to read the instructions ask any questions they may have. The journal entries themselves should be kept in students' notebooks at the end of each day. Entries for this lesson will be spread over three days. In addition to evaluating each event in terms of national and international security, students should write responses to the brief italicized commentaries which follow some of the events. These commentaries are intended to be thought-provoking, and do not necessarily represent the views of SPICE. As the unit evolves, students should discover that their entries become more complex and detailed. You should evaluate journal entries as you wish.

   - Encourage students to photocopy and paste relevant newspaper articles into their journals.
   - Throughout the unit, you may ask students to volunteer some of their journal entries and articles to the class.

Homework

(In preparation for Lesson Five only)

1. Lesson Five contains an in-class presentation of newspaper and magazine articles on Soviet-American relations. If your plans include teaching this lesson, you can allow the students extra time to collect articles by giving the homework assignment now. Ask students to look for articles in magazines and newspapers at home or in the library on issues related to Soviet-American relations. The articles should focus on issues of military security, arms control, politics—international or national, culture/society, economics, ideology, or history. Articles should contain both American and Soviet points of view.

Procedures: Day 2

Ideology in Soviet-American Relations: 40 minutes

1. Distribute one copy of Handout #3, *Cold War Ideologies*, to each student. While students are reading, write the following headings on the chalkboard:

   AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES SOVIET IDEOLOGIES

2. Divide students into pairs or groups of three or four, and assign each group a statement. Review each of the ideologies in Handout #3 with the class, asking students to describe what they found (words or images) in their statements. Handout #3, Answer Key, contains the sources of the statements in addition to some key terms and phrases. You and your students should find some of the following characteristics:

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES	SOVIET IDEOLOGIES
• accuse the Soviet Union of oppression and human rights violations	• portray capitalist nations as imperialistic and aggressive
• characterize communism as subversive, dangerous, and/or evil	• associate capitalism with exploitation
• describe a world wide struggle between freedom and slavery	• predict the downfall of capitalism and the establishment of international communism

3. Ask the following questions about Handout #3:

   - Why do most of the statements describe a global rivalry?
   - Why is communism perceived as "vast" and "monolithic" in statement #4?
   - Why do Soviet leaders not describe themselves as totalitarian, and why do American leaders not describe themselves as imperialistic?
   - What role does the economy play in this struggle? Was this an American or Soviet view, or both?

- Why is each side afraid that the other side's power is expanding?
- What kinds of events are associated with the expansion of power?
- Are these kinds of struggles actually won?

4. To conclude today's discussion, ask students the following questions:

    - What are some concrete examples of the impact of ideology on Soviet-American relations? (Responses should include: *a)* Create mistrust and antagonism; *b)* provoke hostile reactions; *c)* interfere with communication; *d)* hinder understanding; *e)* create myths, stereotypes, and enemy images.)
    - How might ideologies be useful? (Responses should include: *a)* Ideologies strengthen a nation's will to defend itself and *b)* its national values; *c)* help give societies meaning; *d)* help justify the importance of military defense.)
    - How do ideologies help to build preconceptions? Do these make it easy or difficult to learn about others? (Possible answer: Ideologies work like stereotypes by describing people or countries as if they always behave according to a certain pattern. This can make it difficult for nations and people to learn about each other.)
    - What is the opposite of ideology? (Possible answer: Open-mindedness and willingness to consider and discuss other points of view.)
    - Given what you have learned so far, how do you think ideology affects Soviet-American relations in general?

Journal: 10 minutes

1. Allow students to work on their journals.

Homework

1. Remind students to bring all of their handouts to class tomorrow.
2. Assign Handout #6, *The Bipolar World,* for tomorrow. The study questions do not have to be answered on paper, but are intended to help students think about the issues.

3. For Lesson Five, remind students to collect articles.

Optional

Ideologies and Definitions: 25 minutes

1. Use the definitions on Reference #1, *Defining One Another,* as an overhead, or distribute it as a handout. Ask students to read the definitions in class, and take note of their differences. Using what they have learned in this lesson, they should then try to describe these differences using some general characteristics. Some possible answers are listed below:

Note: The purpose of this exercise is not to draw conclusions, but to make comparisons of definitions and terminology as they are found in an American and a Soviet encyclopedia. It is hoped that this brief exercise will increase the student's grasp of the subtleties of ideology. We are not making generalizations about popular views in the US and USSR.

	US Interpretations	**Soviet Interpretations**
COMMUNISM IS...	organized/disorganized; peaceful/violent; free/controlled; conservative/revolutionary	advanced/backward; disorganized/organized; free/controlled; individualistic/communal
CAPITALISM IS...	marked by wealth/marked by poverty; advanced/backward; highly competitive/tightly regulated	based on private property/ based on communal ownership; exploitative/fair; advanced/backward
REVOLUTION IS...	peaceful/violent; natural/disruptive; desirable/unwanted	backward/progressive; natural/disruptive; desirable/unwanted

Ask students the following questions:

- Who made these definitions?
- How are the definitions different?

- Why are they different?
- Are there some that you agree with? Some that you disagree with? Explain.
- Do you think some are correct?
- What is the difference between agreeing with a definition and declaring it to be correct?

Procedures: Day 3

Strategies of the Cold War: 20 minutes

1. Today's discussion raises questions about national and international security. Students are expected to have read Handout #6, *The Bipolar World.* If they have not yet done so, allow them the time at the beginning of class.

2. Answer any questions students may have about the reading. Ask the following questions on Handout #6, *The Bipolar World*:

    - How are the terms "sphere of influence" and "bipolarism" related to each other? (Answer: In the "bipolar" world, divided between capitalism and communism, the US and the USSR maintained their own "spheres of influence." Within these spheres they normally promoted their own policies without fear of interference from the other side.)

    - What does the phrase "inevitable conflict" mean? Who used it? (Answer: "Inevitable conflict" means that the struggle between capitalist and communist nations is unavoidable. It was first used by Lenin in 1919, and has since been invoked during particularly rough periods in Soviet-American relations. Stalin tended to use the phrase more frequently than his successors, however, for the coming of the nuclear age later altered Soviet interpretations of war. In some versions of "the inevitability of conflict," the struggle between "imperialism" and "communism" implies the rivalry of the US and the USSR, but not *war*.)

    - What kinds of Soviet political, economic, and military strategies might the inevitability of conflict lead to? (Responses should include: A long-term struggle might lead to the Soviet Union's *a)* gradual strengthening of its military power and *b)* political unity with other communist nations; *c)* economic self-sufficiency. Examples might be Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet arms buildup during the early 1950s.)

- What does the term "roll back" mean? Was it used by American or Soviet leaders? (Possible answer: "Roll back" was used by the Eisenhower administration to describe the active containment of the USSR. Its goal was to actively shrink the scope of Soviet influence by pushing it back.)

- What kinds of American political, economic, and military strategies might roll back lead to? (Responses should include: *a)* Military initiatives and *b)* economic and political pressure on countries considering communism. An example might be the movement of UN forces into North Korea.)

National and International Security: 15 minutes

1. Remind students that nations are unlike people, and that their security requirements can be much more complex than those of individuals. Nations conduct many different activities, each of which might interfere with the conduct of other nations—and all of these possible conflicts can threaten national security. At the same time, all nations are endangered when international security is at risk. Ask students the following questions:

   - What is national sovereignty? (Possible answer: National sovereignty is a nation's right to make its own decisions and carry them out without interference from others. Another word for it might be "independence.")

   - What is an alliance? (Possible answer: In many cases a nation will benefit from a military or political alliance, from economic trade, or from a peace treaty even though it might have to give up some independence in exchange for the benefits. Military alliances, for example, can draw nations into war even when they have little interest in being involved.)

   - What are some components that make up "national security?" (Possible answers: Military strength, economic strength, social and cultural well-being, political security.)

   - Are any of these components more important than others, and if so, why? (Possible answer: Many analysts think that military security is the greatest of a nation's concerns, above economic and political security. Others argue that in the nuclear age military security is less important than economic security. A country's economic and political stability may be more important than its military protection from others if there is little danger of war or aggression: for example, countries with dissatisfied citizens but without aggressive neighbors would be more concerned with political and economic stability.)

- What does insecurity mean? (Answers may include: Military threat; political unrest; economic competition; environmental danger.)

- What components make up "international security?" (Possible answers: Many experts agree that the stability of the relations between states is the most important factor in international security. Tension between nations can be reduced through international treaties and agreements, alliances, cooperative ventures, and summit meetings. These agreements often concern "international" dangers, such as the spread of nuclear weapons, threats to the environment, international crime, etc.)

- Of the following events or pronouncements, which might increase national security, and which might increase international security? *Students should realize that there are no clear-cut answers.*

  Arms control treaties; United Nations resolutions; economic boycott of foreign goods; nuclear power plant disaster; an earthquake; an international environmental conference; "spy" satellites; a civil war; testing for a new weapon.

Journal: 15 minutes

1. Ask students to begin today's entries by describing the role one of the following played in the Cold War: alliance; brinkmanship; containment; deterrence; massive retaliation; roll back; summit meeting. Today's entry should finish section one of the journal.

Homework

1. Distribute Handout #7, *The Bomb.* Students are to complete the reading for tomorrow. The study questions do not have to be answered on paper, but are intended to help students think about the issues.

2. Remind students to collect articles.

© SPICE

Pre-Test: Soviet-American Relations

Answer the following questions either true (T) or false (F).

1. ( ) The US and the Soviet Union have similar governments, but different economic systems.

2. ( ) Ever since World War II, Eastern European countries have had capitalist economies, and the Soviet Union has had a centrally-planned economy.

3. ( ) The term "ideology" applies only to revolutionary or un-democratic propaganda used by communist countries to encourage anti-American feelings in other countries.

4. ( ) The US has often intervened in foreign countries in order to support the establishment of western democratic societies.

5. ( ) "Bipolarism" is a term used to describe the rough division of the world by two superpowers into East and West, communism and capitalism.

6. ( ) Both the Soviet Union and the United States belong to separate military alliances.

7. ( ) In August, 1945, the United States detonated its first and second atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing the deaths of approximately 200,000 Japanese.

8. ( ) The "Cold War," in which severe versions of the common cold were infiltrated in the US and the Soviet Union, was the first bacteriological war ever.

9. ( ) The "Cuban missile crisis" of 1962 produced one of the most tense confrontations in the history of Soviet-American relations.

10. ( ) US and Soviet leaders have been meeting regularly for summit conferences and arms control agreements ever since the Second World War.

11. ( ) In several military conflicts the US and the Soviet Union have supported the opposing sides.

12. ( ) "Detente" refers to an increase in tension and hostility between countries.

13. ( ) The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-89 was an important demonstration of change in Soviet foreign policy.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

14. ( ) A Soviet Premier once declared to the US that "we will bury you." An American President has called the Soviet Union an "evil empire."

15. ( ) "Arms control" and "disarmament" have the same meaning.

16. ( ) The INF (Intermediate-range nuclear forces) treaty of 1987 was the first agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to actually cut their arsenals of nuclear missiles.

17. ( ) Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Nikita Khrushchev in 1984.

18. ( ) The United States and the Soviet Union have both vowed never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Answer the following questions based on what you think. These questions will not be scored. Your teacher may ask you to answer them again at the end of the unit. Use an extra sheet of paper if necessary.

"What do you think?"

1. Is the Soviet Union a threat to the United States? Is the United States a threat to the Soviet Union? Explain.

2. Is it necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union to stockpile thousands of nuclear warheads for their national defense? Explain.

3. Is Soviet-American cooperation important? Explain.

4. Are deeply-rooted differences between the United States and the Soviet Union responsible for their historical distrust of each other? Explain.

5. Would you be interested to in living in the Soviet Union for six months if you had the chance? Would you and your friends enjoy being host to Soviet youths? Explain.

The Cold War

The story of the Cold War is a difficult one to tell. Some times it seems as if the Cold War persists only as a bundle of bad feelings or aggressive and mistrustful attitudes, as if breathing life into a ghost. At other times there seems to be a fundamental discomfort belonging to the special relationship shared by the Soviet Union and the United States. This is partly a result of competing values and beliefs, economic structures, and political systems. There are in fact many reasons for the Cold War, as the early postwar period in Soviet-American relations was to be called. When the Second World War finally ended in August, 1945, many unanswered questions remained for the US and the Soviet Union. Although they had been allies during World War II, they quickly discovered that without a common enemy their interactions were becoming tense and difficult. The Cold War was the disruptive beginning of a relationship dominated by suspicion and bitter antagonisms.

Economics and Politics

Some experts argue that the Cold War was a natural outcome of vast differences in the US and Soviet economies, governments, and political systems. Since the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union, or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), has been until very recently the proud home to *communism*, an economic and social system very different from the capitalist system. In line with this one-party system, the Soviet government maintained centralized control of the nation's economy, politics, and military. Economic production and growth were structured in five-year periods and factories and businesses were supposed to produce according to the guidelines of each "five-year plan." The profits earned by producers went to the state, which was then supposed to redistribute them equally among the population. Soviet businesses, unlike those we know, did not pursue "profit."

The United States' economy is called a "free market" system. Known also as capitalism, in this system the competition between producers for the accumulation of profit guides economic production and growth. Producers compete with each other for sales (profits), and the economy is not centrally planned. The government, much like the economy, is built on the principles of pluralism: two major parties and many interest groups compete with each other according to the ways of democracy.

This leads us to the distinction between types of government and economy. Whereas democracies are founded on a political system of two (or more) parties, and election by majority vote, *totalitarian* or authoritarian governments do not allow more than one (the ruling) party. These systems are ideals, and the realities of the American and Soviet governments differ substantially from these ideals. Though "socialist" might have described the

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

Soviet Union better than "communist," both terms are often used interchangeably.

Origins of the Cold War

Even today, historians and political analysts disagree over the causes of the Cold War: some blame it on the basic and essential differences between capitalism and communism, some blame it on the events of the 1940s and 1950s, others prefer to see it as a natural struggle between two powerful nations. It's a good idea to think about Soviet-American relations with these views in mind.

Beginning in 1943, the year Allied forces launched a major attack against German troops in the USSR, British, Soviet, and US leaders began to map out Europe's future. The "Big Three"—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States—were eager to extend their influence into Europe. Under the inspiration of Britain's leader Winston Churchill, they agreed to establish "spheres of influence": Britain and the US would have Greece; the USSR, Romania and Bulgaria; Yugoslavia and Hungary would be shared. At the end of the war two years later, the Soviet Union was in control of Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the eastern zone of Germany. All in all, these countries were home to 100 million people. The US kept its hand in Western Europe, where it actively campaigned against Western European communist parties. Not only the Soviet Union, but also Britain, France, and the United States were anxious to use Germany and its industries for war repayments. In this the East and West agreed; it was the question of how and when the four wartime allies should take money and materials from Germany. And the United States, for its part, believed that Europe should be rebuilt quickly so that it would be able to stand on its own. In other words, Germany would have to be rebuilt while it was paying money to its former enemies (payments continued until 1953). France, Britain, and the US combined their western occupation zones, and the Soviet Union kept its presence in the eastern zone—which contained the occupied city of Berlin. Unable to cooperate over the timing of these war repayments, the Soviet Union and the Western allies went different directions. The Western zones (French, British, and US) kept the free market economies they had before. Countries in the eastern (Soviet) zone adopted centralized communist economies. Berlin was divided into an East and a West. Thereafter, differences between Eastern and Western Europe hindered cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union. The cost of Europe's reconstruction was its division.

Busily trying to figure out how to clean up the political rubble left by the war in Europe, US and Soviet leaders were as yet undecided in their long-term political plans for the future. However, the urgency of European development rushed policymakers. In March, 1947, US President Truman announced a new policy of economic and military support ($400 million) for Greece and Turkey. The policy came to be known as the "Truman Doctrine." Fearing that the Greek government might collapse under pressure from Greek communist rebels, Truman's speech declared a Cold War between "East" and "West," arguing that aid to Greece and Turkey was built on the choice "between alternative ways of life." One of these was the life of "free peoples," the other was that within "totalitarian regimes," and "[t]he ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey."[1] The Truman Doctrine coincided in time with the Marshall Plan, which supplied economic aid to Western Europe.

Some disagreed with the Truman Doctrine, however, and questioned whether or not communism was a real danger in Greece and Turkey. To the Soviet Union it was a political blunder, dividing "Europe into two groups of states . . . creating new difficulties in the relations between them."[2] In the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Soviets also believed they saw America's usual *imperialism*: the United States was asserting its influence in the larger part of Western Europe, directly on the border with Eastern Europe (now that Europe seemed divided).

Whether or not the United States had any right to obstruct the Greek communist movement was also an issue. During the Cold War years, the American public tended to view all communist movements (German, French, Greek, Italian, etc.) as one big communist plot or danger, regardless of their separate identities. With such a stark picture of East and West, and communism and capitalism, however, the Truman Doctrine had little difficulty gathering American public support.

Ideologies

In many respects, ideology was as much a part of the Cold War as actual political events. We can learn a lot about the United States and the Soviet Union and their perceptions of each other from their ideologies. The Soviet Union officially maintained the view that capitalist nations were imperialistic.[3] Communism is founded on the belief that in capitalist societies, workers are exploited by the ruling classes. According to communism, this inequality between the two classes of people generates a class struggle which is ultimately followed by a workers' revolution, (the working class was also known as the proletariat). Though the nineteenth century German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were the first to construct a communist philosophy, twentieth-century Russians such as Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky were the authors of Soviet communism. In Soviet communism, the notion of revolution is borrowed from the class society and applied to the international society of nations: imperialist nations exploiting developing countries are the equivalent of the "ruling class"; weaker or smaller and less-developed countries are the "exploited classes." Out of the slogan, "Proletarians of all countries, unite," came "Proletarians of all countries and oppressed nations, unite!"[4] During the early 1920s, Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin argued that war between capitalism and communism was inevitable. Official Soviet policy later shifted its position to the theory of the "peaceful *coexistence*" of the two systems alongside each other:

> The fundamental and new, the decisive feature, which has affected all the events in the sphere of foreign relations during this period, is the fact that a certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country . . . and the countries of the capitalist world: an equilibrium which has determined the present period of "peaceful coexistence."[5]

Following the Second World War, Soviet foreign policies fluctuated. At times during the Cold War it was unclear whether the "inevitability of conflict" or the "peaceful coexistence" was behind Soviet actions. Perhaps it didn't matter: both Americans and Soviets were responsible for distrustful and sometimes provocative behavior.

At the time of the Cold War, some thinkers in the US were convinced that the USSR would dissolve before it gained enough power to seriously challenge Western nations. Many analysts thought that the USSR was fundamentally unstable because of its notorious violations of human rights, imprisonment of political opponents, and deportations of minorities. George F. Kennan, for example, wrote that Soviet communism "bears within it the seeds of its own decay."[6] Moral opposition to the Soviet Union was firmly established in the United States, too. Yet at the end of the war thousands of Europeans were interested in Soviet communism, especially those who thought that by changing to a communist political system, wars—like the one just finished—could be avoided.

Though the political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States had been present since the Russian Revolution, the post-war years saw these differences reach a new intensity. The ideological conflict was contrasted in phrases such as "East vs. West," "freedom vs. enslavement," "democracy vs. totalitarianism," or "imperialism vs. brotherhood." When the Soviet press used these terms, Western leaders dismissed them as propaganda—used to lower the appeal of the West to the Soviets dissatisfied with the Soviet government. When the US press used the terms, Soviet leaders saw them as examples of American aggression. The two "camps" threw words at each other as if they felt insulted: the USSR was totalitarian and immoral; the US was greedy and imperialistic. Where the United States saw the dangerous and revolutionary expansion of Soviet communism, the Soviet Union saw encirclement by imperialism. Try to imagine what effect this might have had on American and Soviet citizens. Beginning with Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and American economic and political intervention in Western Europe, the see-saw progression of events during the Cold War produced extreme and sometimes ferocious enemy images.

Containment

US foreign policies towards the Soviet Union evolved slowly. In 1947 George F. Kennan, former US diplomat in Moscow, published a now-famous article in *Foreign Affairs*, a respected journal of international relations. He had hoped that it would awaken the US public by revealing what he considered the real character of Soviet intentions. In so doing, he was the first to outline an American strategy of *containment*. Claiming that the Soviet leadership intentionally exaggerated its criticism of the West, he wrote that:

> since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the *Kremlin* springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.[7]

Put more simply, only as defense against an "imperialist West" would the Soviet form of political control be fair in the eyes of the Russian people. This was the way in which Kennan thought the Soviet government used ideology.

Kennan imagined communism as "a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal."[8] And the big, slow-moving river of communism, he argued, had the luxury of time because it was founded on the belief that capitalism would eventually bring about its own ruin. Thus Kennan added:

> its [Soviet communism's] main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power . . . The main thing is that there should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure, towards the desired goal. . . .[9]

Given what he saw as an unwavering source of danger, Kennan saw no alternative to containment: "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."[10] Others in the Truman administration shared this perception. Dean Acheson, who later took Kennan's position, said in 1949 that "you can't argue with a river, it is going to flow. You can dam it up, you can put it to useful purposes, you can deflect it, but you can't argue with it."[11] And Charles Bohlen, another member of the administration, was heard to say that "Stalin believes you have to probe with a bayonet. If you meet mush, you push farther. If you meet steel, you pull back."[12] It is difficult of course to relate real foreign policies to the ideologies which are used to justify them. In this case, American strategists assumed that although the Soviet Union was probably weakened by its internal problems, it was expanding. The United States wanted to contain this growth.

Not everyone agreed with Ambassador Kennan. One reason was that Kennan's analysis suggested high defense spending, which would not have been very popular immediately following the war. Some argued that diplomacy would be more effective, less expensive, and less risky. Walter Lippmann, a journalist, published a series of arguments against Kennan. In 1947, the title of Lippmann's new book launched the term "Cold War" into popular usage. He did not think that long-term military containment was a feasible option: "American military power is peculiarly unsuited to a policy of containment which has to be enforced persistently and patiently for an indefinite period of time."[13] He wrote that

> The policy he [Kennan] recommends is designed to deal effectively with the Soviet Union 'as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.' Do we dare assume, as we enter the arena and get set to run the race, that the Soviet Union will break its leg while the United States grows a pair of wings to speed it on its way?[14]

One fact of the Kennan-Lippmann debate focused on this question of strategy: should the US begin a long-term military strategy which could eventually run into billions of dollars, at the risk that a future President might cut it short? Or should the US treat the USSR as a political partner instead, and try to find other plans of action? Were either or both of these real options? Lippmann had one prediction:

> . . . there are reasons for thinking that the Russians will not be able to maintain the iron curtain[15] and that we cannot construct Western Europe as a containing wall. They are that the vital needs of the people of Europe will prevail: the economic interdependence of western and eastern Europe will compel the nations of the continent to exchange their goods across the military, political and ideological boundary lines which now separate them.[16]

Lippmann was challenging the notion that post-war Europe should remain divided into two spheres of influence, an "East" and a "West." This challenge was backed by his conviction that Europeans shared cultural and economic interests which were of more importance than the military preoccupations which separated them. Though Lippman's ideas were strong, it belonged to the character of the Cold War that America would be concerned primarily with the military and economic security of Western Europe.

The First Crises

The early years of the Cold War were marked by a series of crises. While the US poured money into the economic reconstruction of Western Europe, the Soviet Union consolidated its power in the occupied Eastern European countries. In late June, 1948, the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on all rail, road, and water traffic to West Berlin through East Germany, where Berlin is located. Until the Soviet Union ceased the blockade 324 days later, the US airlifted 1,300 tons of food and supplies daily to West Berlin. That same year the USSR replaced the Czechoslovakian government with one more agreeable to its own. In April of 1949, before the blockade was over, ten Western European nations, Canada, and the US signed and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for their common defense. This alarmed the Soviet Union, whose deep fears of military invasion from the

West stretched back to Russia's memory of the Napoleonic wars in the early 1800s. Later that year the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb, thus ending the United States' "nuclear monopoly." And before the year was over, American fears of communism were jolted by Mao Tse-Tung's successful communist revolution in China. In light of these events, US policy-makers became increasingly committed to the road of containment. Today, some argue that the provocative Berlin blockade rightly contributed to the decision to form NATO, and to finally establish the Federal Republic of Germany. Others argue that the Soviet Union had good reasons to want the US out of Western Europe.

Of course, the Soviet Union too had reasons for doing what it did. The USSR wanted the political conversion of Eastern Europe—whose countries had never before been communist—to go smoothly. It was also thoroughly opposed to the rearmament of Germany, which seemed a possibility. The memories of the Second World War (in which the Soviet Union lost 20 million people) were still very fresh. On the one hand, the mild reaction of the west to Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary reassured Stalin. On the other, the formation of NATO in 1949 was upsetting. How was the USSR to interpret the organization of this new *military pact*? For what reason would the western countries want to encourage military confrontation? Whether or not anybody or any nation was intentionally promoting confrontation is of course a historical matter, and up for debate. The Cold War was an especially rough period in Soviet-American relations, during which it was not at all easy to tell which side was acting and which was reacting.

Vocabulary

bayonet: an edged steel blade with a point, attached to the muzzle of a gun. Allows a gun to be used like a spear.

centralize: to concentrate power or authority in a center or central organization, such as a governing party.

doctrine: a statement of fundamental government policy, in particular of foreign policy.

ideology: a way of thinking that is characteristic of an entire group of individuals.

perceive: to be aware of something, usually with the senses.

pluralism: a state of society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in and development of their traditional culture.

propaganda: a form of ideology generated by a group or government with the aim of convincing others.

unwavering: fixed; not subject to change.

vigilant: watchful, especially for danger.

Study Questions

Think about answers to some of the following questions when you have finished your reading:

1. How would you describe the images Americans and Soviets might have had of each other during the early years of the Cold War?
2. As a Soviet or American, would you have felt secure during this time? Why or why not?

REFERENCES

1. President Truman, 1948, cited in Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, 1982, pp. 64-65.

2. Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, 1947, cited in America, Russia, and the Cold War, Walter LaFeber, 1985, p. 60.

3. According to official Soviet doctrine, capitalism is the "[s]ocial and economic structure based on private property in the means of production and the exploitation of wage labour by capital. Capitalism replaces feudalism and precedes Socialism, the first phase of Communism..." Imperialism is defined as "Monopoly Capitalism; the highest and last stage of Capitalism; the eve of Socialist Revolution." The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd edition, (English translation). Collier MacMillan Publishers Ltd., London, 1976. Vol. 11, p. 99. and ibid., Vol. 10, pp. 162-165.

4. Cited in Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, 1984, p. 19.

5. Joseph Stalin, 1925, cited in ibid., p. 24.

6. American Diplomacy, George F. Kennan, 1984, p. 125.

7. Ibid., p. 112.

8. Ibid., p. 118.

9. Ibid., p. 118.

10. Ibid., pp. 118-119.

11. Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, David S. McLellan, 1976, p. 181.

12. Ibid., p. 53.

13. Walter Lippmann, "The Cold War," in Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1987, p. 874.

14. Ibid., p. 871.

15. The term "iron curtain" was first used by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1947. It was supposed to evoke the image of captivity, in which he thought E. European countries were being held by the Soviet Union.

16. Lippmann, p. 881.

Cold War Ideologies

The following statements were made by political figures of the US and the Soviet Union, mostly during the Cold War. What components of ideology can you find?

1. A policy paper written in 1950 cited this country's "determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper," for "The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."

2. Thus in the course of the further development of international revolution two countries will form on a world scale: A Socialist center, binding to itself the countries that gravitate to Socialism, and a Capitalist center, binding to itself the countries that gravitate to Capitalism. The struggle between these two centers for the possession of the world economy will decide the fate of Capitalism and Communism in the whole world.

3. It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

4. [Communism is] a vast monolithic system which, despite its power, believes that it cannot survive except as it succeeds in progressively destroying human freedom.

5. If Soviet communism is permitted to gobble up other parts of the world one by one, the day will come when the Soviet world will be so powerful that no corner of the world will be safe.

6. In the short time that I live, I would like to see the day when the communist flag flies over the whole world.

7. The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building Communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world Socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation.

8. . . . in what way do the delirious plans for such an 'Americanization' of all countries and continents differ from the mad plans of Hitler and Goering for the Germanization, first of Europe, then of the whole world?

9. The United States is trying to impose on the world community its claims to some exclusiveness and some special mission in history. This alone can explain its imperial claims to zones of vital interests, to the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, to encourage or punish sovereign countries and peoples at Washington's whim.

Handout #3: Answer Key

Cold War Ideologies

The terms and phrases circled have been chosen as examples of, or keys to, the ideologies represented in these statements.

1. A policy paper written in 1950 cited this country's "determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper," for "The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.'"[1]

2. Thus in the course of the further development of international revolution two countries will form on a world scale: A Socialist center, binding to itself the countries that gravitate to Socialism, and a Capitalist center, binding to itself the countries that gravitate to Capitalism. The struggle between these two centers for the possession of the world economy will decide the fate of Capitalism and Communism in the whole world.[2]

3. It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.[3]

4. [Communism is] a vast monolithic system which, despite its power, believes that it cannot survive except as it succeeds in progressively destroying human freedom.[4]

5. If Soviet communism is permitted to gobble up other parts of the world one by one, the day will come when the Soviet world will be so powerful that no corner of the world will be safe.[5]

6. In the short time that I live, I would like to see the day when the communist flag flies over the whole world.[6]

7. The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building Communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world Socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation.[7]

8. . . . in what way do the delirious plans for such an 'Americanization' of all countries and continents differ from the mad plans of Hitler and Goering for the Germanization, first of Europe, then of the whole world?[8]

9. The United States is trying to impose on the world community its claims to some exclusiveness and some special mission in history. This alone can explain its imperial claims to zones of vital interests, to the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, to encourage or punish sovereign countries and peoples at Washington's whim.[9]

REFERENCES

1. NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, Thomas H. Etzhold and John L. Gaddis (eds.), 1978, pp. 386-387.

2. Josef Stalin, 1927, cited in They Mean What They Say, Ian Greig, 1981, p. 19.

3. President Truman, 1947, cited in Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, 1982, pp. 64-65.

4. John Foster Dulles, 1954, cited in ibid., p. 141.

5. John Foster Dulles, 1953, cited in ibid., p. 137.

6. Nikita Khrushchev, cited in The Washington Post, July 5, 1960.

7. Cited in They Mean What They Say, Ian Greig, 1981, p. 18

8. Georgii Malenkov, 1949, cited in ibid., p. 54.

9. Mikhail Gorvachev, cited in Pravda, May 9, 1985.

© *SPICE*

Glossary

alliance: a formal agreement between nations to support, and in the case of military alliances, defend each other. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are both military alliances.

atomic bomb: a bomb which uses radioactive materials to create an enormous explosion, dangerous both for its destructive potential and for its radioactivity. First used by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Japan) in August, 1945. (See also **radiation**.)

bipolar: the term used to describe the division of the world into two different and opposing political and geographic systems or regions (the superpowers; the US and the Soviet Union).

Chernobyl: the Soviet nuclear power plant in Kiev which caught fire and released large amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere in April, 1986, contaminating people, animals, and the environment in the USSR, Scandinavia, and Eastern and Western Europe.

class conflict: an important argument in Communist theory that capitalist societies comprise ruling and working social classes in a constant struggle for power and rulership. According to this theory, working classes (the proletariat) are exploited by the ruling classes.

coexistence: the peaceful but competitive rivalry between two or more social, political, and economic systems in which both systems survive without warring against each other and without necessarily cooperating with each other.

communism: a social theory or stage in economic development in which capitalism is supposedly replaced by communal ownership of factories, industries, etc., and in which there is no governing "state," but the sharing of responsibilities through a single political party.

containment: the (US) military, political, and psychological strategy of halting alleged communist expansion, first applied by the Truman administration during the Cold War period.

conventional forces: all non-nuclear weapons, explosives, and other military forces (including troops).

credibility: believability; plausibility. A credibility gap exists when it is generally believed that a country cannot stand up to its own claims, i.e. is incapable of defending its interests.

cruise missile: a low-flying pilotless airplane propelled by a jet engine that is armed with either a conventional or nuclear warhead. Capable of going undetected by radar. GLCMs (Ground Launched Cruise Missile) were deployed in Western Europe by the US in 1983, and removed beginning in 1988 under the INF

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

treaty. **SLCMs** (Sea Launched Cruise Missiles) are **cruise missiles** designed to be launched from submarines.

delivery vehicle: the part of a missile that contains the rocket or engine, and which propels the warhead to its target.

deploy: to station or position troops or weapons (including missiles) for use.

detente: (also **rapprochement**; pronounced day-**taunt**) the relaxation of tensions between competitive systems, i.e., the US and the USSR, the "East" and the "West." Most of the 1970s and the late 1980s were periods of detente.

deter: the act of convincing others (usually the use of threat or fear) that aggression would not be in their self-interest. Deterrence is usually—but not always—accomplished through military threat.

dissident: in the past, a political opponent, usually a resident and critic of the communist system. Many dissidents became world famous for their outspoken remarks against the Soviet or Eastern European leadership.

first strike: the first use of nuclear weapons in an attack. A country has "first-strike capability" if it can knock out or protect itself from the enemy's nuclear forces completely; because of nuclear submarines and bombers, this is virtually impossible.

ICBM: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. A self-propelled missile launched high into the atmosphere which then falls to its target. Soviet and American ICBMs are different sizes.

imperialism: a broadly-defined notion of imperialism means the influence of "powerful" countries in or on "weaker" countries. More specifically, it is a label often used in communist ideology and doctrine to describe the allegedly aggressive foreign policies of capitalist nations.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF): medium-range missiles deployed in Western and Eastern Europe and the eastern Soviet Union for use within distances of 1,000 - 5,0000 km. These missiles were eliminated by the 1987 INF Treaty. Medium-range missiles do not travel as far as **strategic missiles**.

Kremlin: a Russian citadel (type of castle). Used in the West to identify the Soviet Union's government in Moscow.

launch on warning: the decision to launch a nuclear strike the moment an incoming nuclear attack has been detected by warning systems. Launch on warning means that a country under attack launches its missiles before the attacking missiles hit, at the risk that the warning was incorrect.

Marxism: the political, economic, and social system developed by Karl Marx in the mid 1800s based on socialism.

military pact: less formal and binding than an alliance, a military pact is an agreement between nations to support each other militarily in times of war.

MIRV: Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles. A single warhead capable of reaching a target after being released from its **delivery vehicle**. MIRVed missiles therefore can carry up to fourteen warheads.

moratorium: a temporary halt or pause, as in a nuclear test moratorium.

mutually-assured destruction (MAD): the realization accepted during the 1960s that any nuclear strike would be suicidal because the other side would be able to respond with its own missiles.

MX: a politically controversial **MIRVed** nuclear missile first researched in the 1960s to be deployed in hardened silos so that it would be protected from a foreign nuclear strike. They are the largest and most powerful in US nuclear forces.

national sovereignty: applies to the right of each independent nation to make its own political decisions without interference from others.

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created in April, 1949, by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, joined later by the United States, Greece, Spain, Turkey, and West Germany as a military pact. France withdrew its military membership in 1966.

nuclear: unlike the "atomic" bomb, which was a fission bomb, a nuclear bomb might use fusion or fission. See **atomic bomb**.

on-site inspection: the actual inspection of missile deployment sites, factories, etc., by investigators from one or more countries; the most thorough method of **verification**, and often an obstacle to arms control treaties.

parity: the level of military (conventional or nuclear) forces at which opposing nations possess approximately equal capabilities.

preemptive: initial or first; a preemptive strike is a nuclear strike launched by a country that thinks it must attack or be attacked.

premier: the first in rank; leader. In the Soviet Union, the premier is known also as the general secretary.

proxy: a substitute; used often to define military forces involved in a conflict for another country. The involvement of Cuban troops in Angola led to that war being called a proxy war.

radiation: a sometimes fatal form of energy released by reactions of some of the basic physical elements (such as uranium and plutonium). Radioactivity produced by a nuclear explosion causes radiation poisoning, resulting in nausea, the loss of hair and teeth, and, in severe doses, a slow and painful death. Of the approximately 200,000 who died within five years after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 120,000 died of radiation and burns.

ratification: full governmental acceptance of a treaty. In the US, treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

retaliation: a military, political, or economic blow by a country or individual against aggression by another. It is striking back; a retaliatory strike.

roll back: a doctrine popularized by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of the Eisenhower administration designed to shrink and push back Soviet influence. It was used as a reason for intervention in other countries.

second strike: a military strike fired at an aggressor nation after it has already launched an attack. **Second strike capability** means that enough weapons can survive a first strike that they can be used in **retaliation**. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have second strike capability.

silo: the underground tube-like missile compartment which houses an ICBM and its launching pad. Trident nuclear submarines contain up to 24 silos.

strategic: used to describe a type of weapon (usually missiles) which is capable of reaching long-range targets (more than 5,000 km.). ICBMs are strategic weapons because they can reach the Soviet Union even when fired from the United States and vice-versa.

subversion: the act of undermining and influencing one's own or another's national political affairs with the intention of changing them.

summit: an official meeting between two or more world leaders.

superpower: the label given to the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II, when the two nations were the most "powerful" in the world. West Germany, Western Europe, China, and Japan are considered superpowers by some.

totalitarian: authoritarian; dictatorial. A term used to describe a form of government which is dominated by a single leader or administration, and which grants very few freedoms to its citizens.

verification: the process of determining whether nations are complying with and abiding by the terms of an arms control treaty.

warhead: the part of a missile which contains either nuclear explosives or other damaging materials (such as chemicals or conventional explosives).

Warsaw Pact: created in May, 1955, as a military pact between Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR.

© SPICE

Handout #5

Evolution Timeline

The following chronicle of events should be used in your journal notebook. Find the time period you have just studied, and read the entries. Evaluate the impact each event on the timeline had on American and Soviet national security and international security by writing a (+) or (-) next to the event. Think of it as a barometer reading that rises or falls. V-E Day, May, 1945, for example, was probably (+) for the US, USSR, and international security, since it was the end of the European theater of World War II. Some of the events are followed by a short commentary in italics. Reread them and write a few sentences in your notebook in response. Background information for most of the events is in your handouts.

1945

January	Yalta Conference at which Roosevelt (US), Stalin (USSR), and Churchill (GB) agree that the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan.
April	US President Franklin Roosevelt dies, and Harry Truman becomes President.
May	V-E Day in Europe (end of World War II in Europe), May 7.
July	Talks are held in Potsdam between Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and US President Harry Truman.
August	The United States detonates two of its first atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over 100,000 Japanese are killed instantly. Japan surrenders soon thereafter, thus ending World War II completely. The United States is the only country in the world to possess atomic bombs. *This means that American policies can be backed up with a threat unmatched by any other country. Soviet scientists begin working around the clock to develop their own. Neither side has yet been able to consider the implications of an "arms race." As a Soviet, what advice do you give to your government?*

1947

March	The Truman Doctrine is formulated in a speech before the US Congress for economic aid to Greece and Turkey. In it Truman one-sidedly proclaims that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures" (meaning the USSR). *The President has made a broad and expensive commitment to Western Europe. The "armed minorities" are alleged communists, your allies during the war. As an American, are you behind President Truman? Why or why not?*
June	The Marshall Plan is begun, extending economic assistance to 16 Western European nations. Almost $11 billion is transferred to Western Europe between 1948 and 1950 under this program. *An act of American imperialism or commitment to the people of (Western) Europe? The Marshall Plan is crucial to Western European recovery. At the same time it means the parting of the war-time allies, forcing the*

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

		USSR to increase its influence in Eastern Europe and design its own recovery plan. As a German, how do you feel about European division?
	July	"The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by "Mr. X" (George Kennan), appears in *Foreign Affairs* magazine.
1948		
	February	The Soviet Union quells unrest in Czechoslovakia and imposes communist rule.
	June	The Berlin blockade is imposed by the Soviet Union, and the US reacts with a massive airlift program. *For eleven weary months US forces keep the western zone of occupied Berlin afloat, defying the Soviet attempt to expel western presence in Berlin once and for all. Could the United States be blamed for then taking an interest in forming NATO, perhaps in the fear of future Soviet hostilities? Was then the Soviet Union really trying to anger the West? What would you do if one, just one Western European city were also home to Soviet forces kept there since the "last war?"*

Stop here for Lesson One

1949		
	April	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is created; also known as the Atlantic Pact, it is a military alliance with fourteen Western European members, plus Canada and the US. *The establishment of NATO writes American military commitment to Western Europe into law. But why then form an alliance for the sake of defense, if the Soviet Union is neither economically nor militarily capable of attacking Western Europe—especially when it doesn't have atomic bombs? How is the Soviet Union to interpret NATO's existence so close to its own borders? Should the USSR now create its own alliance? Respond as a Soviet.*
	May	The Berlin Blockade ends without a direct Soviet-American conflict.
	August	The first Soviet atomic bomb is successfully tested.
	October	China takes on communist rulership under Mao Tse-Tung (Zedong). Chiang Kai-shek flees to Formosa to establish the Republic of China (now Taiwan).
1950		
	June	The Korean War begins, in which UN peace-keeping forces (including the US) support South Korea, and China supports North Korea. *In this sometimes forgotten war, the United States loses 54,000 lives. There are three million total casualties. While Americans may question the sanity of worldwide military commitment and the "roll back" strategy, Soviets become nervous at the sudden American presence in their neighborhood. Should they have intervened in the conflict? And the United States? Respond as an American.*
1952		
	November	Dwight Eisenhower enters office as President of the US.
1953		
	March	Josef Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, dies. Nikita Khrushchev emerges as the singular leader in 1955.

	July	A cease-fire is arranged in the Korean War. US forces remain.
	August	The first Soviet thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb is detonated.
1954		
	January	The US declares massive retaliation and brinkmanship strategies.
	January-February	French, British, US, and Soviet delegates meet in Berlin to discuss European security. There are no agreements. The first thermonuclear bomb is detonated by the US.
1955		
	May	West Germany joins NATO. Days later Soviet bloc countries form the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance similar to NATO. *West Germany's entry into NATO is Western Europe's strongest signal that its defense is being taken very seriously. NATO forces will now actually border the Eastern bloc. Politically, it puts an end to any thoughts of reunifying divided Germany, and Soviet leaders now have virtually no choice but to form an Eastern bloc alliance. What would the West have thought of their credibility if they hadn't?*
	July	The Geneva Summit brings together British, French, US, and Soviet leaders. There are no breakthroughs.
1956		
	February	The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convenes, bringing changes in Soviet doctrines and ideology.
	June	President Eisenhower authorizes U-2 spy plane flights over the USSR. *The U-2 flights are flatly provocative spy missions and a careless political risk. They tell the Soviets that they are not trusted by the United States. Eisenhower believes, however, that the U-2 flights are an acceptable means of maintaining national security. How would you treat this situation? Respond as a Soviet.*
	October	The Soviet Union responds to a Hungarian uprising by mobilizing troops and tanks into Hungary.
	November	The Suez Crisis in the Middle East takes place.

Stop here for Lesson Two

1957		
	August	The first Soviet ICBM is tested. *Although only four of these first-generation ICBMs are deployed at first, within several years both the US and the USSR are rapidly developing Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles. American forces soon overtake those of the Soviets, until later when the fear of vulnerability causes each side to build into the thousands of warheads. Should the Soviet Union have foreseen the "arms race" and chosen not to develop the ICBM? Soviets could only expect the United States to develop ICBMs in due time, and could they accept the risk of falling behind? If there is no way to stop this technology, what might slow the "arms race?"*
	October	The Soviet Union launches "Sputnik," the first satellite in earth's orbit. Shocked, Americans accelerate their own space program.
1958		
	November	The US, Britain, and the USSR stop atmospheric nuclear testing temporarily.

Handout #5

1959		
	September	Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev visits the US, meeting with ordinary Americans and political leaders. *A curious American public is fascinated by the sometimes comic presence of this distrusted Soviet leader. For a moment it is easier for Americans to talk and to trust the Soviets. The Soviet leader also seems relieved. Is this for real? Respond as an American.*
1960		
	May	A U-2 spy plane is downed over the USSR and its pilot taken. The "Big Four" summit in Paris collapses and brings no results.
	November	John F. Kennedy is elected US President.
1961		
	April	US-backed Cuban exiles, in a US effort to topple the Cuban leadership, conduct an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba known later as the "Bay of Pigs."
	June	President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev meet in Vienna.
	August	Construction of the Berlin wall by East Germany begins unannounced. The wall separates East and West Berlin, dividing and further damaging East-West German relations. *If East Germany does not built the wall, its economy runs the risk of collapse. The wall is a last resort, but the only one left to stop some people from leaving the East. Why does the United States refuse to accept the wall as a justified solution to East Germany's dilemma? What are your reactions to the wall? Respond as an East German.*
1962		
	October	For thirteen days the Cuban missile crisis dominates world news. *Imagine that you are either President Kennedy or Premier Khrushchev. What are your concerns at the height of the missile crisis? What do you think of a naval blockade of Soviet ships carrying missiles, or of private talks between the two of you for resolution of the tensions? Are your duties to world peace or to the honor of your country?*
1963		
	August	The Limited Test Ban Treaty is signed by the US, Britain, and the USSR. *What makes this treaty possible? What kinds of attitudes are necessary for arms control negotiations to be successful? Would you call this treaty an arms control agreement? Why or why not?*

Stop here for Lesson Three

	August	The US sells four million metric tons of grain to the USSR. *What does it mean for two countries like the US and the Soviet Union to trade with each other? Does trade help to get rid of conflicts between countries? Why or why not? What would you think if another person refused to make a fair trade with you? How many Soviet or Eastern European goods do you have at home? What does this tell you?*
	November	Kennedy is assassinated; Lyndon Johnson becomes US President.
1964		
	October	Soviet Premier Khrushchev loses power and is replaced by Leonid Brezhnev, with Alexei Kosygin as prime minister.

© SPICE

		When a US patrol boat comes under fire in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson authorizes US troops to use force to "prevent any further aggression" in South Vietnam. *Four years later, the US has 500,000 soldiers engaged in war against communist North Vietnam. What reason does the US have for being involved in a country so far from home? What justification is there for the loss of 54,000 American lives? Respond as a South Vietnamese or as an anti-war protester.*
1967		
	June	President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara meet with Kosygin in Glasboro, New Jersey.
1968		
	July	The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is signed by 62 nations world-wide. The treaty controls the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not yet in possession of them.
	August	Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces invade Czechoslovakia in response to anti-Soviet demonstrations. *In 1989 the Soviet Union will declare that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia's reformist uprising was a mistake. But why does the Soviet Union behave differently now? What is Khrushchev afraid might happen?*
	November	Richard Nixon is elected US President.
1969		
	November	US and Soviet delegates meet in Helsinki for the beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), aimed at halting the construction of ICBM silos and placing ceilings on other strategic systems.
1971		
	December	The US, USSR, Britain, and France come to positive agreements over the status of Berlin.
1972		
	February	President Nixon becomes the first US President to visit China, thus beginning official relations with that country. *By initiating ties with the Chinese, the United States is altering the bipolar balance of Soviet-American relations. Why might this be to America's advantage? As an American, what will you say if you are accused of provoking the Soviet Union?*
	May	President Nixon and Soviet Premier Brezhnev sign the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, agreeing also to the ceilings on offensive forces prescribed by SALT I. *The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to keep defensive systems under tight regulation. Why don't they go further and prohibit them completely? Who would argue that defense is better than offense? How would you respond to them?*
	November	SALT II negotiations begin, aiming at more strict limitations of strategic forces than those concluded by SALT I.
1973		
	June	Brezhnev and Nixon meet for a summit in Washington.
1974		
	June	Nixon and Brezhnev hold their last summit.

© SPICE

	August	Nixon resigns from the presidency because of the Watergate scandal, and Gerald Ford becomes US President.
	October	Kissinger and Ford meet with Brezhnev in Vladivostok, the Soviet Union, to discuss the future of SALT II talks.
1975		
	April	US troops are withdrawn from South Vietnam, and the war comes to an end. North and South Vietnam are reunited by the communist forces of the north.
	July	The Helsinki Accords grant recognition to East European borders and begin an on-going European Security Conference. The Helsinki Accords involve 35 European nations, and include the US and the USSR. *Multipolarism is essential to detente. The more voices heard, the less control the superpowers can exercise over Europe. As a small, European country, why is this an important opportunity? What do you have to say to the US or the Soviet Union?* US and Soviet astronauts link capsules in space.

Stop here for Lesson Four

1976		
	March	Soviet-supported forces, including Cuban troops, win in Angola.
	November	Jimmy Carter is elected US President. He begins a campaign supporting political dissidents in the USSR.
1978		
	June	The Soviet government arrests a US businessman, allegedly retaliating for the arrest by the US of two Soviet spies in the US. Soviet-American relations drop to a low point.
1979		
	June	Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT II treaty in Vienna.
	July	The Sandinistas proclaim control of Nicaragua.
	August	A Soviet combat brigade is "discovered" in Cuba.
	December	NATO ministers agree to the "double track" decision, combining deployment with negotiations. Soviet troops enter Afghanistan. President Carter asks the Senate to stop consideration of SALT II. The treaty is not ratified by the US. *Shortly after Soviet troops are sent into the neighboring country of Afghanistan to assist a Soviet-installed government there, President Carter calls off the ratification of SALT II. Are the two linked in any way? When is it correct to use this linkage strategy between two seemingly unrelated issues? Is this something people do to each other also? If so, why?*
1980		
	February	The US government decides that US teams will boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow.
	November	Ronald Reagan is elected US President.
1981		
	October	The Reagan administration announces a $180 billion plan to modernize strategic forces.
	November	Negotiations between the US and USSR over the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) resume.

		The US organizes and funds the Contra rebel group in Nicaragua. *Though it's too early to pass final judgment on the Sandinista government, Nicaraguans were happy to be rid of the old Somoza regime. Now President Reagan want to organize and support Contra rebels to wage guerrilla-style war on the Sandinistas. As a Nicaraguan farmer, what is your reaction to the US?*
	December	Martial (military) law is imposed in Poland. *Do you have any idea what martial law is like? As a Pole, how do you react to 10 pm curfews, to the sight and sound of tanks and soldiers on the streets? How do you react to a government which has installed martial law? Will you join underground organizations or "stay clean"?*
1982		
	November	Brezhnev dies and is succeeded by Yuri Andropov.
1983		
	March	President Reagan announces the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars."
	September	The Soviet airforce shoots down a Korean airliner over sensitive Soviet territory. All passengers and crew are killed.
	November	Soviet negotiators walk out of the INF arms control talks in Geneva to protest the deployment of new US missiles in Europe.
1984		
	May	The USSR announces its decision to boycott the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
	September	Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and President Reagan meet for the first time, to ease Soviet-American tensions.
	February	Andropov dies and is succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko.
1985		
	March	Chernenko dies and is succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev.
	November	Reagan and Gorbachev meet for the first time.
1986		
	January	Gorbachev announces a three-month extension on the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, and proposes that all nuclear weapons be banned by the year 2000.
	April	The US conducts further underground nuclear tests, causing the Soviet Union to end its eight-month moratorium.
	May-April	An explosion at a the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Kiev contaminates a large part of Eastern and Western Europe.
	May	Reagan charges that the Soviet Union has violated SALT II, and hints that the US may do the same by deploying B-52 strategic bombers armed with cruise missiles.
	October	Reagan and Gorbachev meet in Reykjavik and come close to major agreements on arms-control issues. President Reagan rejects Gorbachev's proposed limitations on SDI.
	November	Gorbachev calls US deployment of a B-52 strategic bomber capable of carrying cruise missiles a violation of SALT II and a "major mistake."
1987		
	May	Geneva talks on the reduction of strategic weapons reopened.

Handout #5

	September	The US and Soviet Union tentatively agreed to a worldwide ban on medium-range nuclear missiles.
	December	Reagan and Gorbachev meet in Washington, during the Soviet Premier's first visit to the US. The INF treaty is signed, eliminating an entire category of nuclear missiles.
1988		
	May	Reagan and Gorbachev meet in Moscow, and exchange ratification documents for the INF treaty.
	July	At the 19th All-Union Conference of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow, Gorbachev receives broad support for *perestroika*.
	August	US and Soviet scientists conducted their first joint nuclear test in Nevada to refine verification techniques.
	November	START talks are adjourned in Geneva without major progress. Differences remain on verification and the 1972 ABM Treaty.
	December	The Soviet legislature approves political restructuring and a new national legislature.
1989		
	April	After talks with Poland's ruling communist party, the once-banned Solidarity Movement is legalized. It is announced that Poland will hold its first free elections in 40 years.
	May	Hungary (Eastern Europe) and Austria (Western Europe) begin to take down the barbed wire along their common border. Hungary's leader since 1956, Janos Kadar, is ousted.
	June	Solidarity delivers a humiliating defeat to the Communist Party in the Polish elections. Solidarity takes office in August.
	September	As many as 30,000 East Germans use the newly opened frontier between Hungary and Austria to leave for West Germany.
	October	Anti-communist demonstrations begin in East Germany. The Hungarian communist party changes its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party. Leader of East Germany, Erich Honecker, resigns.
	November	The entire government of East Germany resigns. The new leader, Egon Krenz, fires his Politburo, and then on Nov. 9, opens the East-West border that has been closed to most East Germans since 1961. In Prague, Czechoslovakia, massive demonstrations force the resignation of the Czech leader and his Politburo.
	December	Romanian security forces fire on anti-government protesters, and a wave of violence is unleashed. The Romanian army sides with civilians against the security forces. Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu is captured and executed days later. The disorganized National Salvation Front claims power. *As events unfolded in Eastern Europe, observers from around the world held their breaths waiting for violence. The Romanian people faced their leader and turned the military against him. Imagine yourself as a Romanian: having seen the peaceful revolutions in the rest of Eastern Europe, what is your reaction to Ceausescu's resistance?* The United States conducts an attack General Manuel Noriega's headquarters in Panama, and ultimately arrests Noriega.

© SPICE

The Bipolar World

> "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere . . ." *From a speech delivered by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, March 1946.*

The division and creation of the two Germanies, the establishment of communism in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and in China by Mao Tse-Tung (1949), the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, all contributed to the post-war division of world politics between two "poles." At each pole stood either *superpower* America or superpower Soviet Union, and between them, their expanding "spheres of influence." In the *bipolar* world the US and the Soviet Union (the two poles) competed for greater shares in the political orientations of other countries, hoping to strengthen their positions relative to each other. The sphere of influence associated with each superpower was off limits to interference by the other. These geographic and political zones, however, were not the full extent of superpower interests. Combined with tough Cold War ideology, American containment strategy intensified: one US government document (NSC 68) proclaimed that ". . . a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere."[1] Global declarations, such as the one here that US interests were all-encompassing, were also made in the Soviet Union. Similar to America's "for us or against us" was the Soviet Union's "two-camps." Like his American counterparts, Stalin's chief lieutenant Andrei Zhdanov described the world in terms of:

> two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other.[2]

Bipolarism soon shaped the way political leaders looked at the world. It replaced shades of grey with straight black and white. Foreign policies in the US and Soviet Union, it seemed, were clear-cut issues. In response perhaps to the bleak mood of the Cold War, US containment strategy hardened:

> In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.[3]

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

In Stalin's view the "inevitability of conflict" replaced the notion of "peaceful coexistence":

> It is said that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today in defense of peace and against another world war. That is not true . . . To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.[4]

With the extreme character of these perceptions of the bipolar world, neither side accepted the blame for having started the Cold War, and neither side was willing to risk its safety in the hopes of more pleasant relations. It would be a while before negotiations on any "issues of major importance" could take place.

The Korean War

In June of 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, hoping to reunify the two. This was the year that the NSC 68 government document insisted that the Soviet Union was operating under a design for communist expansion—which the United States was committed to halt. Analysts would later describe US foreign policy in the Far East in terms of falling dominoes: American policy, they wrote, was driven by the fear that the fall of one domino (country) to communism would trigger the fall of others. Whether or not the Soviet Union had this in mind is a difficult question with a complicated answer. The US wasn't waiting to find out, however; it was determined to prop countries up (and keep them up) with economic, political, and even military support. And with the expansion of America's interests (South Korea was not really within the US sphere of influence), there was an increase in the demand for *credibility*. It was not enough for American leaders to say that they would battle communism "anywhere" if they didn't have the means or will to actually do so.

By 1949, 100,000 Koreans had died in the war between rightist and leftist forces. Rightist groups were favored by the US, leftist groups by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union backed North Korea even though it was not on good terms with communist China, a neighbor with interests in North Korea. When US troops joined the "peace-keeping" forces organized by the United Nations (an international organization for the promotion of international cooperation), and China sent its own men to fight the UN *retaliation* in North Korea, the Soviet Union realized that the Korean War kept two of its rivals, China and the US, conveniently occupied with one another.[5] Though North and South Korea were close to the Soviet Union geographically, the USSR chose not to interfere. Nonetheless, American forces aggressively defended South Korea until the truce in 1953. A total of five million lives (54,000 US) had been lost. Ultimately, North and South Korea remained separate, as they had been before the war.

© SPICE

Roll back

The Korean War was not only a serious East-West confrontation, it was also a major shift in US containment strategy. The new containment strategy, exemplified by the crossing of the 38th parallel (the border of North and South Korea), took the initiative against the Soviet Union. (Secretary of State John Foster Dulles justified it by saying that containment was "bound to fail because a purely defensive policy never wins against an aggressive policy." He saw the Soviet Union as an expanding power.) Called *roll back*, aggressive containment strategy was to use "processes short of war" such as "political warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda." Areas in which communism was just becoming popular should be the subject of US containment; communism was to be pushed back and its sphere of influence shrunk. Falling dominoes were to be propped back up. Dulles once compared Soviet communism with the imagery of a giant swallowing up countries and holding their peoples captive. The snag, he suggested of communism, was that "there is such a thing as indigestion. People don't always get stronger by eating more."[6] As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, roll back showed little respect for their sphere of influence.

What then—if these were the new and enriched goals of American containment strategies—were the means with which to achieve them? Dulles thought that the threat of nuclear attack should be employed in the global struggle with communism, and President Eisenhower agreed:

> The free world [must] develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red [Soviet] armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing.[7]

There were two new strategies for this military posture. The first, "massive retaliation," was a threat to use nuclear weapons against an aggressor, even if the aggressor had not already used them. This was supposed to frighten countries (Dulles was thinking of the Soviet Union) from doing anything. Massive retaliation included a second strategy, "brinkmanship," which said that in order to *deter* an opponent, one had to be ready to go even to the brink of nuclear war. Brinkmanship was in fact one of the earliest nuclear strategies, and because nuclear weapons were less expensive than conventional ones, it was backed up by Dulles as "more basic security at less cost."[8] As a political strategy, brinkmanship was consistent with the extremism of containment and the Cold War. As a nuclear strategy, however, it was dangerous and perhaps even provocative.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact

As a result of the bipolarization of Europe, and to a lesser extent, of Asia, the two superpowers cultivated long-term ties to their allies. For both blocs this meant increases in trade, political and cultural exchange, and obviously military protection between partners. American and Soviet influences in other parts of Europe and Asia became widely visible. Some think that this was unavoidable; they argue that even the US had too many cultural, political, and economic interests in common with Europe for it not to have become involved. But others claim that neither the US nor the USSR had the right to intervene in European politics. The superpowers had begun a game of high stakes in which the ordinary citizen had little to say, for or against.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*NATO*) was formed in 1949 for the military protection of Western Europe and the US. In the 1950s, however, it became clear that Western Europe alone could not supply the military strength that experts thought was needed to deter possible Soviet aggression. Again, if the United States wanted to be credible, it was going to have to provide a military guarantee. Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, suggested in 1949 that "Without it [US support] free Europe would split apart," though it is unlikely that Western Europe needed a military *alliance* for protection from Soviet aggression that soon after World War II. Soviet forces, though increasing in size, were poorly equipped and supported. And probably no Soviet citizen had any kind of "Soviet aggression" in mind. Since that time, it has seemed almost natural for most Western Europeans to be allied with the United States. The mood of the Cold War undoubtedly heightened Europeans' (East and West) fears of future confrontation.

The rearmament of Western Europe irritated Soviet leaders. Soviets, and some Europeans too, saw it as an excuse for American intervention in European affairs. One Soviet author complained that "the formation of an American-Western European alliance was proposed in peacetime and at a time when in fact nobody threatened the security of either the United States or Western Europe."[9] The Berlin blockade, you remember, gave Americans and Western Europeans a different impression. The sole comfort for the Soviets lay in the exclusion of West Germany from NATO. When, in 1955, West Germany joined, the USSR responded with the creation of the *Warsaw Pact*—made up of the Soviet Union and seven of its Eastern bloc neighbors. The rearmament of West Germany so closely situated to Soviet territory was unacceptable to Soviet leaders, who just ten years before had lost 20 million lives to Nazi Germany. It was clear that they had taken West Germany's rearmament seriously. Politically, the formation of the two pacts had done little to insure security.

Thaws in the Cold War

The Korean War was brought to a close with a truce in 1953—a draw for "East" and "West" as well as a draw for the North and South. That same year Stalin died, and after a power struggle was replaced by Nikita Khrushchev in 1955. In July of that same year, British, French, US, Soviet, and Chinese representatives met in Geneva, Switzerland, for a *summit* conference. News reports showed the smiling faces of joking leaders—despite the fact that little was accomplished. Discussions failed to arrive at a resolution. Nonetheless, the summit was a break in the weather, a chance for the world leaders to catch their breaths and look ahead before racing blindly onward.

The positive "spirit of Geneva" endured, and the Soviet occupation of Austria was ended with a treaty which declared it a neutral country. Many people attributed the speedy passage of the treaty to the positive trend in Soviet-American relations.

In September, 1959, Soviet *Premier* Nikita Khrushchev appeared in the US for a summit meeting with President Eisenhower. He brought with him his family, friends, famous Soviet scientists, and even a Russian poet. His hope was to learn from the Americans he was to meet, and for them to learn from those who accompanied him. His tour of the US proceeded well, though the President and the Premier were at times naturally uncomfortable with each other. Upon his departure, Khrushchev spoke of President Eisenhower as a man of "wise statesmanship . . . courage and will power," and invited him to the Soviet Union for a summit in 1960. When an American U-2 spy plane was shot down above the Soviet Union in 1960, and President Eisenhower was forced to admit to having authorized the flights, Khrushchev was angered and embarassed at his earlier impressions of Eisenhower. The summit was cancelled, thus cutting short another experiment in cooperation. Friendships were obviously not to be built upon irregular and unpredictable encounters.

Vocabulary

encompass: to enclose or include.

exemplify: to be typical of something; to show or illustrate by example.

leftist: the term used to describe "revolutionary," "radical," or "communist" groups, organizations, and governments. In this case, "leftists" wanted unification of the two Koreas.

rightist: the term used to describe "conservative," "traditional," and sometimes "authoritarian" groups, organizations, or governments. "Rightists" in South Korea were opposed to unification, and in favor of elections in South Korea.

truce: an agreement of peace or a cease-fire acknowledged by the parties involved in a conflict with each other.

Study Questions

1. Why do you think the Soviet-American Cold War became a global Cold War? Try to use what you know about "spheres of influence," "bipolarism," and "superpowers" in your answer.

© SPICE

2. Do you think that the Soviet Union and the United States would have had the same policies and strategies if one of them had not existed? Do you think spheres of influence are possible without enemies? Think of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Berlin Blockade as examples.

REFERENCES

1. "NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, edited by Thomas H. Etzhold and John L. Gaddis, 1978, p. 389.

2. Andrei Zhdanov, September 1947. Quoted in Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 84.

3. "NSC 68...," Etzhold and Gaddis, p. 442.

4. Josef Stalin, 1952, cited in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, David Holloway, 1983, p. 31.

5. British Prime Minister Churchill may have been doing the same in the middle years of World War II, when by delaying an allied attack on Nazi troops in Soviet Union, he allowed Germans and Soviets to "kill each other off."

6. John Foster Dulles, 1953, cited in Strategies of Containment, Gaddis, 1982, p. 155.

7. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," in Life, May 19, 1952, pp. 146-160.

8. John Foster Dulles, 1954, cited in Gaddis, p. 147.

9. A.G. Mileykovsky cited in Expansion and Coexistence, Adam B. Ulam, 1968, p. 428.

© SPICE

The Bomb

The Atomic Bomb

Long before the popular phrase "arms race" was ever used, American scientists at work on the secret "Manhattan Project" in the 1940s were designing a new bomb the country's politicians thought might secure Germany's surrender and end World War II in Europe. On August 6, 1945, after Germany had surrendered, the US Air Force dropped one of its only two *atomic bombs* on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. No one, not even the scientists, was quite sure what to expect. The resulting devastation was horrifying. Sixty thousand people died during and after the blast of this single bomb. Its name was "Little Boy." Up to 120,000 more who survived its searing heat and fire died over the next five years later from *radiation* poisoning or burns. On August 9, the second bomb was detonated over Nagasaki, killing 40,000 instantly. A broken Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's surrender on August 15. World War II was over.

The atomic bomb dropped over Hiroshima matched the explosive power of 14,000 tons of TNT. Experts abbreviate this number as 14 kilotons (kt). A modern-day one megaton (mt) *nuclear warhead* equals one million tons of TNT, or 1,000 kilotons—much more than that used over Hiroshima. One single US Trident submarine, armed with 24 missiles, can deliver eight times the explosive power of the total used in *all* of World War II. The total destruction is so inconceivable that almost all experts have ceased to think of nuclear weapons as instruments of war, preferring to think of them as weapons of threat instead. By this rationale these weapons are to be used not in war-fighting but to insure us against an "all-out" war—in particular, war with the Soviet Union. In order to communicate this idea to other countries, both the US and the Soviet Union, together with their respective allies, have developed military strategies which involve the hypothetical use of nuclear forces.

Because nuclear weapons are not usually considered normal weapons of war, nuclear strategies are termed "deterrence" strategies. Deterrence is a strategy of "non-use,"—the moment nuclear weapons are employed, the strategy has failed. Deterrence is supposed to work by raising the risk of (nuclear) war to such an unacceptably high level that no nation dares to wage it. One could say that there can be no such thing as "nuclear war." Nuclear weapons, though they stand ready for launch at a moment's notice, are developed, purchased, and *deployed* with the intention of never being used. Understanding the evolution of military technology and these nuclear strategies is central to understanding the story of contemporary Soviet-American relations, for each time a technology or strategy changed, Soviet-American relations underwent a change also.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

Handout #7

Nuclear Strategies

During the first years after World War II, the United States was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Although the bomb was originally intended for Berlin, Germany had surrendered before it was ready. Its research and development had been kept secret from the Allies—a fact which made Soviet officials, US allies during World War II, suspicious. In August, 1949, Soviet military scientists successfully tested their first atomic bomb. Although this discouraged the US from founding nuclear strategies on the guarantee that only the US possessed nuclear weapons, American strategists went ahead with nuclear military planning. Both the US and the USSR now had to decide how and when, or if, they planned to use nuclear weapons. Each side had to make its strategies known to the other side, so that the strategies would be effective as deterrents. Through the years nuclear strategies would shift, sometimes as a consequence of technological advances, sometimes with changes in political or economic circumstances. Thus began the "nuclear age."

Massive Retaliation

Soon after news had broken that Soviet scientists had developed an atomic bomb, American scientists launched into work on the "superbomb," an atomic bomb using fusion rather than fission as an explosive mechanism. In the fission bomb, energy is released by the splitting of heavy atomic nuclei. In the fusion, or thermonuclear bomb, energy is released when light atoms combine to form heavier atoms. Known also as the hydrogen bomb, its explosive power was limited only by its physical size. In August, 1953, the Soviet Union's first thermonuclear bomb test yielded 200-400 kts. In October, 1954, the United States' first thermonuclear bomb produced an explosion of 15 megatons. That's one thousand Hiroshimas.

During the early and mid-1950s the Eisenhower administration sought to clarify its nuclear strategy. At that time several kinds of nuclear weapons had been developed by the US and the USSR—from small battlefield (tactical) weapons to large hydrogen bombs to be dropped from long-range bombers. In March, 1955, US President Eisenhower stated, "Where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Early American strategies emphasized the role of nuclear weapons. By contrast, the Soviet Union, still very aware of its vulnerability to invasion, stressed *conventional* strength (battlefield troops and equipment).

Together with their advisers, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, devised a nuclear strategy they called "massive retaliation." It meant simply the threat of large-scale retaliatory nuclear attack in response to enemy aggression. Vice President Nixon was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying that:

> Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive retaliatory power which we could use in our direction against the major source of aggression at times and places that we choose.[1]

The strategy of massive retaliation was also ultimately adopted by the Soviet Union. But the Eisenhower administration fortified its credibility (believability) with the strategy of "brinkmanship." Being prepared to "go to the brink" of nuclear war meant for the US that it could also choose where this brink was. If the strategy were effective, a potential aggressor would restrain itself for the fear of pushing a confrontation over the edge.

> It should not be stated in advance precisely what would be the scope of military action if new aggression occurred . . . That is a matter as to which the aggressor had best remain ignorant. But he can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this respect is ours and not his.[2]

Fear, US leaders thought, would force the Soviet Union to be extremely cautious. In British Prime Minister Churchill's words, peace would be the "sturdy child of terror."

Sputnik: The Soviet Surprise

While thinking about nuclear strategies, you should keep in mind the overall superiority of American technology during this time period. Americans were comfortable with and proud of their greater technological efficiency. Deterrence, however, is built on the mutual (two-sided) threat of nuclear terror. In order for it to work, it is important that the two sides deter each other, in other words, the terror should be in balance. However, Dulles described the early years of the Cold War as an "imbalance" of terror:

> It was the preponderance [better quality and superiority] of US nuclear forces, enhanced by the dynamism of her technology, that would keep the Soviet Union's expansive tendencies in check. The East was considered to have both the manpower and the inclination to make trouble; the West had neither. World peace would not, for this reason, benefit from a balance of terror, for the West did not need to be deterred.[3]

This view of the Cold War was of course one-sided. The Soviet Union did not view itself as the source of expansionist danger, and perceived the imbalance as dangerous. This imbalance might, they feared, encourage the United States to take advantage of its apparent technological edge.

In October, 1957, the Soviet Union startled the US by launching the "Sputnik" satellite into orbit when the United States' space program was still in its infancy. Defense experts recognized the implications at once: sooner or later Soviet researchers would be able to launch nuclear bombs on long-range rockets. Rockets, of course, were much faster and more difficult to defend against than bombers. Because rockets (missiles) could travel so far—from one continent to another—they took the name of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (*ICBMs*). Soviet General Pokrovsky declared in 1956 that "the future . . . belongs to long-range ballistic rockets."[4] They were fast and, once launched, unstoppable. The reaction of the US to the launching of Sputnik demonstrated that an unmatched technological advance for one side could create vulnerabilities and inspire fear in the other(s). During the Kennedy administration, American scientists would catch up to Soviet rocket technology. The superpowers were on the verge of a new stage of the nuclear era.

US and Soviet Deterrence Strategies

In principle there are just two strategies for using nuclear weapons, a first strike and a second strike. The former strategy is a policy of striking first and denying the other side the possibility to retaliate, or strike back. The latter is a strategy which relies on the potential to deliver a retaliatory strike even after the other side has launched its missiles. A second strike might be made *"on warning,"* (the moment an attack had been detected), or after the *first strike* had already hit. (Bombers in the air could deliver the second strike.) Both the US and the USSR strove to keep a second strike capability, and neither side wanted the other to have the power to launch an annihilating first strike. If one side were ever to attain first strike capability, they feared, the other might be tempted to launch a *preemptive* nuclear strike. In a preemptive strike, one side attacks the other before the other has time to respond. This fear of being destroyed before having the chance to strike back was the reason first strike potential was and has remained destabilizing and dangerous.

Flexible Response

When John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, he and his advisers initiated a new approach to nuclear strategy. Aware of the risk of brinkmanship, Kennedy and his administration sought a more flexible defense. The doctrine of massive retaliation had implied that the US would launch a nuclear strike against even small conventional attacks; few people believed that the US would start a nuclear war for this reason. If the Soviet Union too doubted that the US would launch a nuclear attack in response to military action far away, then the threat of massive retaliation remained hollow. Some termed this a *credibility gap*. But the threat of a conventional response—tanks against tanks, fighter planes against fighter planes—would be more convincing. If the US then wanted to, it could threaten to escalate, using first small and then larger nuclear weapons. The strategy of flexible response added to the kinds of military responses the US had to choose from. In other words, the Kennedy administration emphasized the how of military response, less the where and when. Kennedy and his advisers believed that this would lower the risk of nuclear war, and at the same time increase the credibility of American deterrence. In contrast to Eisenhower's administration, Kennedy's believed that increased military spending stimulated the economy, and so military spending on conventional arms increased.

Soviet strategists at first rejected flexible response. The Soviet military was not prepared to spend more on conventional troops—the forces which the Kennedy administration thought were crucial for a flexible response. During the years preceding Kennedy, Khrushchev had been convinced that the next war, if there were one, would be a "rocket war." Soviet strategists were so sure of this that in 1954, Soviet troops conducted a maneuver in which they tested the effects of an atomic explosion during military training exercises. Soviet military thinking had also stressed the importance of surprise. It was believed that the country delivering the first strike would have the advantage in determining the outcome of the war:

> . . . the first massive nuclear blows can to an enormous extent determine the entire subsequent course of the war and result in losses . . . which could place the people and the country in a difficult situation.[5]

In 1960, statements by Khrushchev indicated that Soviet strategists were no longer considering the option of a first-strike:

> The state which suffers the first attack, if, of course, we are speaking of a sufficiently large state, will always have the possibility to give the proper rebuff [retaliation] to the aggressor.[6]

The difference in official nuclear strategies was dangerous. That the two superpowers had accumulated massive arsenals of nuclear weapons and couldn't agree on how to use them was unsettling. Over the course of the next several years, Soviet strategists would continue to formulate plans based on the strategy of massive retaliation, and the US Congress would feed a growing sum of dollars into its military industry to create flexible capabilities.

Second strike strategies of nuclear deterrence rest on the fundamental recognition of a simple reality. We saw that the use of nuclear weapons does not bring any kind of reward if the other side has second-strike capability. In the early 1960s Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara gave a name to this situation: "*mutually-assured destruction*" (MAD). Second strike capability means the assured destruction of both sides; in other words, an attack means suicide.

In spite of their mutually-assured destruction, both the US and the USSR have shared the hope of achieving nuclear superiority. Because of their mutual vulnerability to nuclear devastation, both the US and USSR were naturally motivated by the appeal of superiority. In these early years, for example, this fit with Soviet ideology, which maintained the view of eventual communist victory. At the same time, the United States held a distinct lead—but not superiority—in the "arms race." Until the time when nuclear weapons become obsolete, and are replaced with technology perhaps even more destructive, most experts agree that there is little point in building up nuclear arsenals so that one side has many more weapons than the other:

> Such 'nuclear superiority' as the United States maintains is of little significance, since we do not know how to use it to achieve our national security objectives. In other words, since the Soviet Union has an assured-destruction capability against the United States, 'superior' US nuclear forces are extremely difficult to convert into real political power. The blunt, unavoidable fact is that the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the United States even after absorbing the full weight of a US first strike, and vice versa.[7]

Together with the doctrine of MAD, nuclear weapons have changed the nature of war, for nuclear war cannot be won. Thus nuclear superiority gives only the vague illusion of added security. The damage inflicted by a small number of weapons in response to a first strike is sufficient to result in catastrophe. Ultimately, nations are secure only as long as they do not use their nuclear weapons.

The "Arms Race"

Many people wonder why the world's political leaders didn't simply get together at the very beginning and put an end to the "arms race." Unfortunately, the causes of the nuclear buildup are too complex for such obvious solutions. Technology is a good example. In the military, revolutions in technology have often been at the root of changes in strategy and planning. Sputnik, for example, allowed the Soviet Union to move towards the use of rockets; it also forced the US to make new plans. Another shift came in the US, almost ten years after Sputnik. US experts successfully pioneered a way of placing more than one warhead on certain kinds of missiles. (Warheads carry the explosive device; missiles propel the warhead towards its target.) Each of these warheads—three in the American Minuteman III, ten in the *MX*, and twelve in the Trident II—can be targeted independently. Called "Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles," *MIRVed* warheads have become extremely accurate. (An accurate warhead could conceivably destroy a missile even in a protected *silo*, thus making the opponent's ICBM forces vulnerable.) Because of their larger number of accurate warheads, MIRVed missiles ultimately challenged nuclear strategies by decreasing the likelihood of missiles on the ground surviving an attack.

Without knowing if there was any point in achieving superiority, the US and USSR drove the "arms race" forward in the fear that either one of them might "get ahead." In order to minimize vulnerability to a possible first strike, the United States deployed its nuclear forces on submarines and bombers in addition to land-based missiles. These three forms of deployment are known as the "Triad." Meanwhile, Soviet warheads were based primarily on land. These Soviet ICBMs were generally much larger (though less accurate, and not MIRVed) than American ICBMs. The US has generally smaller "MIRVed" missiles, and altogether many more warheads than the USSR. Soviet ICBMs, on the other hand, are usually larger and also have more explosive power. In addition to these *strategic* missiles, it must be added, both countries deployed smaller missiles with shorter ranges in Western and Eastern Europe. In contrast to strategic missiles, these are "tactical," that is, they mostly would have been launched from one European country against another. Some are even designed as battlefield nuclear weapons, to be employed almost like traditional artillery—fired from tanks, bazookas, mortars, or hidden in the ground as mines. Their explosions are small, but the thought that NATO alone has some several thousand tactical nuclear weapons to be used mostly on West German soil haunts many Germans. (Some short-range missiles were also deployed in Asia.)

The Nuclear Balance

By the early 1970s the USSR had built a nuclear arsenal equal to that of the US. The Vietnam War, in which the US was involved from roughly 1965-1975, forced US President Nixon (1968-1974) to reduce the rest of the overall military budget beginning in the late 1960s (before the conclusion of the Vietnam War). Meanwhile the Soviet Union pursued a nuclear buildup aimed at establishing military *parity* between the Soviet Union and the United States. Where US ground troops in Europe were cut by 207,000 between 1970 and 1977, Soviet troops increased by 262,000. Having also designed a new bomber and other strategic weapons, the Soviet Union finally considered itself in a position of equality. The charts below show one comparison of US and Soviet ICBM arsenals. Here the Soviet Union is portrayed as having a general superiority over the US. However, another comparison might show the total number of warheads on sea-based weapons, where the number possessed by the United States exceeds that of the USSR.

Figure 2-2
U.S. and Soviet ICBM Launcher Deployment and Warhead Totals, 1969–1985



Source: Both Figures 2-1 and 2-2 were adapted from Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1985* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985)

Figure 2-3 / Comparison of Superpower Nuclear Weapon Systems in 1986



8

Can there be an end to the arms race? Many observers, concerned that the superiority of one side or the other could tip the balance and create an unstable and dangerous situation, hope for political solutions to the arms race. But some the question is whether or not nuclear arms are actually necessary for national defense, and whether they are necessary enough to make up for the danger they pose to world peace. And what is stopping the further development of highly-advanced technology? Here the question centers on the tension between national and international security. If deterrence has indeed kept war at bay, it has done so at some cost to trust and friendship. The economic impact of pursuing the arms buildup has also been enormous for all of the countries involved. Thus for many, the kind of deterrence a nation should pursue remains an open question.

Vocabulary

arsenal: a collection of weapons; an establishment for the manufacture or storage of arms and military equipment.

doctrine: a statement of fundamental government policy, especially in international relations.

threshold: a boundary or limit.

vulnerable: in terms of a weapon, capable of being damaged or made ineffective.

Study Question

1. One analyst has compared nuclear deterrence to a tribal war in which both tribes have poisoned darts. In the time that it takes one tribesman to kill another with a poisoned dart, his opponent has enough time to strike back before dying. The result is that only the avoidance of poisoned darts avoids mutual suicide. What would you do if you were a tribesman, and both you and your enemies had these poisoned darts?

REFERENCES

1. The New York Times, 14 March, 1954, cited in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman, 1981, p. 86.

2. John Foster Dulles in "Foreign Affairs," April, 1954. Cited in Freedman, p. 86.

3. Ibid., p. 125.

4. Cited in ibid., p. 151.

5. Marshal Malinovsky, Oct 61, 22nd Party Congress, cited in ibid., p.266.

6. Nikita Khrushchev in Pravda, January 15, 1960. Cited in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, David Holloway, 1983, p. 38.

7. A. Enthoven and W. Smith, cited in Freedman, p. 360.

8. From Reluctant Warriors by Coit D. Blacker. Copyright 1987. Reprinted with the permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.

The Arms Buildup

Introduction

In this lesson students learn concepts of nuclear deterrence through the analysis of cartoons. Beginning with questions concerning the impact of the nuclear age on the methods and purposes of warfare, students think about the possible consequences of nuclear conflict. The teacher then asks further questions which direct students to consider the complexity of Soviet-American relations in the nuclear age. In this fashion students think about the state of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. This establishes the context for the future study of Soviet-American relations, while at the same time encouraging students to think critically and analytically about nuclear arms.

One optional activity is contained in the lesson plan. Called nuclear rocks, the game forces students into a crisis situation in which one aggressive move could may end the fun for everybody (see Day Five).

Objectives

In this lesson, students will

- realize that nuclear weapons are different from any other by discussing their implications for warfare
- work in groups to analyze and discuss political cartoons
- study strategies and elements of deterrence
- discuss the impact of nuclear weapons and deterrence on conflict and on Soviet-American relations
- break into groups to choose their own strategies of deterrence and diplomacy in a game called *nuclear rocks* (optional)

Materials

- Handout #4, *Glossary*
- Handout #5, *Evolution Timeline*
- Handout #7, *The Bomb*

Make one copy per student of

- Handout #8, *Cartoons*
- Handout #9, *Nuclear Rocks,* as a handout or overhead (optional)

© SPICE

- overhead projector (optional)

Homework

- make one copy per student of Handout #10, *Awakening to Crisis* (for Day Six)

Procedures: Day 4

Ideology Review: 10 minutes

1. Briefly review Soviet and American ideologies to make sure that students understand the ideological character of the Cold War. You may want to use the following questions:

   - What was containment? Why did American strategists think that containment was necessary? (Refer to Lesson One for American views of the USSR during the Cold War.)

   - Which Cold War events do you associate with containment? (Possible responses: the Korean War; the Truman Doctrine; the Marshall Plan; the formation of NATO; the Berlin airlift; the use of U-2 spy planes.)

   - How would you characterize Soviet ideology? What views of the United States did it include? (Refer to Lesson One for Soviet views of the US during the Cold War.)

   - What Cold War events do you associate with this ideology? (Possible responses: intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; the Berlin blockade; the formation of the Warsaw Pact; the U-2 incident.)

(Nuclear) War: 10-15 minutes

1. To prepare for the cartoon exercise on nuclear weapons, review the concept of war by reading the following passage to the class:

> In military thought there are distinctions made between different kinds of war. A *conventional* war is fought with conventional and not nuclear weapons. Examples of conventional forces include tanks, bombers, guns, and troops. In the case that a conventional war escalates into a nuclear war, small *tactical* nuclear weapons such as nuclear mines and artillery shells might be used. These have a short range, and are intended for use on the battlefield, though such a battle has never been fought. According to one strategy, a *limited* nuclear war might involve even larger nuclear forces, using, for example, submarines and bombers armed with nuclear missiles

© SPICE

or bombs. An *unlimited* nuclear war would probably include the launching of *intercontinental* ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These are the strategic forces fired from one continent to another, or launched by submarines or bombers from a distance of 4,000 miles or more. Some of these have 1,000 times the explosive power that was used over Hiroshima. Most experts agree that there is virtually no possibility that you and I would survive an unlimited nuclear war.

Ask students the following questions:

- What are the usual purposes of war?
- How do weapons help to attain these goals?
- Do you think nuclear weapons are any different from conventional weapons? Could nuclear weapons also be used to attain the goals of warfare? Why or why not?
- Do you think there would be many survivors of a nuclear war? Do you think there could be such a thing as a "limited nuclear war?"
- Think about the term "nuclear war." Some people say it is misleading because nuclear weapons and war do not fit together. Instead, they might say "nuclear holocaust" is more accurate. Why might they argue this? (Possible answer: In the case that nuclear war brings total destruction to everyone involved, there can be no victor or victory. Without victory, there is little purpose for war. Conflicts which do not have to lead to war could be solved in other ways.)

Nuclear Weapons in Cartoons: 15-20 minutes

1. Divide the class into groups of four, and distribute one copy of Handout #8, *Cartoons,* to each student. Assign one cartoon to each group—cartoons may be assigned to more than one group. Read aloud from the instructions at the top of the handout, and allow a few minutes for students to discuss and analyze their cartoons in their groups.

   The answer key to Handout #8 provides some possible descriptions of each cartoon and what it represents. Since the cartoon activity below uses open-ended questions which are not answered in the lesson plan, the answer key has been provided as a resource. You may want to analyze one cartoon with the class before dividing them into groups.

Journal: 5-10 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have before. Entries for this lesson will be spread over two days.

No Homework

Procedures: Day 5

Nuclear Weapons and Soviet-American Relations: 50 minutes

Note: Each cartoon will be discussed in one or more contexts to allow students to compare and contrast different aspects of each cartoon. Assure the groups that they will all have an opportunity to discuss their cartoon. There are two sets of questions.

1. Tell students that they are now going to think about nuclear weapons in the context of Soviet-American relations. The cartoons represent the interpretations of the cartoonists, two of whom are Soviet.

   The following questions about deterrence and nuclear war are for the whole class. Before asking them the following questions, invite the students in each group to contribute their observations and interpretations of the assigned cartoon:

   Cartoon A

   - What does this cartoon say about war? What is about to happen?
   - Why might a cartoonist have depicted nuclear war in this way?
   - What does the cartoon say about deterrence? Is it a comfortable and safe position for people to be in?
   - Are the two people in a state of independence or dependence? Explain.

   Cartoon B

   - How does this cartoon portray deterrence?
   - Do you think the inhabitants of this street feel threatened or protected? Why?
   - Does either side appear to have second-strike capability?

- What would be the temptation in this situation—what does each side fear the most? (Answer: Each side fears a surprise first strike.)
- Why might the people who live on this street not want to start a war?
- What would be the results of an attack by either side?
- Would this street be safer if only one side or both sides had weapons of cannons?
- Would you answer differently if they had nuclear weapons instead?
- Do you have any suggestions for what the inhabitants of this street should do? Do you live on this street?

Cartoon C

- Does either gunfighter appear to have a second-strike capability?
- How would you know?
- What would be the temptation in this situation—what does each gunfighter fear the most? (Answer: Each gunfighter is afraid that the other will shoot first.)

Cartoon D

- Why is the "Soviet threat" portrayed as supporting NATO?
- What would happen to NATO if it were not supported by the Soviet threat? What is the cartoonist trying to say here?
- As a Soviet cartoon, are the views presented here different from those popular in the West?

Cartoon E

- Why is the weapon chained up?
- Who might be cutting the chain?
- Can the bomb see where it is going?
- Does the bomb care where it is going?

- What is in danger of happening?
- Is the bomb responsible for its capabilities? If not, who is?

2. Students should be aware that our views of various situations are strongly influenced by past experiences. Our impression of the aggression a potential opponent is capable of and willing to carry out depends in part on what has happened in the past. These experiences play a large part in how we view rivals and in what we think they are capable of and willing to do. Read the following passage aloud, and then ask students the questions given below:

   > In order to deter a possible aggressor, a country must possess both the *capability* and the *intention* (or appearance of the intention) to defend itself. The potential aggressor must *fear* that the defending country has the power to strike back and the will to do so also. Canada, for example, does not feel threatened militarily by the United States. Why? In spite of America's military defense (its *capability*), it does not seem to have any *intention* of being aggressive towards Canada.

   Ask the following questions:

   - Does Canada *know* or *assume* that the United States has no intention of attacking it?
   - Why does a police officer bearing a gun not threaten the ordinary passerby, even though he is armed?
   - Why does a bank robber brandishing a toy pistol sometimes receive his demands?

3. Involved in the mechanism of deterrence are the perceptions of the person or country being deterred. Explain this by first reading the following passage aloud. Then apply these ideas to Soviet-American relations by asking some of the questions below.

   > Deterrence is not based on full knowledge of a threat, but on *perceptions* and *beliefs* of a threat. Countries cannot know what each other's intentions are. Sometimes they know what each other's capabilities are. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union developed perceptions and beliefs about each other which led them to *believe* that they had to deter each other from aggression.

© SPICE

Ask the following questions:

- During the Cold War, did the United States *know* or *assume* that the Soviet Union had an intention of being aggressive towards it? Explain.

- Discuss some of the Cold War events with which students are familiar to demonstrate how historical experiences influenced these assumptions.

- During the Cold War, did the Soviet Union *know* or *assume* that the United States had an intention of being aggressive towards it? Explain.

- Discuss some of the Cold War events with which students are familiar to demonstrate how historical experiences influenced these assumptions.

Use the following cartoons to illustrate the above points:

Cartoon A

- What assumptions do you see in cartoon A? Are they correct or false?

Cartoon B

- What do you think the residents of this street have to assume about each other?

- What are those assumptions based on?

- Is there any likelihood that the *people* living here could interact with each other less threateningly than the situation portrayed in the cartoon? If they did, what might that do to their credibility, to the way the two sides perceive each other?

Cartoon C

- Explain your interpretations of the intentions and capabilities of each gunfighter.

- Do the gunfighters need as many guns as they have? Why or why not?

- What do you think the cartoonist is trying to say? How would you relate this to what you read about the arms buildup between the US and the Soviet Union?

- What do you think would happen if one of the gunfighters got another gun? What would happen if one of the gunfighters got a bullet-proof vest?
- Why, if both gunfighters are proclaiming their commitment to parity (and not superiority), do they have so many guns?
- Do these gunfighters believe each other? Do they believe themselves?
- Will one of the gunfighters be more vulnerable if he has fewer guns than the other? Will his defense seem less credible?

Cartoon D

- Does NATO appear to know what it is being supported by?
- What is the Soviet perception of NATO? And of itself?
- Of the military threats, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which appears more threatening? How did the artist use black and white to convey his interpretation?

Cartoon E

- Who are the enemies in this image?
- Why might the cartoonist have chosen not to show any conflicts?

4. Summarize by raising these issues of national and international security:

   - How do cartoons A and B portray the difference between national and international security? (Possible answer: Both of them make little distinction between national and international security. They depict war and nuclear weapons as a threat to both, and not as a means to gain security. In cartoon B, the proximity of the two sides to each other suggests that the only security they have is the one that they share.)
   - In the cartoons that you have analyzed, how has nuclear deterrence complicated the relationship between national and international security? (Possible answer: Deterrence is portrayed in cartoons A, B, and C as either discouraging friendship or even playing a role in aggressiveness. A country may believe it is secure because of its military

might, but the loss is on the international level, where nuclear weapons endanger the rest of the world.)

- How do you think nuclear weapons might influence American and Soviet perceptions of each other? (Possible answer: Nuclear weapons contribute to the distrust in the Soviet-American relationship. At any time they could produce mortal blows to each side.)
- Do these cartoons give you the impression that it is world leaders, their countries, or nuclear weapons themselves that are dangerous? (Possible answer: This varies from cartoon to cartoon, but we might say that the themes are: (A) leader, nuclear weapons; (B) countries; (C) leaders; (D) perceptions, alliances; (E) nuclear weapons.)

Journal: 10 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have before. Today's entries should finish section two.

Homework

1. Distribute Handout #10 for Day Six.

Optional

Nuclear Rocks: 50 minutes

1. In this activity students are policy-makers for either the United States or the Soviet Union. Without knowing what the other side is doing, each player (or team) must choose from three possible strategies of crisis management; strategies may be anything from conciliatory to warlike. The two sides go through a mock crisis together in six rounds, each time playing one of the three strategies they have chosen for that round. Budgets which are given in the instructions limit their options. *Complete instructions are provided in Handout #9.*

   Students will want to guess the capabilities and intentions of the other partner or team—whether they will declare war, cut ties, or act diplomatically. Based on their guesses, each side "invests" in rocks (*war*), scissors (*cutting ties*), or paper (*diplomacy*). During each of the six rounds of the game, the players (either two partners or two teams) face their strategies off against each other. *Three losses in a row bring defeat to a player.* The game is similar to "Rocks-scissors-paper" with the twist that rocks defeat paper. The game should be played three times (eighteen rounds total), and *money saved from one game can be spent in the next.*

- Rocks = Nuclear War
- Paper = Diplomacy
- Scissors = Isolationism/withdrawal

- Two rocks played by teams at the same time bring about the end of the game (both sides lose).

- Two papers played at the same time and twice in a row resolve the conflict.

This activity is intended to help students understand the difficulties involved in managing a crisis in a situation of uncertainty. Students will be required to weigh the risks and opportunities of diplomacy, war, and isolation (or appeasement). This is not a "zero-sum" game: like the real world, both sides can simultaneously win—or lose.

2. The aim of this exercise is to foster an interest in the process of arms control. Different ways in which this game can be played will produce different results. Read and try these variations:

   - Allow students to change their strategies after every six rounds. How do students play differently?

   - Mix the players into male-male, female-female, and male-female pairs. What are the outcomes?

   - Increase the budget of one of the players by 30, so that he/she can afford one more nuclear rock. How does this change the shape of the game? Do students think it is fair if one country is "richer?" Do they think it is more or less realistic for one player to have a greater budget? Were the nuclear rocks used?

Instructions

1. Distribute Handout #9, *Nuclear Rocks*, to each student, or place it on an overhead projector. Allow students 15 minutes to read the instructions and play the first round of the game either as partners (one-on-one) or teams. You might try a practice round.

2. After the first real round of the game, introduce students to the "logic" of deterrence by asking the following questions:

   - How many of you bought three rocks? Two? One?

   - Why did you buy them? Were you interested in winning, or were there other reasons for buying them?

- How many of you were afraid to use your rock(s) because you thought the other side might use one at the same time?
- Did one or both partners (or teams) think that rocks should not be used?
- Did any of you want to use one or more rocks to prove that you had them and that you were willing to use them?

3. Conduct the game a second time to see if students change their strategies. Partners or teams *must* remain the same as before.

   - How many of you started—in round one—with paper (diplomacy)? With rocks (war)? With scissors (isolationism)? Why?
   - How many of you resorted to rocks after one loss? After two losses? (Tell those who had rocks but were still defeated that they were especially forgiving.)
   - How many of you bought one or two rocks? If you knew that one or two were not enough to defeat the other side, what were your reasons for buying them? Were you thinking about retaliation? If so, why?
   - How many of you did not have any rocks? Paper? Scissors? Why?

4. Conduct the game the third and last time. This time ask the teams to declare their strategies aloud to each other. Read these guidelines to the class:

   Your strategy can be real, or a ploy. There is no way of telling which it is. It may include any of the following:

   - whether you would rather use paper, rocks, or scissors
   - whether you will use rocks after one, two, three or more losses, or never
   - whether you will be the first to use rocks

   Repeat the questions used after game two (see previous page, #3.) Did students learn from previous rounds of the game?

5. Ask students what they learned from the game. Was it difficult to come to a group decision on the best strategies? Was there any interest in actually winning the game, or were players interested in surviving. Were they interested in negotiating?

Cartoons

All of the following cartoons portray one or more concepts related to deterrence strategies, the arms buildup, or national and international security. Once the teacher has assigned one cartoon to your group, you should try to list as many of these concepts as you can. Some of the concepts you will find are: first strike, second strike, mutual-assured destruction, parity, overkill, "arms race," and superiority. Think about the way in which the cartoonist has portrayed these.

A.



B.



C.


I'M A PEACE-LOVING MAN! I JUST WEAR THESE [illegible]S FOR PARITY.
©1982 NEWSDAY
LORD

D.


„СОВЕТСКАЯ УГРОЗА"
NATO

"The Soviet Threat"

E.



Рисунок А. КРЫЛОВА

Cartoon A © Jules Stauber, reprinted with permission of Jules Stauber. *Cartoon B* from WAR HEADS by Steven Heller and the Nuclear Freeze Campaign. Copyright © 1983 by American Friends Service Committee, Inc–The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of Viking Penguin, a division of Penguin Books USA, Inc. *Cartoon C* reprinted with permission, © 1981, Newsday, Inc. *Cartoon D* reprinted with permission, Ogonek, 1979, © Pravda. *Cartoon E* reprinted with permission, Krokodil, 1981, © Pravda.

Note: The teacher might want to read these analyses while preparing for class. Following each of the descriptions are a few of the key concepts depicted in the cartoons.

Cartoon A:

Cartoon A can easily be associated with the doctrine of mutual-assured destruction. The globe signifies the world; the single string from which both of the figures are hanging signifies their dependence on each other. Despite any distaste the two characters may have for each other, neither of them is able to let go, move, or get rid of the other without committing suicide: they depend on each other for their security. This is exactly what is occurring in the cartoon—if the thread is cut or one of the partners lets go, both of them fall—there will be no victors.

Concepts: MAD; international vs. national security

Cartoon B:

In cartoon B a similar situation is depicted. The street is empty of life in the fear of an attack by one of the two sides. No one would presumably want to start a war on this street because both sides are equally armed and the war would result in disaster for both sides. In this cartoon the assurance of mutual destruction and retaliation is a little more complicated than it is in cartoon A. If the attack by one side were well enough coordinated, the other side of the street might be effectively demolished. The aggressor would have nothing to capture or claim, however. As with "scorched earth" tactics (used for example by Soviets during the second World War), the victor is denied the spoils of war. At this point the logic associated with war and victory disappears. If the two sides were armed with nuclear weapons, an attack by either of the sides would be suicidal because of the explosive power. This might remind students of the theory of "nuclear winter."

Concepts: deterrence; first-strike; threat and fear

Cartoon C:

Cartoon C pokes fun at the "arms race" and overkill. Neither of the two men shown here as Soviet and US leaders (Brezhnev and Reagan) actually need so many pistols for their self-defense. One shot would probably be adequate—the remainder of the guns would go unused. Yet both of the men here seem compelled to accumulate pistols in order not to fall behind the other (parity). One interpretation would be that the "arms race" is an action-reaction dynamic, in which **both** sides play never-ending catch up—"catch up" being driven by the need to appear credible. As with cartoon B, there is a temptation to shoot first.

Concepts: parity; arms buildup; overkill

© SPICE

Cartoon D:

Cartoon D is a mockery of NATO from the Soviet perspective. The ridiculously harmless duck from which NATO is suspended—upon which NATO depends—poses absolutely no threat. It is a patchwork creature without a real pair of wings. But as long as NATO appears determined to continue with its mission, it will probably not recognize the Soviet threat for what it really is. As usual, NATO is militaristic when set next to the Soviet Union.

Concepts: threats and assumptions; militarism

Cartoon E:

Cartoon E zooms in on the nuclear bomb as it is about to break free and perhaps go out of control. There is no telling what may happen when it escapes from the cartoon frame—that is an open question. The bomb is blind to its fate. An unidentifiable hand is about to cut the chain which safeguards the bomb from its own destructive power. The Soviet cartoonist may be asking us who will stop the bomb, and who is cutting the chain.

Concepts: Arms race; nuclear danger

Nuclear Rocks: A Game

Imagine that you are a policy-maker for either the United States or the Soviet Union. You are responsible for choosing from three basic foreign-policy strategies which you think should be followed in six steps during a crisis. These strategies are (1) nuclear attack (*rocks*), (2) negotiation (*paper*), and (3) isolationism (*scissors*—cutting ties with the other side rather than interacting with it). You don't need to know what the crisis is about—what is important is to think about how you want to manage it. Read the following directions before beginning the game.

Rules

"Nuclear Rocks" resembles "rocks-scissors-paper." Alone or with a team, you begin the game by choosing your combination of rocks, paper, and scissors. Since one game has six rounds, each round you are allowed to play a different strategy. Because rocks, paper and scissors each have different prices, however, you will have to make your choices according to the constraints of your budget. Do this at the very beginning (you will notice that the budget of 120 allows you to buy at most three nuclear rocks). After "buying" your choices, write them all down in the order (1-6) in which you will play them during the mock crisis.

In *Nuclear Rocks*, scissors beats paper, because isolationism (scissors, or cutting ties and refusing to cooperate with others) foils diplomacy (paper, or negotiation). Rocks beat paper and scissors, because a nuclear attack (nuclear rocks) thwarts diplomacy and isolationism. However, two rocks played at the same time by both players (or teams) end a game—for obvious reasons.

The Game

Without knowing what the other side has chosen to play, you go through each round together, six rounds per game, three games. Facing each other, use your hands to play each round: a fist is a nuclear rock, an open hand is paper, and you probably know how to make scissors. As you play the game, write the other side's strategies next to yours so that when the six rounds are over you can see what they chose and use that in planning for the next game.

- Three games are played (a total of eighteen rounds), so that you might learn what to expect from the other side.
- Any money that is left over in your budget (i.e., if you buy 6 scissors, you will have 60 left over) goes into the next round and allows you to buy more then.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

- If both of you declare paper at the same time twice in a row, you have chosen to negotiate, and the crisis is resolved for that game.
- If you declare rocks at the same time, the game ends in nuclear annihilation for both of you. (Because this is a game, you will be able to try again.)
- It is possible to be beaten by the other side if they declare rocks a total of three times (not necessarily in a row). The winner gains nothing, and both sides start over with the next game.

Remember: Two rocks played by teams at the same time bring about the end of the game (both sides lose). Two papers played at the same time twice in a row resolve the crisis.

- Rocks = Nuclear War
- Paper = Diplomacy
- Scissors = Isolationism/cutting ties

Costs

Rocks	30
Paper	20
Scissors	10

Budget 120

	Sample	Game 1	Game 2	Game 3
Selections				
	120 budget	___ budget	___ budget	___ budget
	0 rocks	___ rocks	___ rocks	___ rocks
	6 paper	___ paper	___ paper	___ paper
	0 scissors	___ scissors	___ scissors	___ scissors

Strategies

Ours	*Theirs*	*Ours*	*Theirs*	*Ours*	*Theirs*	*Ours*	*Theirs*
1. P	S	1.		1.		1.	
2. P	S	2.		2.		2.	
3. P	S	3.		3.		3.	
4. P	R	4.		4.		4.	
5. P	P	5.		5.		5.	
6. P	P	6.		6.		6.	

© SPICE

Awakening to Crisis

What is the purpose of arms control, and what compels nations to take part in it? Different forms of arms control have existed for hundreds of years: sometimes as rules for the conduct of war, other times as rules for the maintenance of peace. Of course these rules were not always successful. Nuclear weapons and modern technology, however, present a new situation. Because the nations of the "nuclear club" (those which possess nuclear weapons) want to maintain a second strike capability, it is in their interest to carefully monitor and control technological developments. No world leader can be comfortable with the thought that another country's research might make its nuclear strategies and capabilities obsolete or ineffective. Beyond its importance as a response to the "arms race," arms control also seeks to reduce the danger of nuclear war by encouraging representatives of the world's nuclear countries to communicate with each other and build trust in each other.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

It would be wrong of us to study arms control without placing it in its historical contexts. One of the early events to have enduring impact on the course of arms control centered on the island of Cuba a mere 90 miles from Florida. In 1959 this country had a new leader named Fidel Castro. The revolution he had led his country through that year made many US politicians very uneasy, for the US had supported Cuba's overthrown leader. Although the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Castro's success, and very little to do with the revolution, by 1960 it had granted him its support.

On April 18, 1961, an invasion of Cuba was staged under the authorization of US President Kennedy. The attempt immediately ran aground, leaving Kennedy no choice but to abandon it (and with it, his determination to overthrow Castro). The invasion is remembered as the Bay of Pigs, and it was a great embarrassment to the United States. A similar but successful invasion of Guatemala had taken place in 1954. (At this time in Soviet-American relations, each side expected the other to come to the support of smaller countries which showed an interest in aligning themselves with one of the superpowers. In some cases, the superpowers didn't wait for the smaller countries to show much interest.) The US continued to perceive the Cuban government as a communist threat to its interests.

In 1962, the US became entangled in a second and more serious crisis. On August 29, American U-2 spy-plane missions returned with photographs that showed the construction of Soviet ground-to-air missile sites on Cuba. These were the same kinds of missiles that had downed a U-2 over the Soviet Union earlier that year. As a warning, President Kennedy announced that the United States would not tolerate "significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance." As far as

---

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

the United States was concerned, Soviet or Cuban military strength was a threat to American national security.

At the same time, Castro of course felt threatened by the US, having only recently survived the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt. They continued construction on the missile sites, although they didn't shoot at any of the American spy planes. Cuba, with the backing of the USSR, perceived the missile sites as defensive in nature. On September 11, a message released by the Soviet Union included the following passage:

> The arms and military equipment delivered to Cuba are exclusively designated for defensive purposes. . . . Can these means really threaten the United States of America? . . . You have invented this threat yourselves and now you want to persuade others of its existence.[1]

On October 1[illegible] American U-2 flights discovered at least 16 ground-to-ground nuclear missiles in Cuba—presumably targeted at American cities. The president immediately formed an executive committee (ExComm) to consider possible options. These included an air strike against the missile bases in Cuba, secret negotiations with the Soviet leader Khrushchev, public charges against Khrushchev, "exchanging" US missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba, and a naval blockade of Soviet military vessels approaching Cuba. The experts in the committee were uncertain of Khrushchev's intentions, and feared that a provocation might trigger an even more precarious international crisis. Robert Kennedy, the President's brother, US Attorney General, and a member of ExComm, wrote that he opposed an air strike against Cuba on the grounds that:

> . . . America's traditions and history would not permit such a course of action. Whatever military reasons he [Acheson] and others could marshal, they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a surprise attack by a very large nation against a very small one. This . . . could not be taken by the U.S. . . . Our struggle against Communism throughout the world was far more than physical survival—it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals, and these we must not destroy.[2]

ExComm member Dean Acheson, who strongly advocated the air strike, recalled the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor where:

> . . . the Japanese without provocation or warning attacked our fleet thousands of miles from their shores. In the present situation the Soviet Union had installed missiles ninety miles from our coast—while denying they were doing so—offensive weapons that were capable of lethal injury to the United States. This they were doing a hundred and forty years after the warning given in President Monroe's time that the United States government would regard an attempt by any European power to extend its 'system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety' and as manifesting 'an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.'[3]

After several intense days of debate with his advisers, President Kennedy chose to begin a naval blockade around Cuba. Soviet ships continued on their direct course, and the US awaited a response of some sort from Khrushchev. Soviet newspapers attacked the blockade as a violation of Cuba's national sovereignty. One newspaper saw it as a threat to international security:

> The measures adopted by the American ruling circles are a flagrant violation of the elementary norms of international law and of all international custom. They are incompatible with the principles of the UN [United Nations] Charter. They are a challenge to all peace-loving nations.[4]

Eleven days into the crisis President Kennedy was rapidly losing time. He received a letter from Khrushchev in which the Soviet leader warned Kennedy of his greatest fears:

> If you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.[5]

Just as the world was beginning to fear the worst—escalation—Khrushchev backed down and instructed the ships to turn around. He offered to remove the missiles in exchange for a guarantee from Kennedy that the United States would not invade Cuba, an offer Kennedy quickly accepted. This event was one of the most tense moments in Soviet-American relations; it served to remind the world of its mortality under the existence of nuclear weaponry, and created a new impetus for arms control. The US later removed its missiles from Turkey. In 1963, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to connect two teletype machines to a phone line reserved for the most urgent of crises. This "hot line" still exists today.

Arms Control

Early moves in the nuclear arms control process had occurred even before the first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb was tested. Neither side had been prepared to place real constraints on its nuclear forces, however, and a string of proposals and counter-proposals led nowhere. In 1955, for example, the Soviets had requested that the two countries "ban the bomb" completely. They were concerned that simply agreeing to an American arms limitation proposal would bind them to their position of nuclear inferiority. In 1957, when on-going discussions had brought the two countries closer to agreement on the details of an arms reduction treaty, France, and Great

Britain—countries that were developing their own nuclear forces—had raised objections. Like the USSR, they too were uneasy with the constraints that would be placed on their incomplete nuclear programs. (None of the Warsaw Pact countries other than the Soviet Union have their own nuclear programs.) Debates sparked by these NATO countries threatened to disrupt the entire alliance, and the United States revised its position. Soviet leaders naturally perceived the Americans as still trying to prevent Soviet nuclear forces from catching up to US levels. Although the intent to disarm may have been present in the minds of some policy makers, the US and the Soviet Union feared that arms control would disrupt their national security and deterrence capabilities. For this reason it is unlikely that some of the first disarmament suggestions were actually taken seriously by either side. After the launching of Sputnik in 1957, attempts at disarmament were postponed.

Troubled by the possible environmental effects of testing atomic weapons in the atmosphere, people in many countries urged world leaders to ban nuclear testing in the late 1950s. Atmospheric testing, sometimes involving bombs of many megatons, released dangerous radioactivity into the air. There were fears that the tests would endanger not only human and other animal life, but the environment also. In 1958, US, Soviet, and British negotiators met to discuss such a test ban treaty. They discovered that *verification* could be assured by using standard technology and occasional *on-site inspection*. Verification—which is the task of obtaining proof that both sides are doing what was agreed to—had long been an obstacle to a test ban treaty. With this adequately resolved, the three countries began a testing moratorium that year which lasted until 1961 when the Soviets conducted a series of tests. That same year saw the establishment of the United States' Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the creation of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which achieved minor agreements. Public pressure for a test ban treaty continued to build, and in 1963, President Kennedy, Premier Khrushchev, and representatives of 68 countries (not including France or China) signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. The Cuban missile crisis had without a doubt exercised some influence in the timing of this treaty.

In 1964 the Soviet Union revealed an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) missile: a defensive missile designed to shoot down in-coming missiles. An ABM system would have a number of these missiles deployed around large cities or military sites as protection from possible attack. However it threatened to destabilize deterrence by giving one side reason to feel invulnerable, thus casting doubt on the guarantee of "assured destruction" which was so important for deterrence. Better defense for one side, many feared, would result in less safety for the rest of the world. US President Johnson authorized development of an ABM system in 1967, while at the same time inviting the Soviets to consider limiting ABMs. In 1968, when the USSR had almost achieved rough parity in nuclear weapons, negotiations were scheduled for the limitation of both "offensive" and "defensive" nuclear forces. Before they could get properly underway, a crisis in Czechoslovakia cut them short. Alexander Dubcek led a movement favoring an independent Czech socialism. Called "Prague Spring," after the nation's capital, the movement was cause for Soviet and Warsaw Pact military intervention. This brief moment of protest was watched around the world, and the intervention met wide-spread condemnation. Johnson called off the talks, leaving their fate in the hands of the next President.

SALT I

The historical developments of the SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) talks, which ran from 1969 to 1972, will be reviewed more fully in the context of detente. SALT I can serve here as a testament to the success of arms control. It produced one treaty (the ABM treaty) and one agreement (the Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces), both of which are still observed. By 1969 both sides had recognized the danger posed by ABM systems, and neither the US nor the Soviet Union wished to dedicate a large sum of money to a defense system which would endanger the stability of deterrence. When negotiators sent by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev—the two new leaders of the US and the USSR—met to discuss ABM, they were in fundamental agreement with each other: "The ABM treaty reflects the judgment on the part of both countries that whatever they might prefer in the abstract, their mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation was a fact that could not be undone through technical means. . . ."[6] The Interim Agreement on offensive forces, also signed in 1972, placed a freeze on certain classes of nuclear missiles by prohibiting the further deployment of their launchers (i.e. silos or submarine tubes). The agreement was to be reviewed after five years and then revised. SALT I gave the USSR a numerical superiority in ICBMs and SLBMs that the US made up in its arsenal of MIRVs—which were left untouched by the treaty—and bombers. Because the agreement limited only the launchers and not the actual *warheads* of each side, Soviet deployment of MIRVed missiles begun in 1975 sparked additional fears. French and British forces were not a part of the treaty. The treaty encountered some opposition in the US Senate, which is required to ratify arms control treaties by a two-thirds majority, but since SALT I was an executive agreement between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was passed in both houses of the Congress with a simple majority.

The risk of being inferior continued to haunt some politicians, and the US Congress advised the President to "seek a future treaty that . . . would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental *strategic* forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."[7]

SALT II

In late 1972, SALT II talks began, aimed at eventually placing broad limitations on all US and Soviet strategic forces. In 1974, after two tedious years of negotiations, President Ford and Premier Brezhnev met in the

Soviet city of Vladivostok and agreed on a rough outline which established a ceiling of 2,400 ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers, and air-to-surface missiles. No more than 1,320 of these could be MIRVed. This was already a significant step beyond SALT I. The final treaty was over 10,000 words in length, a complex document when compared to other arms control agreements. Yet it was never ratified by the US Senate. By 1979, when US President Carter met with Soviet Premier Brezhnev to sign the SALT II treaty, Soviet-American relations had worsened, and many public officials in the US were already calling the treaty a surrender of the "arms race" to the Soviet Union. Opponents of the treaty drew attention to its verification procedures, which they thought easily permitted cheating by either side. Another common American perception was that the Soviets were gaining a significant lead in the arms buildup. When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter requested the Senate to cease consideration of the treaty, which it did. Until 1986, however, both the US and the Soviet Union continued to abide by the SALT II treaty.

INF

The *INF* (intermediate range nuclear forces) treaty of 1987 is a good example of successful arms control. Unlike the SALT I and II agreements which dealt with strategic, inter-continental missiles, the INF treaty eliminates all medium range land-based missiles. Altogether 2,800 missiles were eliminated. Most of these were deployed in Europe during the 1980s as an answer to US fears that the USSR was gaining in the "arms race." INF missiles traveled distances between 300 and 3,410 miles. American INFs were controversial because of their speed (the Soviet Union often called them first strike missiles) and because of the danger they presented to Western Europe. US missiles in Europe were aimed at the Soviet Union. None of the Soviet Union's medium range missiles were targeted at the US; the distance is too great. Instead they were targeted at European NATO countries, and at Asia. Of the more interesting facets of this treaty are its allowances for verification. Both sides wanted a guarantee that the missiles would in fact be eliminated. For the first time in history, US and Soviet inspectors traded homes (for thirteen years) in order to make sure that new medium range missiles are not secretly built. The visitors examine trains as they leave primary missile construction plants, checking the contents to make sure that the treaty is not violated. They are present when the missiles are destroyed, and when the trucks are remodeled so that they are incapable of transporting the missiles. By the provisions of the treaty, neither the US nor the USSR should be capable of repairing, storing, deploying, transporting, or producing these weapons. Strategic forces, where the "arms race" continues, remain untouched by the treaty.

Strategic Arms

There was little progress in the limitation of strategic nuclear forces during the negotiation of the INF treaty. START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) talks, begun by President Reagan and Soviet Premier Brezhnev in 1982 for the reduction of strategic weapons, were slow to get off the ground. Until 1983, first US and Soviet negotiators failed to find common ground. The United States wanted to maintain its sea based weapons (of which it had many) and cut the number of land based weapons; the Soviet Union, because it had mostly land based weapons, wanted the opposite. Furthermore, US military expenditure was expanding in the early 1980s and arms control was not a priority. The Soviet Union objected to President Reagan's early plans to strengthen the US military and pressure the Soviet Union into negotiation. In 1983, the Soviet delegates left the START talks, and discussion was not resumed until 1985. The deaths of three Soviet premiers (Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko) during the early and mid 1980s, had the effect of complicating the Soviet negotiating position. With the completion of the INF agreement, attention is returning to issues of strategic arms, where the US and the Soviet Union have agreed that fifty percent cuts could be made without radically changing the balance of nuclear forces.

The Future of Arms Control

In the minds of many citizens, arms control is only a beginning. The "arms race," they claim, has been out of control much longer than it has been in control. Even after the INF treaty, the US and the USSR are left with huge numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, enough to destroy the world's population tens of times over. In addition to the raw numbers of weapons is the high cost of keeping pace in the "arms race." Some scholars look to the benefits of negotiation, some of which have been learned through the arms control process, hoping to make them a basis of Soviet-American relations. In this way arms control serves as a beginning, encouraging the two nations to address their problems politically. At the same time, of course, they keep well aware of the intricacies of maintaining a solid national defense.

Vocabulary

compliance: yielding or agreeing to demands, such as those of an arms control treaty.

ensue: to follow or take place afterward.

espionage: spying.

flagrant: obvious, blatant, even insulting.

impetus: a driving force such as an impulse or incentive.

Supreme Soviet: the legislative body of the Soviet Union.

Handout #10

Study Questions

1. The world's leaders have often learned from their experiences of crises. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, led to the hot line. What would you have learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis?

2. One of the reasons arms control agreements take so long to draw up is that verification can be a very complicated process. One US government document states that "American Presidents and negotiators have been willing to reach agreements only when we were sure we could adequately verify Soviet compliance with them. We have never been willing to rely solely on Soviet assurances or 'trust.'"[8] How important do you think verification is to arms control, and why?

REFERENCES

1. TASS, September 11, 1962. Cited in The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962, p. 196.

2. Robert F. Kennedy cited in Essence of Decision, Graham T. Allison, 1971, p. 197. Documents declassified in 1988 show that the President's brother apparently favored some military options.

3. Dean Acheson cited in ibid., p. 203.

4. "Frustrate the Criminal Schemes of Enemies of Peace," in Pravda, 24 October, 1962.

5. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert F. Kennedy, 1969, pp. 67-68.

6. Reluctant Warriors, Coit D. Blacker, 1987, p. 107.

7. Cited in The Salt Process, Department of State Publication 8947, General Foreign Policy Series 306, June, 1978, p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 5.

Lesson Three Controlling the "Arms Race": Arms Control and Disarmament

Introduction

On the first and second days of this three or four day lesson, the teacher and students discuss the elements and goals of arms control and disarmament. Students are encouraged to reflect on what they think the capabilities and limitations of arms control should be, and the reason arms control belongs to the national security policy of a nation. On the third and fourth days students in groups of four write newspaper editorials on the future of arms control. Each group is given a briefing representing one of several points of view. Class presentations on these articles allow for a comparison of multiple perspectives.

Two optional exercises are included in the lesson plan: the first is a quiz based on the arms control agreements that students learned in Handout #12. The second, *Super Rocks*, is a continuation of the *nuclear rocks* game with incentives added for arms control. *Super Rocks* should add one day to the lesson plan (see Day Eight).

Objectives

In this lesson, students will

- discuss important aspects of arms control, and take a quiz (optional)
- discuss arms reductions and matters of national sovereignty and international security
- write and present articles based on different views of the arms control process
- develop the *nuclear rocks* game into an arms control process (optional)

Materials

- Handout #4, *Glossary*
- Handout #5, *Evolution Timeline*
- Handout #10, *Awakening to Crisis*

© SPICE

Make one copy per student of

- Handout #11, *Super Rocks*, as an overhead or handout to be given to each team or player (optional)
- Handout #12, *Events in Arms Control*
- Handout #13 A, B, C, D, or E, *"On The Future of Arms Control"*
- Handout #14, *Nuclear Test*

Homework

- make one copy per student of Handout #15, *Detente* (for Day Nine)

Procedures: Day 6

"Why Arms Control?": 45 minutes

1. Distribute one copy per student of Handout #12, *Events in Arms Control*, as a resource. First answer any questions students may have concerning the homework reading.

   The following terms all belong to the arms control process. Write them on the chalkboard, and invite your students to group them together according to three categories of successful arms control: its *elements*, *process*, and *outcomes*.

"the nuts and bolts"

   verification; silos; arms control treaties; warheads; nuclear forces; ratification; negotiations; military research and development; conventional forces; limitations; inspections; reductions

   When the class is finished, your chalkboard should look something like this:

Elements	Process	Outcome
silo	verification	limitations
warhead	ratification	treaties
research and development	negotiations	reductions
conventional forces	proposals	inspections
nuclear forces		

   Ask students to name some of the areas (i.e. warheads, verification) in which nations might have difficulty agreeing with one another. Why? Ask students to give examples from the reading they did for class. (Example: Verification is a tricky matter when countries are reluctant to allow close inspection of their military forces. Research and development is also normally off limits to other countries.)

2. The open-ended questions below are provided for a discussion of arms control. You may want to have students answer them in pairs or groups. Encourage your students to express their own views.

   - Does arms control make the world safer? If so, does it make each country safer too?
   - Are countries more tempted to use weapons when they have them? If so, do you think they will at some time be tempted to use nuclear weapons? (Two atomic bombs were used by the United States against Japan at the end of World War II.)
   - Do you think conventional war would be more likely if there were no nuclear weapons? If you didn't think countries can be tempted to use nuclear weapons, do you think they would refuse to use them even if it meant losing a conventional war?
   - What happens to the credibility of a country if it begins to "build down?" Is disarmament a loss of credibility?
   - Does arms control increase or decrease trust between nations? Why or why not?
   - Does arms control help nations to communicate with each other, or do you think communication is necessary for arms control?
   - What does verification mean to the countries involved in the arms control process? How often do you require that your parents or friends verify their promises to you?
   - Should verification measures include on-site inspections? Should they include restrictions on research and development?
   - Should there be limitations on the sales of arms to other countries? If so, how do you decide which countries are allowed to buy them? What kinds of arms would limitations include?
   - What are some problems and conflicts created by arms control? (For example, how does arms control relate to national security and national sovereignty?)

© SPICE

Journal: 5 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have before. Journal entries for this lesson will be spread over three days.

Homework

1. Ask students to become familiar with Handout #12. The optional quiz (Handout #14) is based on Handout #12.

Procedures: Day 7

Arms Control: 25 minutes

1. The following are three statements (in boldface) which summarize the essential purposes of arms control. Each statement is followed by a group of three questions. Ask your students what they think the goals of arms control might be, and use the statements and questions below to guide them into discussion. At the end of the discussion, write the three statements on the board so that students can make note of them.

   Statement 1: ***The fundamental goal of arms control is the avoidance of nuclear "war."***

   - What is the basis of deterrence?
   - Are deterrence strategies dangerous? Why or why not? (Possible answer: Because deterrence is threatening, crisis situations might easily *escalate* into nuclear confrontation, even against the wishes of the countries involved.)
   - What one basic goal do nations involved in arms control share? (Answer: The avoidance of accidental or intentional nuclear "war.")

   Statement 2: ***Arms control attempts to regulate the number, kinds, and purposes of the weapons and military forces participating countries possess.***

   - Should nations establish laws which regulate the numbers and kinds of weapons they are allowed to have? (Should gun control be applied to nations?)
   - Do the nations of the world have more nuclear weapons than they need? If so, how do they know what the right number is?

© SPICE

- Should nations be interested in maintaining or reducing the number of nuclear weapons they have? Give reasons for your answer.

Statement 3: ***Arms control seeks to make the participating countries aware of what they are researching, developing, and building. Even if it does not regulate these, it tries to reduce fears by encouraging discussion.***

- Should arms control place limits only on numbers and types of forces, or on strategies and other military aspects of deterrence also (for example offensive vs. defensive forces, intelligence gathering, training maneuvers, etc.)?
- Should arms control be concerned with the research and production of armaments? Why or why not?
- In what ways would this affect national security and national sovereignty?

Arms Control Editorials: 15 minutes

1. In preparation for tomorrow's group-writing exercise, divide the class into groups of four, and designate *one* of the editorials (A-E) to each group. Distribute Handout #13, *"On the Future of Arms Control," A, B, C, D, or E* to each student in the group: *each student in the group receives the same handout*. There will be more than one group per assignment.
2. Students are to work together in their groups to prepare their newspaper editorial columns. One person in each group will be responsible for writing the assignment on a sheet of paper. Each group should imagine that it is representing the interests of the organization or group which has been assigned to it, according to the summary provided in their particular handout. Students should use previous handouts for additional information. The column should be about one page in length, double-spaced.
3. Read the following instructions aloud, and allow students to spend the rest of class time preparing their articles:

> Suppose that you are writing a group article to the local newspaper in order to express your views on the arms control process. *Your are trying to explain to your readers why they should think about arms control.* The title of your article is *"On the Future of Arms Control,"* and it should be about one page in length, double-spaced. From the point of view of the position described in your handout, prepare to write a brief commentary on the INF treaty and arms control in general. Use the

questions on the handout as a guideline—and don't forget to use your *Timeline, Glossary,* and Handout #12, *Events in Arms Control.*

Journal: 10 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have before, or assign as homework.

Homework

1. Ask students to spend some time at home thinking about possible outlines for their articles.

Procedures: Day 8

Editorials: 45 minutes

1. Divide the class into the same groups as on Day Seven. Read the instructions from yesterday aloud once again, and allow students thirty minutes to write their editorials.
2. When the groups have finished writing, have them read their columns aloud and spend fifteen minutes discussing them with the class.

Note: The teacher is encouraged to display the columns during parent's week, and to submit the best editorial to the school or local newspaper.

You may also want to change the focus of the article according to the grade level of your class. A simpler assignment might use questions on the basics of arms control. Some of these could be taken from the lesson plans of Days Six and Seven.

Journal: 5 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have before, or assign as homework. Today's entries should finish section three.

Optional

Nuclear Test: 10 minutes

1. At the end of this lesson, give each student one copy of Handout #14, *Nuclear Test*. Allow students 10 minutes to complete the quiz, and then collect or grade it aloud with the answer key.

© SPICE

Optional

Super Rocks: 50 minutes

1. *Super Rocks* is another version of *Nuclear Rocks* in Lesson Two. If your class has not already played *Nuclear Rocks*, do so first. Then with the same groups or partners as in nuclear rocks, use super rocks to have students try to place restrictions on each other's nuclear rocks programs. This time, budgets allow for investment in the research and development of "super rocks." Super rocks are more expensive and superior to nuclear rocks, and make them obsolete. (If only one side develops a super rock, it can defeat the other in one blow, regardless of what the other side uses: a super rock will *cancel* a nuclear rock when both are played at the same time. If *both* sides develop and use the super rocks at the same time, they are again annihilated.)

   Super rocks essentially raises the stakes, requiring students to make careful decisions on arms control and research and development. The game tries to give students a sense of the difficulty of negotiation and verification common to arms control. See Handout #11, *Super Rocks*, for instructions.

2. Some suggestions for the different ways in which this game can be played are found in Lesson Two. Here are some more which apply to *Super Rocks* only:

   - Ask students to tell the class about the agreements they were able to come to. Can you get the entire class to agree on one of these? If so, have them carry out the three games again. Did they all abide by the agreement? (This variation would allow you to see what happens when nations join an existing treaty at a later date. This has been the case in many multilateral arms control negotiations.)

   - If the game is being played by many two-person groups, split some of them up into groups of three or more. Do multipolar groups manage to initiate the process of arms control more quickly, or do they experience more disagreement?)

   - Instead of handing out super rocks randomly, "load" the games so that in some, both partners are either successful or unsuccessful in their research and development programs. Are the players with unsuccessful programs any more interested in arms control than those who received a super rock?

- Play the super rocks game between two or more of your social studies classes. Students should spend class time allocating their budget, writing down their class strategy, and making plans for arms control—including verification requirements, etc. The game could take up a short amount of class time over a six-day period (one game of six rounds). Each day you would tell your classes of each of the others' decisions. This would demonstrate the difficulty of negotiating treaties when the groups involved do not actually see or talk to each other.

3. Have students announce the agreements they came to and try to draw parallels between their arms control agreements and existing treaties. These are some parallels you might be able to find.

   Students voted to:

   - Control the investment in the super rock. (Similarity: The ABM treaty which limits the development of defensive missile systems.)
   - Control the numbers of nuclear rocks allowed on each side. (Similarity: SALT I and SALT II limit or freeze the numbers of missile launchers permitted on both sides.)
   - Control the numbers of nuclear rocks available to the entire class. (Similarity: The Non-Proliferation Treaty restricts the global spread of nuclear weapons.)
   - Provide means for the announcement of intention to use a nuclear or super rock. (Similarity: The Hot Line Agreement provides for clear and immediate communication between the superpowers.)

4. Ask the following questions about the game so that students can reflect on their experience:

   - Did those of you who had nuclear rocks realize that you would have to use them?
   - Did the fact that having the rock would require you to use it bother you; did it discourage you from buying one?
   - Would you have preferred to have conventional arms?
   - What had you expected from the game?
   - In the game and the editorial, what were your fears, hopes, and perceptions of the other side?

© SPICE

Super Rocks

Rules

In this version of *nuclear rocks,* you are given the option of committing some of your budget to research in a super rock program. At the same time you are encouraged to be open to arms control. Your budget has grown from 120 to 150, which gives you enough money to invest in research of the *super rock* (two fists). If you invest 60 in the super rock program, you can take the chance that if research is successful, you will be able to defeat the other side in two blows: a super rock followed by a nuclear rock in the next round (a total cost of 90). In nuclear rocks, it takes three rocks to defeat the other side. In this game, it takes a super rock followed immediately by a nuclear rock in the next round. If played at the same time as a nuclear rock, a super rock will cancel the effect of the nuclear rock. Super rocks are defensive. The prices of rocks, paper and scissors have remained the same, and three nuclear rocks in a row still defeat the other side. It is up to you to decide whether or not you want to invest in the super rock program. There is no telling whether or not the investment will produce a super rock, and once the money has been spent, it is too late to recover it!

There is one further complication with the super rock. Scientists warn that some super rocks might wreak such havoc on the environment that neither side will survive its use. None of you know how the super rock system actually works. It is designed so that if used successfully, it will neutralize a nuclear rock played by the other side during that round. There are three possibilities: Super Rock A, B, or C. One is completely unsuccessful, another is successful but suicidal to you, and the third is completely successful (without any danger to you). Only the teacher will know if you ended up with A, B, or C.

- if the super rock program is completely unsuccessful, a super rock and a nuclear rock played at the same time will neither protect you from a nuclear rock nor harm the other side
- if the super rock turns out be suicidal to you, it will destroy the environment and end the game for *both* of you
- a successful super rock played against the other side, followed in the next round by a nuclear rock, will end the game for the other side
- if the other side happens to develop a super rock and plays it at the same time as you, both of you are eliminated, as in *nuclear rocks*

Even though you can afford only one super rock (since you still need to buy paper, scissors, or rocks for each round of the game), it still takes three nuclear rock attacks for you to be defeated. If you play the super rock when the other side attacks with a normal nuclear rock, you make your defeat impossible.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

If you are interested in making the investment in super rock technology, simply write *SR (SR = Super Rock) A, SR B,* or *SR C* next to the rest of your choices. You must write *A, B* or *C*. If a super rock is played, continue the game through all six rounds. The teacher will tell you at the end of the game which kind was which.

Arms Control

Another important dimension is added to this game. The negotiations begun by two papers, *played at the same time and twice in a row,* can be developed into arms control.

If both of you play paper at the same time twice in a row, you are allowed to begin negotiations for the control of your nuclear rocks or super rocks. As soon as the two sides have declared their interest in arms control in this way, negotiations begin.

1. Start by telling the other side what it is that you want to control.

2. Write a plan stating the objectives agreed upon. Try to be creative about the arms control process. Sample treaties might agree:

    - to limit or eliminate completely the number of nuclear rocks allowed on each side

    - to completely forbid the investment of research in super rocks

    - to forbid the possession of *both* nuclear and super rocks, so that it is impossible for one side with a super rock to destroy the other

    - to change the rules of the game in some way so that each side writes out its strategies one at a time instead of all at once

    - to allow or require each side to make an announcement before it uses a nuclear or super rock

    - to allow each side to stop the game instead of playing a nuclear or super rock written down as part of the strategy

    - to verify the other side's strategy, perhaps demanding its budget

    - to draft a treaty based on the agreements

    - to see if you can both commit to choosing paper only through all eighteen rounds. What would you do with your left over budget money, invest in social security or education?

3. After coming to an agreement, continue to play the game(s) as usual, and see if the agreements work.

© SPICE

Events In Arms Control

1963	*Partial Test-Ban Treaty*	Prohibits military or peaceful nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Under-ground explosions are not banned. 1988: 116 nations.
1963	*"Hot Line" Agreement*	Establishes direct radio and telegraph communications between the US and the USSR for use in a crisis.
1968	*Non-Proliferation Treaty*	Aims at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states not in possession of nuclear weapons. 1988: 138 nations.
1971	*Sea-bed Treaty*	Bans the placement of any kinds of weapons or facilities on the sea-bed more than 12 miles from the coast line. 1988: 80 nations.
1971	*"Hot Line" modernization*	Adds two satellites for the use of the Soviet-American "hot line," thus increasing its reliability. US-USSR.
1971	*Nuclear Accidents Agreement*	Establishes measures which reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. US-USSR.
1972	*High Seas Agreement*	Provides measures which minimize the risk of conflictual incidents between US and Soviet ships or aircraft over the ocean. US-USSR.
1972	*ABM Treaty*	Limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two sites in each country. Reduced to one site in 1974. US-USSR.
1972	*SALT I Interim Agreement*	Establishes a five-year freeze on the total number of offensive ICBMs and SLBMs stationed by the US and the Soviet Union. Later extended to 1980. US-USSR.
1973	*Nuclear War Prevention Agreement*	Provides measures to aid in the prevention of nuclear war during crises in Soviet-American relations. Also seeks to avoid threats to the alliances. US-USSR.
1974	*Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*	Bans the underground testing of nuclear weapons of more than 150 kilotons explosive yield. US-USSR. Not ratified.
1976	*Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty*	Bans explosions of more than 150 kilotons for "peaceful purposes" (i.e. mining). US-USSR. Not ratified.
1979	*SALT II Offensive Arms Agreement*	Limits numbers and kinds of strategic nuclear *delivery vehicles* (i.e. missiles, bombers) to 2,400 (1981, 2,250). US-USSR. Not ratified.
1986	*Stockholm Agreement*	Establishes "confidence-building measures" i.e. the exchange of NATO and Warsaw Pact observers during troop exercises.
1987	*INF Treaty*	Eliminates all of the short and medium-range missiles stationed by the US and USSR in Eastern and Western Europe and Asia. Requires on-site inspection. US-USSR.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

"On the Future of Arms Control"
From the Perspective of the US Military

Briefing

The INF treaty eliminates all the ground-launched intermediate range (1,000-5,000 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles and their support equipment possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to the usual means of verification, the INF treaty allows on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (observation by satellite). A special verification commission is responsible for addressing questions relating to the treaty. The treaty went into effect in June 1988.

Commentary

You are pleased to have eliminated Soviet SS-20 (intermediate-range) missiles with the INF treaty of 1987—missiles targeted at Western Europe—and especially pleased to have eliminated more Soviet than US missiles! In return, you withdrew the Pershing IIs and *cruise* missiles you had deployed primarily to balance out the SS-20s. At first some of your European NATO allies were anxious that the removal of US missiles might make a conventional war more likely. Their worries were that without your "nuclear presence" in Europe there would be little reason for you to defend Europe. Why should they expect you to risk Washington for Paris or London if your own forces were no longer directly endangered by an attack on Western Europe? Some also thought that without your nuclear support, their military deterrent would be less credible. Others, however, thought that having your forces on their soil made war more likely to break out in Europe. West Germany in particular would be an obvious target for any Warsaw Pact aggression, as most of NATO's forces are deployed there. In 1989 you still had over 200,000 troops stationed in Western Europe, along with their conventional military equipment.

In 1989, the Soviet Union announced cuts in its troop forces stationed in some Eastern European countries. Talks on the reduction of conventional forces seemed promising. Military spending is enormous, and Congress is forcing you to significantly decrease spending. Try to give an indication of where (and how) you think arms control should be headed.

- Do you think nuclear or conventional weapons are most appropriate for your deterrence strategy in Europe? Justify.
- What does this mean for your approach to arms control? What do you want to cut and save?
- Would you consider any one-sided reductions in your military forces, such as closing Western European military bases or cutting advanced research? Explain.

"On the Future of Arms Control"

From the Perspective of the Soviet Military

Briefing

The INF treaty eliminates all the ground-launched intermediate range (1,000-5,000 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles and their support equipment possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to the usual means of verification, the INF treaty allows on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (observation by satellite). A special verification commission is responsible for addressing questions relating to the treaty. The treaty went into effect in June 1988.

Commentary

The INF treaty was an important achievement for the Soviet Union. American Pershing IIs, stationed in West Germany in the mid 1980s, were fast missiles with enough range to strike cities inside the USSR. You were concerned that because of both their proximity to the Soviet Union and their speed, they could be used in a first strike against your country. Thousands of smaller tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons remain in Eastern and Western Europe, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact each have several hundred thousand troops stationed there also. Early in 1989, you began to withdraw your own troops from some Eastern European nations, and in 1990, talks with the United States were aimed at reducing force levels in Central Europe to 195,000 on each side.

If you can keep costs low by reducing the number of forces you are developing and deploying, while simultaneously maintaining a deterrent, you will be keeping the arms buildup under control. You can either place ceilings on the numbers of forces you and the US are allowed to keep, or agree to reductions. In 1989, shakeups in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Romania, and parts of the Soviet Union not only weakened the Warsaw Pact, but threatened its very survival. Even before an agreement with the US on reductions, you began withdrawing troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is likely that if conventional reductions go through, the US will come out with more troops stationed in Western Europe than the Soviet Union will have stationed in Eastern Europe. Even a unified Germany may be incorporated into NATO. How far should the Warsaw Pact and NATO go in removing military forces from Europe?

- Do you think nuclear or conventional weapons are better for your deterrence strategy in Europe? Justify.

- What does this mean for your approach to arms control? What do you want to cut and save?

- What do you think of NATO's position in Europe?

© SPICE

"On the Future of Arms Control"

From the Perspective of the President of the US

Briefing

The INF treaty eliminates all the ground-launched intermediate range (1,000-5,000 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles and their support equipment possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to the usual means of verification, the INF treaty allows on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (observation by satellite). A special verification commission is responsible for addressing questions relating to the treaty. The treaty went into effect in June 1988.

Commentary

Though not the first arms control agreement, the INF treaty was one of the most significant. It eliminated two entire classes of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and proved that the United States and the Soviet Union can indeed make real compromises. Public opinion polls in the US and Western Europe strongly supported the treaty, and the Senate had little trouble ratifying it. Disarmament had suddenly become popular, and many people expected it to be only the first in a series of even more comprehensive achievements.

As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, you are also responsible for securing your country, and you have major responsibilities to your allies. Past presidents have achieved security in different ways: some through large-scale military buildups, others through diplomacy and cooperation. Which of these do you favor? Advisers have already told you that you will need to make drastic cuts in the military budget, and many are expecting you to shift money from the military into other areas. When, in 1989, political changes overturned communist rule in most of Eastern Europe, your perceptions of the Warsaw Pact's intentions and capabilities changed too. Much of what is achieved in the next few years of Soviet-American relations hinges on your own personal goals.

- What is your opinion of the Soviet leader?
- What kind of image do you want to present of your country? How do nuclear and conventional weapons fit into this image?
- How are you going to respond to the Soviet Union's troop withdrawals, and to the new, less threatening Warsaw Pact?
- What kinds of proposals would you like to make to the Soviet leader, and what role should the US play in Europe?

"On the Future of Arms Control"

From the Perspective of the Premier of the USSR

Briefing

The INF treaty eliminates all the ground-launched intermediate range (1,000-5,000 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles and their support equipment possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to the usual means of verification, the INF treaty allows on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (observation by satellite). A special verification commission is responsible for addressing questions relating to the treaty. The treaty went into effect in June 1988.

Commentary

Due primarily to unacceptable military expenses, reductions are at the top of your list of priorities. The INF treaty, it now seems, was only a first step on the long road to arms reductions. Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia are visibly transforming the Warsaw Pact. Because you have been the driving force for disarmament and peaceful change in Eastern Europe, the world community expects you to make the next move. Is this the role you want?

Since the INF agreement, the nuclear threat posed by Western Europe has been reduced significantly, even though your own country destroyed more missiles than the United States did. Your political rivalry with the United States has lessened also, giving you time to spend on problems at home, where the Soviet Union faces economic and political crises; Eastern European countries have taken steps towards democracy at the expense of their communist parties, and Germany's division has come to an end. In the midst of this instability, it is time to rethink the Western and Eastern European "spheres of influence." What is your vision for the alliances in a new Europe?

- What is your opinion of the American leader?
- What kind of image do you want to present of your country? How do nuclear and conventional weapons fit into this image?
- How do you propose reform of the Warsaw Pact, and how are you going to link it to NATO?
- What kinds of proposals would you like to make to the United States President, and what role should the Soviet Union play in Europe?

© SPICE

"On the Future of Arms Control"

From the Perspective of the International Peace Movement

Briefing

The INF treaty eliminates all the ground-launched intermediate range (1,000-5,000 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles and their support equipment possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to the usual means of verification, the INF treaty allows on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (observation by satellite). A special verification commission is responsible for addressing questions relating to the treaty. The treaty went into effect in June 1988.

Commentary

You are pleased to see that in 1987, for the first time in history, the arms control process secured a reduction in nuclear weapons. Yet the cut was only minimal. Thousands of warheads remain in the hands of the superpowers, most of which are unnecessary, and strategic arms (those included in the SALT II treaty, which was never ratified) were left untouched by the INF agreement. You would like to see these eliminated, and deterrence achieved either with a minimal level of weapons or none at all.

You would also like to see increased cooperation between the US and the USSR. Nuclear weapons have contaminated the Soviet-American relationship and needlessly increased the distrust between both nations. Most countries have nothing to do with nuclear weapons—why should your two countries be separated by so many deadly weapons? Is there any way for you to get involved? Since the INF treaty, people have been less interested in the peace movement, and many seem to think that the danger is past. How can you bring them to think about it again?

- Do the United States and the Soviet Union continue to threaten each other with nuclear weapons?
- How have the capabilities of the two countries changed? What are your perceptions of the two countries? Do your perceptions and the capabilities match?
- What kind of disarm reduction do you advocate: complete or partial? Explain.
- Of the different means of arms control which have been used in the past—test bans, test moratoriums, ceilings, unilateral reductions—which would you suggest now? Which country should start, and why?

© SPICE

Nuclear Test

Answer the following questions without referring to your handouts.

1. Each nation has the right to develop and possess nuclear weapons according to which treaty?

   a) National Sovereignty Act; b) Proliferation; c) INF; d) none of the above

2. The global spread of nuclear weapons is strictly forbidden by

   a) SALT I; b) Threshold Nuclear Test Ban; c) Nuclear War Prevention; d) none of the above

3. SDI would violate which treaty if it were ever to be constructed and deployed?

   a) INF; b) ABM; c) Partial Test Ban; d) none of the above

4. The INF treaty was the first reduction of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

   a) True; b) False

5. The Hot Line allows American and Soviet leaders to make weekend plans together.

   a) True; b) False

6. Which agreement prohibits countries other than the US and the Soviet Union to have nuclear accidents?

   a) Partial Test Ban; b) Peaceful Nuclear Explosions; c) Nuclear Accidents; d) none of the above

7. Which agreement prohibits countries other than the US and the Soviet Union to have nuclear wars?

   a) Nuclear War Prevention; b) SALT II; c) Non-Proliferation; d) none of the above

8. Which of the following agreements were not ratified by the US Senate?

   a) SALT II; b) Threshold Nuclear Test Ban; c) Peaceful Nuclear Explosions; d) all of the above

9. Arms control agreements always include some means of verification.

   a) True; b) False

Handout #14: Answer Key

Nuclear Test

1. Each nation has the right to develop and possess nuclear weapons according to which treaty?

   a) National Sovereignty Act; b) Proliferation; c) INF; d) [✓ none of the above]

2. The global spread of nuclear weapons is strictly forbidden by . . .

   a) SALT I; b) Threshold Nuclear Test Ban; c) Nuclear War Prevention; d) [✓ none of the above]

3. SDI would violate which treaty if it were ever to be constructed and deployed?

   a) INF; [✓ b) ABM;] c) Partial Test Ban; d) none of the above

4. The INF treaty was the first reduction of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

   a) True; b) [✓ False]

5. The Hot Line allows American and Soviet leaders to make weekend plans together.

   a) True; b) [✓ False]

6. Which agreement prohibits countries other than the US and the Soviet Union to have nuclear accidents?

   a) Partial Test Ban; b) Peaceful Nuclear Explosions; c) Nuclear Accidents; d) [✓ none of the above]

7. Which agreement prohibits countries other than the US and the Soviet Union to have nuclear wars?

   a) Nuclear War Prevention; b) SALT II; c) Non-Proliferation; d) [✓ none of the above]

8. Which of the following agreements were not ratified by the US Senate?

   a) SALT II; b) Threshold Nuclear Test Ban; c) Peaceful Nuclear Explosions; d) [✓ all of the above]

9. Arms control agreements always include some means of verification.

   [✓ a) True;] b) False

© SPICE

Detente

Until the late 1960s and early 1970s, the post-war Soviet-American relationship had witnessed very few periods of friendliness. And even these, such as the visit to the US by Soviet Premier Khrushchev in 1959, were fleeting. It was as if the two countries had convinced themselves that lasting friendship was impossible. Through the *detente* (day-**taunt**) of the 1970s, a time of "relaxation of tensions," the United States and the Soviet Union discovered that they could indeed talk to each other. Despite the high level of distrust in which their relations seemed anchored, there were enough practical matters for these nations to discuss that they even made significant progress in some.

Detente is for many scholars a controversial topic. Some argue that it was a continuation of the Cold War in disguise, and point to the Cold War antagonisms which continued alongside detente. Other scholars look back on it as a time of optimism and cooperation, when conflicts and misunderstandings were reduced and a new relationship began to take shape. Could there have been trust between such radically different countries and systems? Do the actions of world leaders make any difference in the relations between such huge countries?

Coexistence

What changes took place that allowed and encouraged leaders of the United States and the USSR to adopt more trusting attitudes towards each other? Soviet historical philosophies traditionally denied the possibility of cooperation with "imperialists." (Similarly, communism did not receive the most friendly treatment in US political circles.) Soviet interpretations of world history split the opposing forces of historical progress into imperialism vs. communism. Soviet doctrine predicted the eventual communist victory over capitalism, and thus, officially, the Soviet Union's foreign policy was dedicated to accelerating this process where possible.

Americans, though not tied to rigorous official doctrine, seemed equally convinced that the Cold War which had marked Soviet-American relations over time was not about to disappear into thin air. Thus, some were distrustful of the cooperation that in the late 1960s and 1970s had begun to grow between Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.

Peaceful Coexistence

Until the period of detente, leading Soviet politicians had emphasized the inevitability of war between capitalist and communist systems. Detente revived the old and inactive notion of peaceful coexistence. During the 24th Party Congress held in Moscow in 1971, for example, Brezhnev argued at length that the world's two opposing social systems—communism and capitalism—could coexist peacefully, and abide "in practice by the principles of peaceful coexistence in developing mutually profitable relations." This was an addition to the traditional support of "the struggle of the peoples for democracy, national liberation, and Socialism."[1] The Soviet Union, burdened with a failing economy, was intent on making the most of possible cooperation with the West.

The revised Soviet approach to the western world came at a time when the structure of world politics was changing. The world was no longer starkly bipolar, as it had been right after World War II, and new world actors such as Western Europe, Japan, and China, were emerging. Since its cultural revolution in 1949, China had been developing its own style of communism, and with a population of over 800 million, forced the Soviet Union to rethink its view of the world. By 1971, some analysts suspected that China was capable of building over 100 nuclear warheads. Though Sino (Chinese)-Soviet relations had been poor since 1959, they worsened during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Khrushchev's build-up of Soviet forces (partly in response to his humiliation during the Cuban missile crisis), and a number of border clashes in which Soviet and Chinese were killed in 1969 placed notable stress on Sino-Soviet relations. This led the Chinese to be more and more open to relations with the US. China, obviously not comfortable as a new independent world power, leaned somewhat towards the US. American officials clearly saw that they could use the tensions between China and the USSR to their advantage.

The leaders talk

Detente may well have been a product of a quickly-changing world. In practice, it described new approaches to foreign policy, both in the West and in the East. In part a result of these circumstances, detente stimulated changes of its own. Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser and then Secretary of State for US President Nixon, described detente as "a means of controlling the conflict with the Soviet Union,"[2] and of developing "habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and, ultimately, cooperation"[3] between the two superpowers. Brezhnev, who had been the leader of the USSR since 1964, put it this way:

> What is detente? What do we mean by that term? Detente above all means overcoming the 'cold war' and transition to normal, equal relations among states. Detente means a readiness to resolve differences and disputes not by force, not by threats and sabre-rattling, but by peaceful means, at a conference table. Detente means a certain trust and ability to take into account the legitimate interest of one another.[4]

Over the course of the 1960s, the Soviet Union had been accelerating its military growth, and the United States now considered it to be in a position of parity. Soviet leader Brezhnev wanted to use this to his advantage in Soviet-American negotiations.

© SPICE

The war in Vietnam, and China's apparent openness to relations with the US, convinced American leaders to approach the negotiation table, and talks began while Lyndon Johnson was still the US President. He had hoped that the Soviet Union would be willing to exert pressure on the (communist) North Vietnamese to slow down the war in Vietnam, a plan which fell through. Johnson was, however, successful in negotiating the non-proliferation treaty of 1968, thus moving the two countries one step forward in the lengthy process of slowing the global "arms race."

Nixon/Kissinger

In August of 1968, just as President Johnson was preparing to meet with Soviet Premier Brezhnev, anti-Soviet rebellions in Czechoslovakia were quelled by Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces. The summit was cancelled. Meanwhile, Richard Nixon took office as US President. His National Security Adviser was Henry Kissinger. Together they directed US foreign policy virtually without assistance from their cabinet. In the first few years of the Nixon/Kissinger administration, the US initiated a gradual withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. (In spite of the withdrawal, 20,000 US soldiers and 300,000 Asians were killed between 1969 and 1972.) In 1971, Nixon announced a visit to communist China. It would be the first ever by a US President.

The journey to China was significant for several reasons. Both China and the United States were grateful for the flourishing prospects of trade and friendly relations, between each other and between communist and capitalist countries. For the Soviet Union, Sino-American relations were disturbing, for they upset the established balance between the superpowers.

Detente Diplomacy

Detente is remembered for its treaties and negotiations, many of which have had lasting importance. The division of Europe was one focus of these talks. Since World War II, West Germany had refused to recognize East Germany and its border with Poland, because some of pre-World War II Germany had become Polish land. Berlin too had remained a divided city since France, Great Britain, and the United States had combined their zones to form West Berlin and the Soviet Union had established its zone as East Berlin—all in 1946. In 1970 the Warsaw and Moscow treaties were signed, recognizing the sovereignty of the disputed Polish border and declaring peace between West Germany and the Soviet Union. A 1972 agreement between all four of these former WW II allies managed to make life for East and West Berliners just a little easier.

In spite of these highly public achievements, detente had its share of action behind the scenes. Not fully trusting agreements with the Soviets, American negotiators under Nixon and Kissinger took up a strategy known as "linkage," whereby they linked their bargaining offers to returns they wanted from the Soviet Union. What was curious about linkage was that the offers being linked to each other ordinarily had nothing to do with each other. Almost 19 million tons of grain, for example, were sold cheaply to the USSR, in exchange for a successful 1972 summit, and an increase of Soviet pressure on North Vietnam for an end to the Vietnam war. As it turned out, the USSR was able to apply some pressure to North Vietnam (the negotiations which followed were memorable for their inefficiency—bickering over the size and shape of the table, etc.)

Linkage combined rewards with force, allowing each side to manipulate the other. As long as it seemed fair, it worked. When it went too far, however, it was ineffective. For example, when several US congressmen linked the USSR's restrictive emigration policies to the extension of US credits and loans, the Soviet Union rejected trade agreements drawn up with the US on the grounds that the bill interfered with their internal affairs. When linkage took advantage of one of the two sides, cooperation collapsed, and the negotiations were back at square one.

Brezhnev and Nixon met again in 1973 and 1974, signing further agreements and displaying their friendship with one another. By 1974, however, the "Watergate" political scandal had ruined Nixon's reputation in the United States, and forced him to resign from the presidency.

Without radically changing Soviet-American relations, detente brought US and Soviet leaders closer together than they had been in the past. While cooperating, the two countries forgot some of the mistrust that had marked their earlier relations. Even the very act of sitting down at negotiations helped them to identify their shared interests. Though they were rivals during the Cold War, the US and the USSR inhabited the same world. Both were responsible for the environment, for placing the world at the risk of nuclear war and investing billions of dollars in military industries, and for continuing ideological campaigns against each other. During the period of Soviet and US predominance, other countries were coming to the fore, declaring their right to participate in the making of world history. This was a fact that only gradually dawned on the superpowers. The entrance of Europe (East and West), Japan, and China onto the political stage nudged big-power politics from bipolarism to multipolarism, and that meant nothing short of a loss of power for the superpowers. Like the Soviet Union, these countries had now recovered from the disasters of the Second World War, and they weren't interested in sitting on the sidelines. In theory, at least, this was partly accepted:

> It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises . . . I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a stronger, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance."[5]

There is of course a variety of ways to achieve a balance, and simply increasing each nation's power until all are in some kind of equilibrium is

© SPICE

not the same as solving disagreements through discussion. Detente, having settled for neither, was perched precariously between cooperation and confrontation. Which direction would dominate the next few years?

Vocabulary

abide: to accept without objection; to tolerate. To abide by.

dogmatic: stubborn, sometimes arrogantly ideological and opinionated.

flux: continuous change and movement.

Study Questions

Try to answer some of the following questions when you have finished your reading:

1. What are some benefits of international cooperation?

2. What is multipolarism? Which do you think is safer: a multipolar world or a bipolar world? Explain.

REFERENCES

1. Cited in The Troubled Detente, Albert Weeks, 1976, p. 135.

2. Henry Kissinger, June, 1975, cited in Detente and Confrontation, Garthoff, 1985, p. 30.

3. Henry Kissinger, February, 1976, cited in Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, 1982, p. 283.

4. Leonid Brezhnev, January, 1977, cited in Garthoff, 1985, p. 36.

5. Richard Nixon, January, 1972, cited in Gaddis, 1982, p. 280.

© SPICE

Lesson Four Detente

Introduction

With this one-day lesson, students deepen their understanding of threat, insecurity, and cooperation in international relations. In an initial discussion students learn that nations perceive threat as a product of another's capabilities *and* intentions. A brief activity then introduces the class to the prisoner's dilemma, which challenges the student's understanding of conflict resolution and cooperation. Finally the class reads aloud and analyzes the Basic Principles signed and agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union during the height of detente.

Objectives

In this lesson, students will

- begin to distinguish between political and military threats
- analyze threatening and insecure situations
- take part in an activity on the prisoner's dilemma
- discuss the complexity of cooperation
- study the Basic Principles agreed to by the US and the USSR during the era of detente

Materials

- Handout #4, *Glossary*
- Handout #5, *Evolution Timeline*
- Handout #15, *Detente*

Make one copy per student of

- Handout #16, *Basic Principles*

Homework

- make one copy per student of Handout #17, *Detente to Distrust* (for Day Ten)

© SPICE

114

Procedures: Day 9

Threats: 10 minutes

1. In the following discussion, students think about the political relationship between the US and the Soviet Union during the period of detente. The questions below focus on military and political relations.

   Contrast military and political relations between states by raising the following points:

   - The military balance between nations is decided by what each of them is able to do militarily (*capability*). "Stronger" nations often have very large military forces, capable of being used in many parts of the world.
   - The political relationship between nations is influenced by what each of them thinks the other(s) might do (*intention*). If a nation behaves threateningly, as if it **intends** to be aggressive, other countries usually act with caution.

   Read and ask students the following:

   Because our perceptions of others are a mixture of their capabilities and our assumptions of their intentions, it is impossible to predict what they will do.

   - Think of a situation in which you did not feel threatened by a dangerous animal or person. Give an example of a dangerous animal which has been tamed. Why do you not feel threatened by it? (Possible response: The dangerous animal might not have been raised to be aggressive, and if it behaves well, you easily forget that it is still capable of injuring.)
   - How would you put this in terms of "capability" and "intention?" (Possible response: In spite of the animal's strength, or capability, it acts as if it does not intend harm.)
   - How might a political threat from one country persuade another to act in a certain manner? (Possible response: Political threats can be effective when they place the other country's reputation at risk. Any political scandal can severely damage a country and its reputation. Nations may also threaten to leave alliances, violate international agreements, reveal secrets or embarrass another country.)

© SPICE

- When might a seriously intended threat by a country not be effective? (Possible response: The threat is ineffective when the country being threatened does not change its behavior. This would mean that the threat was not credible.)

- Which are more difficult to determine: intentions or capabilities? (Possible response: Though the military, economic and political capabilities of a nation are not always clear, a nation's intentions are even less obvious. Intentions cannot be measured, whereas capabilities, though sometimes secret, can sometimes be discovered or researched.)

The Prisoner's Dilemma: 10 minutes

1. Ask each student to take out a half sheet of paper. Students on the left-hand side of the room are to write "1" on one side of the sheet. Students on the right-hand side of the room should write "2" on theirs. The "1"s and the "2"s should now pretend that they each represent one prisoner. Read the following scenario aloud:

   Imagine that you and another person have been caught for doing something wrong. You are separated from each other, and your interrogator wants you to confess that you and the other person were involved in the crime. You are being interrogated. If you are silent and refuse to say anything, nothing can be held against you, unless the person you were with tells on you. **If you tell on the other person and they remain quiet, they will receive a life sentence. If you both tell on each other, the two of you receive 20 years. If the other person tells on you while you say nothing, you receive a life sentence. If neither of you say anything, you both receive two years.** Do you remain quiet, and hope that the other person will too, or do you confess? Confessing is the same as "telling." You have no idea what the other person is doing, and no way to communicate with him/her. What do you do?

2. All of the "1"s should vote "*confess*" or "*say nothing*" individually, by writing this on their sheet of paper. The votes will be tallied by the teacher as if they were all prisoner number 1. **If one or more "1"s vote "confess," the vote of the entire group of "1"s will be "confess." If all of the "1"s vote "say nothing," that will remain their group vote.** In other words, one mistrustful vote of "confess" is all that it takes for the entire group vote to be "confess." The same goes for the group of "2"s.

3. Votes should be written on the blank side of the paper, folded over, and turned in to the teacher.

Tell students that "confession" is called "defection." Defecting means that you don't trust the other person to cooperate, to "say nothing." "Saying nothing" means "cooperation," because the best result for **both** of you is neither of you say anything.

Detente: 25 minutes

1. Detente (Day-**taunt**) is a French term meaning "relaxation of tensions," and has the same meaning in Russian as in English. It usually refers to the period in Soviet-American and East-West relations during the early 1970s when the two sides increased their cooperation which each other.

2. Ask the following questions about the prisoner's dilemma and Soviet-American relations:

   - Can you think of a way to get out of the prisoner's dilemma? (Responses should include: *a)* Somehow communicate or *b)* talk to the other person. *c)* Find out what the other person has decided to do.)

   - Would you have trusted a complete stranger to say nothing?

   - Would you have trusted your best friend to say nothing?

   - Would you have been more likely to trust someone you knew or didn't know?

   - How might the prisoner's dilemma describe Soviet-American relations?

   - How can deterrence strategies be described by the prisoner's dilemma? (Possible answer: Together, the Cold War and deterrence prohibited real communication between the superpowers. Although deterrence seemed to assure national security, it increased mistrust between the two.)

   - What did the United States and the Soviet Union have to lose? (Possible answer: Both thought they had their national security to lose. Advances in military technology were kept secret, for example, so that the other side would not get ahead in the "arms race.")

   - What did they have to gain? (Possible answer: The superpowers could have built enough trust in each other to decrease defense spending, military danger, and their levels of anxiety.)

© SPICE

- How did detente reduce the extreme uncertainty of the prisoner's dilemma? (As the US and the Soviet Union took up negotiations, they eliminated some of the fears that had kept them in the bind of the prisoner's dilemma.)

3. Write the following list on the chalkboard:

   1) environmental pollution clean-up; 2) medical research; 3) arms reductions; 4) air traffic control; 5) atomic bomb; 6) domestic social security programs

   Explain to students that these are examples of issues that might be national interests and international concerns at the same time. When addressing these issues, states must think about them on both of these levels. You want to think about why international cooperation is sometimes necessary.

   Ask the following questions:

   - Which of these projects do you think your country should pursue alone? Which should be pursued with international help? Why? (Possible responses are: 5) and 6) might best be pursued alone. Outside help might either be unnecessary or undesired: there is little reason for international involvement in a social security program. 1), 2), 3), and 4) could all be accomplished more quickly and efficiently with international cooperation. The scientific and technological discoveries made in other countries could be of great importance.)

   - Are some of these issues only of interest to your own government? Which ones and why?

   - Are some of these issues of interest to other governments also? Why?

   - What kinds of issues affect many countries regardless of international borders?

   - If some of these problems affect many countries at the same time, is there an advantage to international cooperation as a way of solving them? Why?

4. Distribute Handout #16, *Basic Principles*, to each student in the class. Read the opening paragraph aloud, up to the first article. Asking for volunteers, have students read the twelve articles aloud. If time allows, you could divide students into pairs and assign them to one article. Then ask each pair to describe that article's intended contribution to Soviet-American cooperation.

© SPICE

Ask the following questions:

- What do you think is meant by "normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in international affairs and mutual advantage?" (Article one) (Responses should include: *a)* Normal relations means a turn away from conflictual relations and a *b)* beginning of negotiation and discussion; *c)* the respect of each other's territorial, political, economic, military, and cultural security, *d)* the respect of each other as equals, and *e)* the acceptance of parity instead of superiority.)

- What do you think is meant by "they will always exercise restraint. . ." (Article two) (Responses should include: *a)* The danger of conflict is decreased when both sides try not to provoke each other. *b)* Both sides agree to respect each other's sovereignty and *c)* to permit each other to solve their own problems without fear of interference. *d)* Both sides are discouraged from taking advantage of each other.)

- What happens as a result of "exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary," conducting "such exchanges at the highest level"? (Article five) (Responses should include: *a)* By maintaining discussion between countries, policy makers can determine areas in which other countries have shared interests. *b)* High level exchanges promote international cooperation, helping to *c)* eliminate areas of possible conflict, and to *d)* create projects requiring international experience and coordination.)

- Why do you think the US and the USSR agreed to "deepen cultural ties with one another?" (Article nine) (Responses should include: *a)* Cultural contacts are important for mutual understanding and for *b)* learning from and about one another. c) The people of each country can become more familiar with each other through expanded cultural connections and exchanges.)

Journal: 5 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have on previous days. Today's entry should finish section four.

Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each other and to place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics, science and culture, will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual understanding and business-like cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of the people of both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

Second. The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Fourth. The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridicial basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

Fifth. The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

Sixth. The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Seventh. The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

Eighth. The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth. The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

Tenth. The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

MOSCOW, *May 29, 1972*

For the United States of America	For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
RICHARD NIXON	LEONID I. BREZHNEV
President of the United States of America	General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU

Detente to Distrust

Human Rights

From the beginning to the end of the Carter administration (1977-1981), the United States held a spotlight on the Soviet treatment of human rights. Standards for human rights had been provided for in the Helsinki Final Act agreement (1975), a high point of the detente era, and President Carter took a personal interest in the fate of several of the Soviet Union's most famous political opponents, or *dissidents*. For many years, in fact, the US and much of the western world had opposed the Soviet practice of placing political opponents behind bars, in "mental institutions," or of forbidding ordinary citizens from travelling or emigrating to countries outside of Eastern Europe. But President Carter's overall strategy of "competition and cooperation" led him to believe that lobbying for the freedom of famous dissidents would not get in the way of succeeding with the SALT II arms reduction talks. In 1974, a Congressional amendment had linked Soviet-American trade to Soviet policies on human rights. Now Carter hoped to sever this linkage and pursue the two independently. The Soviet Union reacted to him as one would to any unwanted meddler. They were insulted by his "attempts at interference in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries under the pretext of 'defense of human rights.'"[1]

Soviets were, in a sense, accusing the United States of breaking its very own Monroe Doctrine. Georgi Arbatov, a well-known deputy in the Supreme Soviet, later wrote:

> You know, human rights is an issue like motherhood. Everybody is for human rights. We made our revolution for human rights. . . . But we cannot base our governmental policy and our negotiations with your country on the condition that you change your system.[2]

Carter's initiatives ultimately increased the level of animosity between the two countries.

Overseas Interests

Early on in his term, President Carter was eager to leave his mark on Soviet-American relations. In his first important foreign policy speech, he declared that "we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear,"[3] beyond "the conviction that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained."[4] Despite these declarations, the two countries continued to keep an eye on one another; parts of the world which were neither clearly within their spheres of influence nor totally outside them became scenes of competition and sometimes conflict. All through the course of the Cold War, the expanding United States and the Soviet Union had been deepening their interests in further areas of the world. US foreign policy document NSC 68, as you remember, defined the scope of American security interests

---

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

very broadly. In geographic terms, it extended the "defense perimeter" of the US: symbolically redrawing American borders to include countries considered vital to US interests. Many of these "overseas interests" were separated from the United States by great distances, thus burdening the American military responsible for defending them.

The Soviet Union's extensive overseas influence differed in character from that of the US. Most significantly, the USSR had more neighbors to fret over: altogether, the Soviet Union borders on twelve nations, not all of which are sympathetic to their large next-door neighbor. Another factor important to understanding Soviet interests is that the Soviet Union lost one out of every ten of its people during the Second World War, the second time in this century that invading forces had entered through the eastern part of Europe. The Soviet view of the world thus included the stability and friendship of Eastern Europe as a fact of life and security. Western Europe was the United States' logical partner, in spite of its distance from the US. But how then did Cuba, Angola, South Vietnam, Nicaragua, the Philippines, El Salvador, and other countries fit into the policies of the two superpowers?

Regional Conflicts

The twentieth century has seen an enormous amount of political turmoil in developing countries. Many of these were formerly colonies of the European empires, and during this century were torn by violent rivalries between various political factions as they suffered the growing pains of independence. The superpowers had obvious interests in the outcomes of these rivalries, and viewed them differently. Conflicts in Latin America (Nicaragua and El Salvador, for example) were frequently referred to by the United States as "backyard revolutions." The Soviet Union, on the other hand, called them "popular," or "people's revolutions." The difference was ideological: the United States claimed to be on the lookout for "Soviet-exported revolutions." One such revolution, many Americans feared, would trigger a train of falling dominoes, for most new governments of developing countries were unstable and easily toppled. Soviet ideology emphasized the historical and progressive dimension of revolutionary events. Seen from the Soviet point of view, revolutions such as those which occurred in Iran and Nicaragua are conducted by people for the sake of their liberation. One Soviet commentator wrote that:

> The record has shown that national-liberation revolutions are intrinsically anti-imperialist, antifeudal and democratic. Virtually all the forces of society—the working class, peasantry, democratic intelligentsia, patriotic army circles, rural poor and the local bourgeoisie—take part in carrying out these revolutions.[5]

Ideology aside, where the superpowers chose to engage in the affairs of other countries, they often stood to win economic markets, credibility, and cheap labor. They also committed themselves to great economic costs:

throughout the 1980s, the Soviet Union paid $10 million a day in support of Cuba, the United States, $1 million a day to El Salvador. For purposes of discussion, this assistance is normally divided between non-lethal and lethal aid. Non-lethal aid, such as medical and health assistance or economic help, may still bolster a country's ability to fight a war by freeing up money for war-fighting.

The Carter Administration

In connection with his active diplomacy, President Carter began a number of international pursuits. After directing his attention to the conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Arab nations, Carter held a summit with Menachem Begin of Israel and Anwar Sadat of Egypt, successfully bringing a thirty-year war between them to a close. Carter's hopes that this detente might catch on elsewhere were short-lived, however. During the same year and the one following, events in the Middle East, China, and Africa soured the spirit of international cooperation and dialogue. Carter's very own overtures to the Chinese, and the possibility of a Japanese-American-Chinese partnership, for example, sprouted alarm in the Soviet Union. Because of the distrust still active in the Soviet-American relationship, diplomacy sometimes created tensions. And there were further setbacks.

In 1979, rebel forces in the Central American country of Nicaragua, where the US had exercised great influence since the early 1900s, staged a revolution. Their dislike for the United States was a product of their hostility towards the previous and extremely conservative government, which had been put in place by the US, and received American aid. Distraught, and determined to repair his image, Carter offered a $75 million aid package to Nicaragua's new Sandinista regime in order to keep the country in the US sphere. The Sandinistas, who had been American targets for years, turned instead to Cuba for additional help. The Cuban government responded by volunteering the expertise of teachers, health officials, and military experts, among others.

That same year, the Soviet Union toppled the Marxist leader of Afghanistan, one of its southern neighbors. The Soviet military assistance to the endangered pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan in 1979 stirred American fears of Soviet influence. Called an "invasion" by many in the US, this Soviet action turned into a lengthy and costly war. Soviet forces found themselves entrenched in what the Afghan rebels considered a "holy war." Not only did this make the Soviets unpopular in Afghanistan, it caused political opposition in the Soviet Union also. Unlike Nicaragua and the US, the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict involved actual neighbors. There are many Moslems living in the Soviet Union, close to the Moslem countries of Afghanistan or Iran, who favor closer contact with them. And as Soviet military leaders later concluded, it was the kind of war for which a superpower is not well-suited. Late in 1989, Premier Gorbachev announced that his country had made a mistake; some even referred to it as the Soviet Union's Vietnam.

The Use of Force

You might remember the name of the policy used by the USSR in cases similar to Afghanistan. Made famous by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the *Brezhnev Doctrine* was a Soviet warning against other communist countries not to set back the international "struggle for socialism" or to go against the "fundamental interest of other socialist countries." Since ". . . every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement,"[6] the doctrine has been used to justify the use of military force against other socialist nations. The use of force to control or influence other parts of the world was adopted not only by the Soviet Union. After the Afghanistan incident, President Carter flexed American muscles, targeting his threats at the Persian Gulf, a waterway in the Middle East through which crucial shipments of oil were channelled. The Carter Doctrine went as follows:

> An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.[7]

Thus both doctrines set out to give the superpowers the sovereign right to define the extent of their interests. This was where the 1970s, which heralded in the age of cooperation, ended. In a move like the linkage politics of Nixon and Kissinger, Carter decided to cancel the SALT II ratification procedures in the Senate. He then staged a rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran. The operation caused the deaths of 8 US soldiers and was a complete failure. Infuriated by Carter's new style, Cyrus Vance (Secretary of State) resigned.

The Reagan Administration

American attitudes towards problems overseas were by and large defined by the time Ronald Reagan took the presidential office in 1981. As a candidate who promised to "make America strong again," his success was in part a result of a widely-shared perception that Carter had acted too late to reverse a decline in US power. Reagan promised to approach negotiations with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, and America's defense, he contended, suffered from a "window of vulnerability." In order to repair this blemish on the nation's nuclear deterrent capability, the President called on scientists to develop a space-based defensive system. The Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars, as it was often called, consumed economic and scientific resources throughout the 1980s, without actually achieving significant progress. Further still, the President's comments portrayed a weak and inferior America, and a dangerous and menacing Soviet Union. Reagan had taken office at a time when Soviet-American relations were already cool. They soon became frighteningly poor. The President singled out the Soviet Union as a country with "no respect for human life, for the dignity of the individual, . . . the focus of evil in the modern world." "The

© SPICE

Soviet leaders, . . ." he announced, "reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat. . . ."[8]

Policy towards Central America—to many, America's "backyard" and a "hot" one too—hardened during the first years of the Reagan administration. Again, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Cuba were the nations allegedly threatened by Soviet power. El Salvador, led by a regime not in control of its "rightist" military, was struggling with "leftist" rebels supplied with arms from Cuba and Nicaragua. Violence resulting from clashes between the government military and the rebels paralyzed the country in fear. Between 1979 and 1984, approximately 38,000 Salvadorans fell victim to the military's attempt to control what it perceived as Marxist opposition. Those who died were often priests, professors, students, union leaders, lawyers, and anyone else found "with an idea in his [or her] head."[9] By 1987, the first seven years of the war in El Salvador had left the United States with a bill of almost one billion dollars.

As is often characteristic of regional conflicts, the bloodshed in El Salvador was not a product of Salvadoran and American politics alone. Supplies for the Salvadoran rebel forces were channelled through Cuba and Nicaragua, and the Reagan administration pointed to this as proof that the whole of Central America was under the threat of communism. Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that the US might "go to the source" of the Salvadoran rebel supply network, referring to Nicaragua. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua were the subject of some harsh words ("totalitarian" and "genocidal" appeared in descriptions of the Sandinistas), and the administration resolved to deliver a solid and final blow to the Nicaraguan leadership. With the support of a majority in Congress, President Reagan armed and trained rebel Nicaraguan forces called the "Contras" (which means counter, or against, in Spanish) to conduct a "covert" war against the Sandinistas. Though "covert" means "secret," the campaign was widely publicized and soon drew an angry reaction from much of the American public. The ensuing debate for and against Contra aid focused on the killing of innocent Nicaraguans and the destruction of the Nicaraguan society which resulted from the guerilla-style fighting.

Under international pressure, the United States began efforts to negotiate a settlement of the Central American conflict. At first, the Central American nations (Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mexico) and the United States pursued their different goals in separate negotiations. Neither recognized the other. It was clear, however, that the United States would have to be in favor of whatever peace plan might be arranged: any agreements that did not include the signatures of Nicaragua, the United States and the Contras would make little sense. In 1983, US forces invaded Grenada, a small Caribbean island, as a result of concerns that Americans there were in danger. This kindled fears that a US invasion of Nicaragua was in the making. The following year the American CIA mined Nicaraguan ports. A handful of hopeful breakthroughs in the negotiations failed to produce results, and by the end of Reagan's second term, the violence had not yet come to an end.

Almost Arms Control

Back on the arms control front, talks were initiated in Geneva over the US intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) which were to be deployed in Western Europe in 1983. The planned deployment of these 572 missiles was an outcome of NATO's 1979 "double-track" decision, which called for new medium range missiles in Western Europe to offset new Soviet deployments. (Medium range Soviet SS-20s, already stationed in Eastern Europe, were targeted at the United States' allies in Europe.) During the first rounds of negotiations the US offered what some analysts called "killer" proposals, so unacceptable to the USSR that agreement was virtually ruled out. In 1983, when negotiations were clearly failing, the United States carried out its plan to station the 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Europeans reacted with mixed feelings: those who felt reassured by this show of allied commitment were drowned out by others afraid of exposing their continent to the growing danger of warfare. The years-old peace movement grew in numbers and took to the streets in massive demonstrations against the planned deployment. Soviet negotiators refused to negotiate on missiles already being put in place, and walked out. The meetings were resumed later when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader, and with lightning progress, negotiators hammered out a treaty that was eagerly ratified by the US Congress (see Handout #10).

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet Premier in 1985, US-Soviet relations underwent another transformation. The American President began to see the Soviet Union with some optimism and gradually even trust. This gave new impetus to the arms control process, and was one cause for the speedy negotiation of the INF treaty. It was not a revolution in the two countries' relationship, however. The American military maintained its plans for a new "Stealth" bomber, continued research in the Strategic Defense Initiative, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact preserved a strong presence in Europe.

The deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (or "Star Wars") would be nothing short of a major revolution in the nuclear age. As implied by its name, SDI would work as a form of defense. It would theoretically function as a space-based protective "umbrella" over the US and its allies. Once detected, incoming missiles would be destroyed by a laser-operated strike guided by satellites in orbit. Progress on SDI has been slow, in spite of the great sums of money that have been invested in the program, and many experts claim that a simple buildup of Soviet missiles could easily foil it.

The Stealth bomber, when it was revealed in 1989, immediately drew criticism from experts. At a half billion dollars per plane, many also suggested that it was far too expensive. Some added that if Soviet-

American relations continued on an upward swing, the need for SDI and the Stealth bomber might disappear altogether.

Beyond Arms Control

The very act of communicating with each other through summits, exchange programs, cultural exhibitions, scientific conferences, and arms control, etc., has seriously challenged many of the biases the US and the USSR previously held towards each other. People in both countries are aware that they share many common interests. They are also aware that in order to build on these interests, they should focus on new areas—areas which were neglected when military concerns dominated Soviet-American relations. President Reagan noted during his first visit to Moscow that "our problems are not people to people, they are government to government." Gorbachev too had a similar observation:

> We live in a single house, although some of us come into the house by one entrance and others through another entrance. We need to cooperate and lay down communications in this house.[10]

At the close of the 1980s the United States and the USSR had proven to each other that they are able to overcome at least some of their disagreements. The question remained as to whether or not friendly relations could hold.

Vocabulary

Stealth bomber: a low-flying wing-like bomber intended for highly-accurate strikes. Capable of evading radar detection.

Holy War: any war fought motivated by divine command or religious beliefs. The concept of holy war is found in the bible and has played a role in many religions.

covert war: a war plotted and fought in secrecy through conspiracy, espionage and/or intelligence operations.

Study Questions

1. What did the domino theory mean for US foreign policy?

2. Commenting on US policy towards Nicaragua, a British observer once joked that "The Americans must have different maps . . . on which places like Cuba and Nicaragua are about twenty times bigger than they are on our maps."[11] What was he trying to say?

REFERENCES

1. The New York Times, August, 1977, cited in Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Joseph L. Nogee, 1988, p. 294.

2. Georgi Arbatov, cited in Inside the Cold War, John Sharnik, 1987, p. 280.

3. Cited in Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, 1985, p. 345.

4. Ibid., p. 345.

5. Nicolae Sedov, "Soviet International Involvement is Purely Humanitarian," in The Soviet Union: Opposing Viewpoints, David L. Bender and Bruno Leone, series editors, 1988, p. 33.

6. Joseph L. Nogee, 1988, p. 247.

7. Cited in "The Revitalization of Containment," Robert E. Osgood, in The Reagan Foreign Policy, William G. Hyland, ed., 1981-1987, p. 24.

8. Cited in Sharnik, 1987, p. 310.

9. Cited in "El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited," Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel in Low Intensity Warfare, Klare and Kornbluth, 1988, p. 115.

10. Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986, cited in ibid., p. 101.

11. Cited in Inside the Cold War, John Sharnik, 1987, p. 315.

© SPICE

Lesson Five

Contemporary Soviet-American Relations

Introduction

The final three days of this unit present regional conflicts, the transformation of Eastern Europe, and the fundamental change in Soviet-American relations seen in the late 1980s. Students first repeat the prisoner's dilemma to see if they vote differently. An overhead map activity introduces a discussion on the impact regional conflicts have had on Soviet-American relations. On day eleven, students divide into groups of four; each group prepares a brief presentation on the transformation of Eastern Europe based on the homework reading, Handout #18. Questions contained in Handout #19 provide a basis for the presentations. On day twelve, student groups give their presentations on the library articles they have been collecting over the course of the unit. Finally, students take the post-test for unit evaluation.

An optional exercise in which students write US-Soviet summit agendas is included (see Day Twelve).

Objectives

In this lesson, students will

- use maps to discuss regions in which the US and the USSR have come into indirect conflict
- make brief presentations on the political, economic, and military transformation of Eastern Europe
- present newspaper and magazine articles on issues of current importance to Soviet-American relations
- take the post-test for unit evaluation

Materials

- Handout #17, *Detente to Distrust*
- transparencies of Overheads #1-#6
- overhead projector

Make one copy per student of

- Handout #19, *Eastern Europe in Transition*

© SPICE

- Handout #20, *Issues of the Day*
- Handout #21, *Summit Agenda*
- Handout #22, *Post-Test*

Homework

- make one copy per student of Handout #18, *Beyond the Cold War?* (for Day Eleven)

Procedures: Day 10

The End of Detente: 10 minutes

1. Today's lesson begins with the collapse of detente. Ask students why the period of detente came to a close. (Responses should include: *a)* the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979; *b)* the US fear of Soviet military buildup during the 1970s; *c)* increased American public attention to alleged Soviet human rights violations; US linkage of human rights issues to trade with the Soviet Union; *d)* the unpopularity of the Carter administration; and *e)* an increase in US distrust of the Soviet leadership and American unwillingness to negotiate.)

2. Inform the class of the results of yesterday's prisoner's dilemma, and give students a chance to try it again. Explain the game to those who were absent yesterday. The purpose of repeating the exercise is to allow students to learn from yesterday's outcome, and see if they are more or less trustful of the other side the second time. Ideally, all students will elect to cooperate. Use the instructions in Lesson Four. The groups of "1"s and "2"s remain as they were yesterday.

Regional Conflict: 35 minutes

1. Display Overhead #1, *US View of the World* and ask the following questions. Where is the United States relative to the rest of the world? Where is the Soviet Union? How does the map show the American view of the world? Is the US isolated, or does it have many neighbors? Rotate the map; does it still make sense?

   Display Overhead #2, *Soviet View of the World* and ask the following questions. Where is the Soviet Union relative to the rest of the world? Where is the United States? How does the map show the Soviet view of the world? Is the Soviet Union isolated, or does it have many neighbors? (The map does not show the borders of the countries surrounding the USSR.) Rotate the map; does it still make sense?

© SPICE

2. Display Overhead #3, *Europe*. Ask students to indicate as many of the following countries and regions as possible:

    - Western Europe
    - Eastern Europe
    - Soviet Union
    - West Germany
    - East Germany
    - Czechoslovakia
    - Hungary
    - Greece
    - Turkey
    - France
    - Spain
    - Poland

    Overlay Overhead #3, *Answer Key*, or point out the answers by hand. Which spheres of influence did these countries fall into after World War II and why? Remove the answer key, and see if students can point out the countries which belong to NATO and those which belong to the Warsaw Pact. Display Overhead #4, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, for answers.

3. Display Overhead #5, *The World*. Ask students to locate some regions of conflict mentioned in Handout #17. These should include: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Korea, Afghanistan, Cuba, the Persian Gulf, and Vietnam. Place Overhead #6, *Regional Conflicts*, on top of Overhead #5, or point out the answers by hand.

    Ask students why the rotated maps were difficult to understand. What does this say about the importance of perspective?

4. The questions below should be used for the discussion about regional conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. Questions provoke students to use not only Handout #17, *Detente to Distrust*, but everything they have learned so far in the unit on the relationship between regional interests, superpower relations, and regional conflicts. *The responses provided are based on the way the United States and the Soviet Union often acted during the Cold War. They are not definitive answers.*

    - Why do you think the United States and the Soviet Union have maintained a presence in so many parts of the world? What did they have to gain? to lose? (Responses should include: *a)* The anxieties produced by the Cold War caused the US and the USSR to extend their defense needs. *b)* The two superpowers not only sought to keep the countries around them stable, but also became involved in countries close to the other superpower. *c)* By expanding their spheres of interest, the superpowers, like the European colonial nations before them, augmented their ability to affect the rest of the world, and thus increased their power. *d)* Countries risk added dangers to themselves if they overextend their influence.)

    - Look again at Overhead #3, *Europe*. What are some reasons that help to explain why Western and Eastern Europe became US and Soviet spheres of influence? (Responses should include: *a)* The US sought to rebuild Western Europe with the Marshall Plan. *b)* Soviet presence in Eastern Europe made the United States anxious, and *c)* the US perceived a danger of Soviet communism expanding beyond Eastern Europe. *d)* The Truman doctrine provided a mandate for US influence in Western Europe. *e)* US presence in Western Europe made the Soviet Union anxious, and *f)* the occupation of Eastern Europe during World War II allowed the Soviet Union to install communist governments there.)

- What are some reasons that help to explain why US and Soviet influence extended to other world regions? (Responses should include: *a)* US fears that communism was gaining support world-wide--for example, in North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador; *b)* alleged Soviet contributions to "revolutionary struggles" in the developing world; *c)* popular American perceptions that Latin America was its "backyard"; *d)* use of the Brezhnev doctrine in Afghanistan and *e)* use of the Carter doctrine in the Persian Gulf.)

- Why might a nation with extensive foreign influence encounter difficulties in maintaining its defense spending, security, and even credibility? (Possible answer: The greater the amount of influence a nation acquires, the greater the number of dangers it is open to--the bigger the balloon, the more surface that is exposed. A nation that claims to be in support of a country very far away may at some time be forced to actually defend it; if it chooses not to, it stands to lose some of its credibility.)

- What happens when a region becomes unstable? What is meant by the term "destabilizing?" (Possible answer: Political, economic, social, or military instability in any country can always spread across borders to others and destabilize an entire region of countries. New, unstable regions are considered weak and less resistant to the influence of stronger countries. If one of the superpowers believes that it is losing influence in a country or region, it may fear that it will lose even more countries (like dominoes)--perhaps to another superpower.)

- What are some characterizations of regional conflicts between the US and the USSR? (Responses should include: *a)* Regional conflicts are not fought on the territory of the US or the USSR and *b)* do not involve direct confrontation by troops of both sides. *c)* They are fought by forces which are supported militarily, politically, or economically by the

© SPICE

US or the USSR, and *d)* often express a perceived capitalist-communist confrontation. *e)* Many regional conflicts occur in developing countries or regions undergoing civil war or unrest. *f)* Both powers may see these countries as opportunities for influence. Examples are: Cuba, Angola, Vietnam, El Salvador, Nicaragua.)

- How do regional conflicts differ from direct conflicts? (Responses should include: *a)* Regional conflicts are usually fought without formal declarations of war between the US and the USSR, and *b)* without direct attacks of one side on the other.)
- What are ways of fighting regional conflicts? (Responses should include: *a)* The use of foreign troops *b)* trained and or supported by *c)* arms and money from *d)* one of the superpowers. Sometimes, as in Afghanistan and Vietnam, *e)* troops belonging to *one* of the superpowers do become involved in the fighting.)
- What are ways of solving regional conflicts? (Responses should include: *a)* International treaties and agreements signed by *b)* the forces in conflict, and sometimes *c)* the superpowers, have ended some regional conflicts. These usually mean that both sides have to *d)* compromise, unless one of the two sides has *e)* won or given up.)

Journal: 5 minutes

1. Allow students time to fill in their journals as they have before. Today's entry completes the unit's journal assignments.

Homework

1. Distribute Handout #18, *Beyond the Cold War?* Tell students that they will have class time to spend on their articles tomorrow, and remind them to bring their articles to class.

Procedures: Day 11

The Transformation of Eastern Europe: 40 minutes

1. The following questions can be used in an open-discussion or with the class divided into groups. For group activities, divide students into groups of three or four students. Each group should receive one of the four sets of questions. Allow groups fifteen minutes to answer their questions. One student in each group should take notes for a brief presentation to the class.

2. Begin the presentations when the fifteen minutes are over. The student presenter should read the questions aloud before answering them. Limit the length of the presentations so that each group has an equal share of the twenty-five minutes.

I. Perestroika and Glasnost

- What do the terms perestroika and glasnost mean?
- What kinds of problems led Gorbachev to try perestroika and glasnost?
- What problems were created by perestroika and glasnost?
- Should the United States support the goals of perestroika and glasnost? If so, why, and what should it do?

II. Eastern Europe

- What are some changes that occurred in Eastern Europe towards the end of the 1980s?
- How much power does the Communist Party exercise in these countries?
- What happened as a result of the Soviet Union's decision not to intervene in the 1989 revolutions?
- Have the Soviet Union and the United States redefined their perceptions of Eastern Europe? If so, what does Eastern Europe now represent?

III. The Military Alliances

- How did the Warsaw Pact react to the revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe? Can you explain why?
- Why were the changes in Eastern Europe important for the Warsaw Pact and NATO?
- Is the Warsaw Pact a threat to the NATO alliance? Is NATO a threat to the Warsaw Pact?
- Should the Warsaw Pact and NATO remain in Europe after the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe?

© SPICE

IV. Soviet-American Relations

- What were some events in Soviet-American relations that resulted from the reforms of Soviet Premier Gorbachev?
- What are some areas in which the United States and the Soviet Union could benefit from cooperation? Have these areas been explored in the past?
- What roles would you advise the United States and the Soviet Union to focus on in the next few years?
- Is the Cold War over? Why or why not?

Library exercise: 10 minutes

1. Distribute one copy of Handout #20, *Issues of the Day,* to each student, and allow enough time for them to read the directions. The questions are intended to help groups organize their presentations. Answer any questions students may have about their assignments. If students still need to find articles, they can photocopy some at the library or find old ones at home. Divide the class into groups of four. Groups can either share the responsibility for presenting or appoint presenters. Students in each group should spend any extra classtime today in preparation for tomorrow's presentations.

Procedures: Day 12

Issues of the Day: 35-40 minutes

1. Divide students into yesterday's groups of four, and have them continue work on their presentations. Each group should select several related articles from those they have altogether. The presentation will be based on these articles and the presentation guidelines in Handout #20.
2. As the student groups give their presentations, assist them when necessary, using the guidelines on Handout #20. Depending on the number of groups in the class, each group should be allowed an equal amount of time.

Conclusion: 5 minutes

1. Conclude this lesson with the following open questions:
    - Can the United States and the Soviet Union have normal relations with each other? Why or why not?

- What lessons can these countries draw from the Cold War?

Post-test: 10 minutes

1. Distribute one copy of Handout #22, *Post-test*, to each student. Give the students time to finish the test. Ask each student to pass his/her tests to someone else, and then distribute the tests taken on Day One randomly. Read the answers from the answer key aloud, so that students can grade both the new and the old pre-tests at the same time. Have students return the tests to their owners; how many students improved their scores?

Optional

The Summit Agenda: 50 minutes

1. Inform students that they are going to write summit agendas for the next summit meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. First read the following introduction:

> The summit meeting represents the highest-level meeting possible between nations: it is not the kind of meeting you attend unprepared. It will be your task to organize your country's agenda for the next summit conference. The agenda is open, and it will be up to you to decide what your two countries should spend time discussing. You are aware of the different areas that concern the US and the USSR: military issues, economics, politics, regional hotspots, cultural exchanges, the environment, etc.
>
> Your agendas should begin with opening statements introducing your perceptions of the other country and your expectations of the summit. The heart of the agenda will be a list of your priorities for Soviet-American relations. What are the issues you think your two leaders should discuss, and why?
>
> Finally, the summit agenda should include a timeline suggesting the order in which the two countries should tackle the problems you have listed. Try to include the amount of time you expect each of the summit goals to require.

2. Divide the class into student pairs, half of which will represent the Soviet Union and half of which will represent the United States. See Handout #21 for specific directions and format. Each pair should write a statement beginning with their general views, perceptions, and expectations of the other country. The statement should end with the goals of the summit meeting. Included in the statement should be the conditions you face in your own country, and why some of them are important for you to address.



© SPICE


USSR and satellites
EQUATOR

© SPICE

Europe



Answer Key


ICELAND
SWEDEN
FINLAND
NORWAY
UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
DENMARK
IRELAND
UNITED KINGDOM
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
EAST GERMANY
POLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
WEST GERMANY
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
BULGARIA
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
ALBANIA
GREECE
TURKEY

NATO and the Warsaw Pact


NATO
WARSAW PACT

© SPICE

Regional Conflicts


Korea
Vietnam
Afghanistan
Persian Gulf
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Cuba

Beyond the Cold War

It takes a supreme effort of the imagination to grasp the depth of the changes which swept across Eastern Europe in 1989. For years, governments in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were reluctant to accept the reforms of Soviet leader Gorbachev, in spite of the efforts of popular pressure in some countries (Poland, in particular). Then beginning with Poland, a wave of demonstrations forced the collapse of virtually all Eastern European ruling communist parties. In Czechoslovakia, over half a million protesters packed Prague's Wenceslas square, forcing the resignation of their leader in eight short days; that's over three percent of the country's population at one demonstration! In East Germany, the border with West Germany that had been so heavily guarded was opened with only several hours' notice. Thousands of jubilant East and West Berliners crowded at the wall to celebrate the city's happiest day in recent memory.

When Mikhail Gorbachev took his position as General Secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985, he began a serious reconsideration of his country's economic, social, political, and military affairs. People called it a "revolution from the top down." What he had to say took the world by surprise; his honest criticism and the openness expressed in his comments were not expected of Soviet leaders. Gorbachev termed this new openness "*glasnost*" and he urged the Soviet people to follow in his footsteps and speak their minds freely. At the same time, he initiated a badly needed process of "perestroika" (restructuring, i.e. of the economy, political system, military, etc.) aimed at transforming the Soviet economy into a better functioning machine.

The Soviet Union's "new thinking" was deemed by Gorbachev himself as necessary, not only for growth but perhaps even for survival. His country was entering a period of stagnation at a time when its industrial capabilities may have been better than ever. It "began to lose momentum. . . . the huge fly-wheel of a powerful machine was revolving, while either transmission from it to work places was skidding or drive belts were too loose."[1] Gorbachev looked for answers to this decline in new interpretations of socialism. He thought that many of the answers he was looking for had been written into the original texts of socialism by its founders, only to be ignored by his predecessors. The answer he proposed was "more socialism," adding the explanation, "more democracy, openness and collectivism in everyday life, more culture and humanism in production, social and personal relations among people, more dignity and self-respect for the individual."[2] What did this imply for the activities of day-to-day life? Gorbachev replied:

> People, human beings with all their creative diversity, are the makers of history. So the initial task of restructuring—an indispensable condition, necessary if it is to be successful—is to 'wake up' those people who have 'fallen asleep' and make them truly active and

---

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

> concerned, to ensure that everyone feels as if he is the master of the country, of his enterprise, office, or institute. . . . To get the individual involved in all processes is the most important aspect of what we are doing.[3]

The Soviet leader's claims may not seem foreign to us. In fact there may be little reason to think that they are foreign to the Soviet people. However, leaders such as Stalin and Brezhnev were averse to "the consistent development of the democratic forms inherent in socialism" and "the expansion of self-government"[4] which Gorbachev considered essential to socialism.

Political, economic, and social reforms can be shallow and they can be deep. Most countries undergo slight reforms all the time, smoothing out the operations of their educational, financial, governmental, legal, medical and other social systems. Perestroika and glasnost, however, belonged to radical reform: the entire population was asked to learn a new way of relating to work and to society. The above-mentioned systems did not simply need to be reformed, but rather restructured altogether, and in some cases even replaced. For the first time, factories were allowed to sell whatever surpluses they had; in exchange they received less money from the state than before. Some businesses preferred the money, and that created difficulty for the reform process. Because the centrally-planned economies of Eastern Europe had guaranteed employment to all citizens, the unemployment which accompanies radical reform produced trying situations. Coal-miners in Poland and the Soviet Union, for example, were forced to strike in order to draw attention to their plight.

In some Eastern European countries reforms proceeded more quickly than in others; in the Soviet Union itself, many of the expected changes fell behind schedule. As a result, some observers were skeptical of a refurbished socialism's future, still others critical of socialism regardless of its new face. Still others (in China, Cuba, and Albania for example) claimed that Gorbachev's version was not socialism, but a surrender to capitalism. Regardless of the perception held by the vast majority of Soviet citizens that socialism needed substantial revision, perestroika was a gradual process whose effects four years later were still inadequate. Shortages of goods as varied as meat, soap, women's boots and cotton underwear continued to nag the Soviet consumer.

Poland

Glasnost and perestroika only slowly found their way to the countries of Eastern Europe. When, in 1989, they were finally allowed in, they virtually spun out of control, forcing the Soviet leadership into a very difficult situation. Poland, having been primed by the country's strong Solidarity trade union movement, was the first to leave the Soviet fold. In August, 1989, a non-Communist leader was elected by popular democratic vote: the Communist Party relinquished its hold on political power and handed it to

Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the opposition movement Solidarity. Solidarity was a worker's union and political movement attacked by the Polish Communist Party for its disruptive strikes. It was officially banned between 1981 and 1989. The new government set about to reshape the economy without a moment's hesitation. On January 1, 1990, Poland was the first to democratize and begin conversion to capitalist-style government. Lech Walesa, longtime leader of Solidarity, travelled abroad to raise financial assistance. This task of economic restructuring alone threatened to be a nightmare; having taken the most radical path, however, Poland knew it would have to be the guinea pig for its Eastern European neighbors, and perhaps the Soviet Union itself.

Hungary

Unlike Poland, Hungary had been toying with communist-led reforms for over two decades. Although these resulted in a massive national debt, the largest per capita in Eastern Eastern, Hungarians enjoyed a way of life much more comfortable than that of their Eastern European neighbors. Food lines were infrequent and consumer items more plentiful than elsewhere. In October, 1989, the popular Communist Party leader Imre Pozsgay disposed of the Communist Party entirely, naming its reformist successor simply the Hungarian Socialist Party. The Communist Party itself had in fact been the force behind some of the year's unforgettable decisions: early in 1989 it had allowed the formation of new political parties—over fifty were counted early in 1990!—to be competitors in elections scheduled for 1990, and in August 1989, it had clipped the barbed wire along its border with Austria in spite of objections raised by the East German government. The resulting exodus of almost 100,000 East Germans to West Germany through the Hungarian-Austrian border later sparked one of the year's most fantastic surprises.

East Germany

Some said they had seen progress in Hungary and Poland coming. Virtually no one would have said this of the GDR (German Democratic Republic, or East Germany), Czechoslovakia, or Romania. These three traditionally maintained remarkably tight control over their societies (Albania, at the most extreme, is still virtually closed to the rest of the world.) But in the fall of 1989, when free travel from Hungary in the Eastern bloc into Austria and the West first became possible, a flood of East Germans departed straight from their vacations in Hungary or Czechoslovakia to West Germany, where they were legally recognized as West German citizens. The exodus traumatized the GDR's economy and society as it had done in 1961, before the Berlin wall was erected to prevent people from leaving. When enormous demonstrations erupted in East Berlin and other major cities, ailing Chancellor Erich Honecker was cast out by his own party. Protests continued to grow in size, and with a move that stunned the world, the GDR's newest leader announced the opening of the East-West German border. Within hours, the Berlin wall was history. And the movement for change held its momentum: days later the Communist

Party had renounced its leading role in the government and agreed to hold free elections in 1990.

Czechoslovakia

Words or other signs of warning from the Soviet Union were not forthcoming, and the tide of change soon threatened to drown the Czechoslovak leadership. Enormous protests first brought down the Czech leader Milos Jakes and then an interim government led by the Communist Party. Soon a hodge-podge government comprised of active citizens, writers, artists, student leaders, and other members of the political movement "Civic Forum" was in place with Vaclav Havel, a once-forbidden playwright, and Alexander Dubcek, the former Czech President whose reforms were the reason for the Soviet invasion of 1968, at its head. Said one bystander of the revolution: "In 1968 it was a slim hope for change battling against overwhelming odds. Today this is the voice of the whole people when their time has come."[5]

Romania

The changing of the guard was less smooth in Romania, where hundreds died in a last-minute call to order by the country's leader for 24 years, Nicolae Ceausescu. In Romania, the economic and social conditions had become simply unacceptable. The winter's bitter beginning added little cheer to the government's extreme regulation of heating (apartments were kept at fifty degrees or lower), strict rationing of electricity, and the unavailability of food. For over twenty years Ceausescu had forced villagers into concrete communities, torn down villages, and presided over a plan to impose industrialization on Romania's agricultural people. Special police forces kept a close watch on the entire population. Glasnost and perestroika received mention only in private conversations; the country was kept closed to the outside world. Romanians persevered through the strength of their wills and the resourcefulness of their ways. In December, violent demonstrations erupted in several towns, including the capital, Bucharest. When the army joined sides with the civilians against Ceausescu's loyal security forces, fighting got out of control. After eight days, the army claimed control of the country, and Ceausescu and his wife were executed. The purging of communists loyal to their former leader began almost immediately, as did the uncertain transformation to democracy.

Bulgaria

Consistent with its habit of mimicking the ways of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria was quick to respond to Gorbachev's plea for change in Eastern Europe. So quick, in fact, that the ensuing confusion quickly paralyzed bureaucracies and governmental functions. Nobody knew how to operate according to new goals and decrees: bankers, for example, were without insight into the ways and means of commercial finance. The country's leader for 35 years, Todor Zhivkov, was forced to reverse some of the

© SPICE

changes in order to restore order. When the Bulgarian government granted permission to the country's minority population of ethnic Turks to once again use their own traditional names, many Bulgarians became upset. In November, 1989, Zhivkov resigned, and was replaced with a less rigid Communist Party member who seemed more likely to pursue Gorbachev's pace of reform than the faster-paced one of Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Yugoslavia

Problems facing this southern European country, independent of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc since 1948, were representative of Eastern Europe's most serious challenges. Yugoslavia is home to nine ethnic groups, some of which have been hostile to one another for decades, and clashes between Serbs and Albanians in January 1990 threatened to plunge the country into civil war. Because these ethnic groups have strong identities deeper than their association with Yugoslavia as a country, outbreaks of unrest presented a severe challenge to the government's growing politics of restructuring. Forced sometimes to control violent disturbances, the government lost the confidence of many of the Yugoslavian people. (A similar ethnic crisis emerged for the government of Mikhail Gorbachev; neither country has found an easy solution.)

Albania

In Albania, a country which shrouded itself in secrecy, permitting only very few tourists through its closed borders, there was little indication that events in the rest of Eastern Europe were having any impact. Tucked in between Greece and Yugoslavia, this nation has the lowest standard of living in all of Europe, and a stagnant economy. One Albanian citizen supposedly said that if the borders were opened, "even the turtles would run."

Soviet responses

Eastern Europe was the Soviet Union's first post-war sphere of influence. When the people of Eastern Europe took their political destiny into their own hands, the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev, allowed them to go their own way. Even during the most intense moments of crisis, the Soviet Union's respect for each country's own political destiny was maintained, and military interventions, such as were characteristic in 1948, 1956 and 1968, were categorically ruled out. Gorbachev had cast out the Brezhnev doctrine, choosing instead the "normalization" of international relations:

> Every nation is entitled to choose its own way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory, and its human and natural resources. International relations cannot be normalized if this is not understood in all countries.[6]

Before the period of Eastern European turmoil, Gorbachev was set on a vision for a new Europe. It was a vision applauded by other Europeans, and remains a long-term goal for the integration of Eastern and Western Europe:

> Europe is indeed a common home where geography and history have closely interwoven the destinies of dozens of countries and nations. . . the home is common, that is true, but each family has its own apartment, and there are different entrances, too. But it is only together, collectively, and by following the sensible norms of coexistence that the Europeans can save their home, protect it against a conflagration and other calamities, make it better and safer, and maintain it in proper order. . . . The concept of a 'common European home'. . . combines *necessity with opportunity.*[7]

Since then, many of these "families" have demonstrated a fierce interest in having their apartments all to themselves, sovereign and safe from other national influences (including Soviet). The disruptions in Yugoslavia, for example, were echoed in the Soviet Union itself. The USSR is composed of a great variety of nationalities (over 100 altogether), some of which were self-governing between the two World Wars, some of which desire self-government. In several cases, a group of people with a common ethnic origin and shared traditions was divided by the borders of the Soviet Union's twelve republics. Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Soviet Moslems on the border with Iran are but a few. In many cases these groups share opposing religious beliefs, and the minority population often suffers from persecution by those in the majority. The first weeks of 1990 showed that while Lithuania was bent on seceding from the Soviet Union, many Azerbaijanis were determined to drive out the minority Armenians. These and other crises left the Soviet leader between a rock and a hard place.

The losses felt by the communist parties of Eastern Europe had serious repercussions in the Soviet Union. Early in 1990, Gorbachev relaxed his opposition to multi-party rule in the Soviet Union. As Soviet communist power declined, the reforms which were needed to keep the country afloat became self-destructive. Gorbachev's effectiveness was sometimes based on the fact that he possessed the authority to muffle the voices of his opponents. As a result of open discussions favored by glasnost and perestroika, the number of political perspectives increased and his influence declined. In places like the USSR and Eastern Europe, where there had been no real opposition parties, even the process of making simple decisions became incredibly complex. In February 1990, Gorbachev's proposal for a multi-party system in the USSR hinted at a similar fate for his country. Perestroika had produced a political machine for which the most basic parts were still to be built. Thus perestroika's real test would perhaps be its offspring: democratization.

Soviet-American Relations

American response to the "Gorbachev phenomenon" at first lagged behind that of the Europeans (east and west). George Kennan, who had attempted to wake up the American public in 1946 with his famous *Foreign Affairs* article, wrote the following early in 1989:

> we are faced with the fact that Gorbachev has given every evidence, for his part, of an intention to remove as many as possible of the factors that have hampered Soviet-American relations in the past. . . To the extent he is able to carry these efforts to conclusion (and that depends to some extent on the response from our side), they present the most favorable opportunity the United States has had in the last 70 years to develop a normal, constructive and hopeful relationship with the Soviet Union.[8]

Indeed, Soviet-American relations stepped into the 1990s with a strident optimism not seen before. Bush and Gorbachev virtually disposed of the Cold War during their first summit in December, 1989.[9] For the duration of Gorbachev's first years as the Soviet leader, Presidents Reagan and Bush were open-minded but viewed him nonetheless with caution. However, other voices cried out that it was precisely in America's interest not only to see his success, but to actively pursue it. Henry Kissinger (Nixon's National Security adviser and then Secretary of State) advised that "caution can only preserve the status quo; boldness is needed to reach a better future."[10]

The year 1989 is remembered as a year of revolution. Was it final proof of Kennan's prediction in 1946 that within the Soviet Union were sown "the seeds of its own decay?" Gorbachev, while visiting the Pope in Rome, said that "We have now decided, firmly and irrevocably, to base our policy on the principles of freedom of choice, and to develop our culture through dialogue and acceptance of all that is applicable in our conditions." His radical position encouraged firm response from the United States. The challenge seemed to have been taken up by the American President when just before his first summit with the Soviet leader in 1989, Bush said "Let us move beyond containment and once and for all end the Cold War."[11]

What does all this talk add up to? There are many areas available for Soviet-American cooperation first examined during detente but left inactive in the years that followed. Environmental problems, poverty in the third world, technological enterprises, the AIDs epidemic, and the fight against drugs, to name a few, cannot be solved by the isolated efforts of any single nation. It is in the interest of all of them to act together:

> "It's my conviction that the human race has entered a stage where we are all dependent on each other. No country or nation should be regarded in total separation from another, let alone pitted against another. That's what our communist vocabulary calls internationalism and it means promoting universal human values."[12]

As the United States and the Soviet Union emerge from the shadow cast by the Cold War, they are bound to find problems formerly concealed from view. Ethnic unrest in Eastern Europe, in Soviet republics, and perhaps along Soviet borders might set back perestroika significantly. In the 1980s, American forces were active in Grenada, Panama, the Philippines, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East; more such conflicts may arise. One journalist writes: "The cold war may have kept the world on the edge of an abyss, but it had the virtue of simplicity. Today, the old guideposts are gone."[13] That leaves a lot of unmarked territory.

Vocabulary

democratize: to transform a political system into a multi-party democracy; in Eastern Europe, eliminating the Communist Party's unchallenged power.

normalization: in international relations, to reduce and eventually erase ideological, political, economic, and military rivalries between countries.

Study Question

1. In 1988, Soviet Deputy Georgi Arbatov said to Americans visiting Moscow: "We are going to do a terrible thing to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy."[14] What did he mean by this?

REFERENCES

1. Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987, p. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. TIME Magazine, December 4, 1989, p. 23.
6. Ibid., p. 163.
7. Ibid., p. 181.
8. "After the Cold War," George F. Kennan, The New York Times Magazine, February 5, 1989, p. 38.
9. At the end of the summit meeting, President Bush announced that the two countries were ". . . at the threshold of a whole new era in US-Soviet relations." TIME magazine, December 11, 1990, p. 35.
10. Henry Kissinger, cited in Newsweek magazine, December 4, 1989, p. 58.
11. Cited in TIME magazine, December 4, 1989, p. 30.
12. Perestroika, Gorbachev, p. 174.
13. Newsweek magazine, January 8, 1990, p. 26.
14. Cited in TIME magazine, December 11, 1989, p. 40.

© SPICE

Eastern Europe in Transition

I. Perestroika and Glasnost

- What do the terms perestroika and glasnost mean?
- What kinds of problems led Gorbachev to try perestroika and glasnost?
- What problems were created by perestroika and glasnost?
- Should the United States support the goals of perestroika and glasnost? If so, why, and what should it do?

II. Eastern Europe

- What are some changes that occurred in Eastern Europe towards the end of the 1980s?
- How much power does the Communist Party exercise in these countries?
- What happened as a result of the Soviet Union's decision not to intervene in the 1989 revolutions?
- Have the Soviet Union and the United States redefined their perceptions of Eastern Europe? If so, what does Eastern Europe now represent?

III. The Military Alliances

- How did the Warsaw Pact react to the revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe? Can you explain why?
- Why were changes in Eastern Europe important for the Warsaw Pact and NATO?
- Is the Warsaw Pact a threat to the NATO alliance? Is NATO a threat to the Warsaw Pact?
- Should the Warsaw Pact and NATO remain in Europe after the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe?

IV. Soviet-American Relations

- What were some events in Soviet-American relations that resulted from the reforms of Soviet Premier Gorbachev?
- What are some areas in which the United States and the Soviet Union could benefit from cooperation? Have these areas been explored in the past?
- What roles would you advise the United States and the Soviet Union to focus on in the next few years?
- Is the Cold War over? Why or why not?

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

Issues of the Day

1. You and your group should have collected several articles (at least one each) from national and local newspapers or magazines on one topic of current Soviet-American relations. The questions below are guidelines for your class presentations. After reading your articles, choose two or three that you would like to present to the class. Your teacher should tell you how much time each group will be given to present and to answer questions. Make sure that Soviet views are represented.

2. Try to focus your selection of articles on one of the following categories:

   - politics—national or international
   - culture/society
   - history
   - economics
   - military security
   - arms control and disarmament
   - ideology

   If the articles touch on several of these categories, choose the one that is most central.

Presentation Guidelines

1. Begin your presentations with a brief summary of the articles you used. You should include the following information:

   - Where did you get them and when are they dated?

   - What categories did they fit into and why? How did you choose the most central category?

2. Think about the following questions, and focus on two or three of them in your presentations:

   - What is the central topic of your articles, and who are the people involved in it?

   - Do the events described in your articles relate to Soviet-American relations directly or indirectly? How?

   - Do your articles have strong implications for Soviet-American relations? Are these optimistic or pessimistic? In which area(s) and why?

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

Handout #21

Summit Agenda

Country:

Write the name of your country above, according to the country you have been appointed to represent. Use the outline below to prepare your agenda. One of you should be responsible for filling in the outline.

Step 1: Statement

Write a group statement declaring your views of the other country. This introductory statement should begin with your general perceptions of the other country and expectations of the summit, concluding with some goals you would like to accomplish in future Soviet-American relations.

Step 2: Priorities

List your country's priorities, or goals, in their order of importance. Classify each goal in one of the following categories: politics—national or international; culture/society; history; economics; military security; arms control and disarmament; ideology.

Priorities	**Category**
1.	
2.	
3.	

Step 3: Timeline

Fill in the years and months you think each goal should take to accomplish once it is underway.

Timeline

1. ____ months ____ years

2. ____ months ____ years

3. ____ months ____ years

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

Post-Test: Soviet-American Relations

The questions here are the same as those which you saw on the Pre-test, only their answers cannot be guessed! Try your best at answering them.

1. How would you describe the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union? How would you describe their economic systems?

2. Which of these economic systems did Eastern European countries share?

3. Why would it be incorrect to say that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union had an ideology, where the United States did not?

4. Give an example of American support to foreign governments trying to establish free-market economies.

5. Why is the term "bipolarism" used to describe the rough division of the world by two superpowers into East and West, communism and capitalism?

6. What are the names of the military alliances in Europe to which the Soviet Union and the United States belong? Where are they and when were they founded?

7. Why did the United States explode atomic bombs over two Japanese cities?

8. What was the Cold War?

9. Why was the "Cuban Missile Crisis" an extremely tense confrontation?

10. Why have American and Soviet leaders not always met regularly for summit conferences and arms control agreements?

11. Give two examples of conflicts in which the United States and the Soviet Union did not face each other in war, but in which they supported opposing sides.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

12. What is the meaning of detente?

13. Why was the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan important for Soviet-American relations?

14. Which Soviet Premier once declared to the US that "we will bury you." Which American President called the Soviet Union an "evil empire?"

15. Why are "arms control" and "disarmament" not always the same thing?

16. If [illegible] INF (Intermediate-range nuclear forces) treaty of 1987 was the first agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to actually cut their arsenals of nuclear missiles, what did the other agreements do?

17. During which two decades was Khrushchev the Soviet Premier?

18. Which country has vowed never to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

Answer the following questions again, based on your new familiarity with Soviet-American relations. Use an extra sheet of paper.

"What do you think?"

1. Is the Soviet Union a threat to the United States? Is the United States a threat to the Soviet Union? Explain.
2. Is it necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union to stockpile thousands of nuclear warheads for their national defense? Explain.
3. Is Soviet-American cooperation important? Explain.
4. Are deeply-rooted differences between the United States and the Soviet Union responsible for their historical distrust of each other? Explain.
5. Would you be interested to live in the Soviet Union for six months if you had the chance? Would you and your friends enjoy being host to Soviet youths? Explain.

© SPICE

Post-Test: Soviet-American Relations

1. The government of the United States is based on the principles of representative democracy. The government of the Soviet Union is based on the principles of Marxist-Leninist communism. The former is a two-party system with majority vote; the latter is a single-party system with no open voting. The economic system of the United States is based on the competitiveness of free-market capitalism. The economic system of the Soviet Union is state-run. Under Gorbachev's reforms it underwent its first penetrating reforms, aimed at generating incentives and increasing productivity and efficiency.

2. During the Cold War, Eastern European countries shared the economic system of the Soviet Union.

3. The term "ideology" can be used in reference to any belief popular within a society or country; both the US and the Soviet Union have had strongly ideological perceptions of each other, particularly during the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine and "roll back," for example, were for many no less ideological than the "inevitability of conflict."

4. Two examples of American support to foreign governments trying to establish free-market economies are the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift. In the case of the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the Bay of Pigs, to name a few, the "defense of democracy" was the justification given by the American government.

5. The term "bipolarism" is used to describe the rough division of the world by two superpowers into East and West, communism and capitalism, because "bipolar" means to be divided into two poles. The term "bipolar" also connotes antagonism or opposition.

6. The United States belongs to NATO, formed in 1949 in Western Europe. West Germany was not a member of NATO until 1955, after which the Soviet Union created and led the Warsaw Pact (also in 1955) in Eastern Europe.

7. Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima (Aug. 6, 1945) and Nagasaki during the Second World War (Aug. 9, 1945) to force Japan into surrender. Some analysts claim that the United States also wanted to show the Soviet Union that it had developed a unique military weapon capable of destruction on a scale never seen before.

8. The Cold War was a period during which Soviet-American relations were at their most tense and dangerous. The nuclear arms buildup, the expansion of spheres of influence, a feeling of mutual distrust, and politics based on deterrence rather than cooperation characterized the Cold War. Chronologically, it began immediately following World War II, and ended with the dawn of detente in the late 1960s.

© 1990 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University for SPICE.

9. US President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev came dangerously close to a nuclear confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis (October, 1962). Misperceptions of each side's nuclear capabilities and intentions, complicated by a lack of experience with high-level communication, turned the crisis into an important lesson of the 20th century.

10. When confronted with the possibility of nuclear inferiority, American and Soviet leaders often chose not to enter into arms control agreements which threatened to "tie them up." In some cases the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to be so great that summits seemed pointless. General feelings of distrust and dislike complicated this already inhospitable atmosphere, and disputes over policy (such as linkage and human rights, or the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia) often interrupted discussions.

11. Korea, Nicaragua, Cuba, Afghanistan, Angola, Vietnam, El Salvador.

12. "Detente" refers to the relaxation of tensions between rivaling nations, and an increase in cooperation and trust between them.

13. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was an indication that the Soviet Union was interested in non-military solutions to these kinds of conflicts. As a result, the United States built up its confidence in the USSR's intentions for peace and cooperation.

14. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev once declared to the US that "we will bury you." US President Ronald Reagan once called the Soviet Union an "evil empire."

15. "Arms control" tends to mean regulation and management of the arms buildup, whereas "disarmament" is more far-reaching. Disarmament is a reversal of the arms buildup, and not many arms control treaties have resulted in disarmament.

16. Previous arms control agreements have created channels for Soviet-American communication, have placed restrictions on nuclear testing, on the deployment of strategic missiles and of anti-ballistic missile defenses. Weapons in space are prohibited. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been brought under international control.

17. Nikita Khrushchev was the Soviet Premier during the 1950s and the 1960s (from 1955-1964).

18. The Soviet Union has vowed never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

. . . Defining One Another

1. Soviet definitions found in *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1976.

Communism: "(1) The socioeconomic formation replacing capitalism and founded on public ownership of the means of production; (2) in the narrower sense, a stage or phase in the development of this post-capitalist formation that is more advanced than socialism; "a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of members; under it all-around development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology; all the springs of cooperative wealth will flow more abundantly and the great principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' will be implemented. Communism is a highly organized society of free, socially conscious working people in which public self-government will be established, a society in which labor for the good of society will become the prime vital requirement of everyone, a necessity recognized by one and all, and in which the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people." Vol. 11.

Capitalism: "Social and economic structure based on private property in the means of production and the exploitation of wage labor by capital; capitalism replaces feudalism and precedes socialism, the first phase of communism." Vol. 12.

Revolution: "A way of passing from a socioeconomic formation that has become historically obsolete to a more progressive one; a radical qualitative change in the entire socioeconomic structure of society." Vol. 21.

Explain to students that in communist writings the "proletariat" is defined as the "working class" which is exploited by the "ruling class." "Exploitation" occurs when the ruling classes keep the profits which are actually earned by the workers. According to communist views of capitalism, the working class will eventually replace the ruling class in a social revolution. World history, according to classical Marxism, is a dialectical unfolding of this universal struggle, one in which the victor is supported by the very forces of history.

2. US definitions are taken from *The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition*, 1985. Grolier Incorporated, Danbury, CT.

Communism: ". . . a theory or system of social organization based on the holding of property in common. Specifically and currently, it refers to the doctrines underlying the revolutionary movement that aims to abolish capitalism and ultimately to establish a society in which all goods will be socially owned and all economic activities socially planned and controlled, and in which distribution will be in accordance with the maxim "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs." Vol. 7.

Capitalism: "The economic system in which all or most of the means of production and distribution, as land, factories, railroads, etc., are privately owned and operated for profit, originally under fully competitive conditions: it has been generally characterized by a tendency toward concentration of wealth, and, in its later phase, by the growth of great corporations, increased governmental control, etc.."--Excerpted from *Webster's New World Dictionary*, David B. Guralnik, editor in chief, 1984. Simon and Schuster, New York City, NY.

Revolution: "A term used to designate a fundamental change in the government or the political constitution of a country, mainly brought about by internal causes and effected by violence and force of arms on the part of a considerable number of individuals." Vol. 23.

© SPICE

Related Activities

We have provided lists of related activities to offer teachers suggestions on how ideas within **Major Concepts/Events in Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking** may be extended in both general and specific ways. These suggestions vary greatly in their level of complexity and detail. Any connections to California's History/Social Science Framework and History/Social Science Model Curriculum Standards are indicated in parentheses.

Note: In an effort to balance the following related activities, while at the same time correlating suggestions to model curriculum standards, some US History and Geography activities are followed by parallel activities for the Soviet Union/Eastern bloc.

- Assess the role of interest groups in the making of US policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Specifically, the impact of interest groups supporting human rights and Jewish emigration should be studied as a powerful force in US policy towards the USSR. Other interest groups of relevance are the peace movement, the nuclear freeze campaign, and the Test-Ban campaign of the late 1950s. (US History and Geography Standard 4)
- Study the importance of ideology and anti-communism in US military involvements. Try to assess the reality of communist threats and the magnitude of US interests in countries in which military intervention or support was forthcoming. (US History and Geography Standard 8)
- Analyze the "cyclical" nature of US foreign policy (i.e. interventionism vs. isolationism) and consider whether or not detente and cold war were part of this cycle. (US History and Geography Standard 9)
- Consider "roll back" strategy as an interventionist cycle in US foreign policy. (US History and Geography Standard 9)
- Compare the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine to the Monroe Doctrine. What was President Monroe's promise to European nations in return for their non-interference in US foreign policy? (US History and Geography Standard 9)
- Explore the relationship between military intervention and economic interests in foreign countries with strong communist tendencies. Case studies might be Greece, Vietnam, and countries of Latin America. Can the domino theory explain intervention in countries where the US has little direct interest, but significant regional interest? (US History and Geography Standard 10)
- Discuss the aftermath of Chernobyl and other environmental disasters which have affected both "East" and "West." Study the cooperative

attempts to prevent, manage, and clean-up these catastrophes. (US History and Geography Standard 19)

- Assess the role of the media in creating and eroding "enemy images," and their impact on US-Soviet relations. (US History and Geography Standard 21)
- Using a short-wave radio, listen to American broadcasts such as *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Europe*. Try the same with Soviet broadcasts to the United States. (US History and Geography Standard 21)
- Collect US newspaper headlines on the Soviet Union and discuss their impact on the public. What kinds of stereotypes do they create? Is the USSR portrayed as revolutionary, communist, threatening, trustworthy, endangered, etc.? (US History and Geography Standard 21)
- Examine the link between domestic US politics and nuclear technology in the context of the US nuclear arms buildup. An interesting analysis might ask which of the two areas tended to influence policies: technological advances or shifts in political views. (US History and Geography Standard 22)
- What impact did the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces have in Western Europe, particularly West Germany and Great Britain? (US History and Geography Standard 22)
- Study the debates over the Strategic Defense Initiative, both in the United States and with the Soviet Union. Do the same with the MX missile, the Stealth bomber, and chemical weapons. What other American technological advances have created anxiety in other countries? Why? (US History and Geography Standard 22)
- Discuss the role of individual leadership in the making of US policies towards the Soviet Union. Some interesting figures are: Joe McCarthy, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Paul Nitze, Robert McNamara, and Henry Kissinger. (US History and Geography 36)
- Discuss the values and principles underpinning the Truman Doctrine, NSC 68, or other statements of US foreign policy. Read them closely, looking for key phrases, descriptions, even adjectives and verbs. How do these documents define the threat to the US and justify certain responses? (American Government and Civics Standard 2)
- Discuss the controversies surrounding anti-communist ideology in the context of overt and covert operations in foreign countries with ties to communism (i.e. Nicaragua, Angola, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Vietnam). (American Government and Civics Standard 6)

© SPICE

- Study the changing position of the US in the world and corresponding shifts in military strategies and attitudes towards the USSR. (American Government and Civics Standard 16)

- Compare and contrast the role of the military, the public, and government leaders in the making of US and Soviet foreign policies. Are any of these changing? (American Government and Civics Standard 18)

- Study and chronicle US and Soviet images of each other over time, looking particularly at US Presidential campaigns. During what times was a Cold War attitude more popular; a detente attitude? Is there any correlation between popular views of the USSR and other events important to the US public at the time? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 1)

- Study the changing views of nuclear weapons and their role in military doctrine. What were the reasons for the Soviet Union's acceptance of flexible response? Why were the United States and the Soviet Union able to seal the INF agreement? What kinds of realizations were necessary? What are the reasons for the Soviet Union's shift away from tactical nuclear weapons? What difficulties does the United States often perceive in immediately accepting Soviet proposals? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 1)

- Study Gorbachev's program of reform. What factors have been to his benefit? What are his chances of success? If the President were to launch radical economic, political, social and military reforms in the US, how would the American public react? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 1)

- Study American perceptions of perestroika, glasnost, and Soviet ethnic unrest. What does the American public think of them, and why?

- Discuss what it means to divide the world into categories of "East" and "West," "North" and "South," "First," "Second," and "Third World." Where are western traditions strong? What western traditions grew out of the "South," the "Second," and "Third Worlds?" What reasons can you propose for Soviet, Eastern European, and Third World interest in western society? What reasons can you propose for Soviet, Eastern European, and Third World rejection of western society? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 3)

- Discuss why it is western nations that primarily have nuclear weapons. How do western leaders react to India's, Pakistan's, and China's nuclear capabilities? In what way and for what reasons did the non-proliferation treaty forbid all but a handful of nations from having nuclear weapons? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 3)

- Discuss the Cuban missile crisis and its treatment by historians before and after the declassification (1988) of tapes of the Excomm meetings. Try to use tapes or scripts in class. (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 5)

- Discuss the distortions of history common in Eastern bloc and Soviet government writings. How does this complicate the historian's task both in and out of these countries? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 5)

- Compare and contrast the US and Soviet political systems. What differences are there in respect to foreign policy-making and the importance of public opinion? How have Gorbachev's reforms changed this? How has US democracy changed with the growth of mass media? How and what kind of end did the Russian Revolution bring to the Russian monarchy and its style of government? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 11)

- Consider the contexts in which political terms such as *democracy, dictatorship, empire, nationalism, republic, sovereignty, state,* and *totalitarianism* are used in the United States. Would you consider any of these contexts ideological? What terms do you find in Soviet statements or writings, and how have they been defined? What can you say about the differences between American and Soviet contexts and definitions? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 11)

- Compare and contrast the social orders of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia historically. Are they becoming more similar over time? Have tourism, exchange programs, and trade brought them closer together? How has the treatment of ethnic minorities in the US paralleled or differed with that in the USSR? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 12)

- Research and then explain the different perceptions of social orders in American and Soviet thinking. What is the main thrust of Marxism, and why is it not popular in the United States? During what times did it achieve some popularity, and why? Why have Soviets traditionally stood for classless society, and why is it important for westerners to understand this? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 12)

- Research the views of socialism in Western Europe. Discuss the importance of socialism as a philosophy and ethics. How have social democrats around the world combined socialist and democratic ideals? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 14)

- Ask students what they think the most important event of the 20th century might have been for Soviet-American relations. Was it technological, political, or philosophical? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 14)

© SPICE

- Study the history of the nuclear arms buildup, giving special emphasis to technical innovations and their influence on US and Soviet nuclear strategies. When were adaptations in US nuclear strategy rejected or not reciprocated by the USSR, and vice-versa? Examples are the U-2, Sputnik, MIRV, the heavy ICBM, the MX, SDI, and the Stealth bomber. (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 14)

- Trace and discuss the evolution of capitalism and its effects on the structure of international trade and the world economy. Analyze the role communism plays both within and outside of the capitalism system. (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 15)

- Ask students open-ended questions concerning communism and capitalism. Do students think communism will eventually strengthen or weaken? Do students think capitalist organizations (such as the GATT, the World Bank) should accept communist members? Do students think there are reasons why there should or should not be more economic exchange between communist and capitalist economies? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 15)

- Examine Hungary's, Poland's, and East Germany's attempts at economic success. Might they serve as models for the rest of Eastern Europe? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 15)

- Compare the roles and privileges of women in US, Eastern European, and Soviet society. (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 15)

- Trace the history of US anti-communism and its different intensities. Note how these were the cause or result of changing interpretations of international communism. Case studies might be McCarthyism, contra aid, and detente. When was communism linked to totalitarianism, anti-Americanism, and subversion? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 19)

- Read and discuss the human rights "basket" of the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975. How important has the human rights issue been in Soviet-American relations? Look at the life of Andrei Sakharov, probably the Soviet Union's most famous dissident. (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 19)

- Compare and contrast American and Soviet views of change. Upon what are they founded? Why has "revolution" been a sensitive word in the West? (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 20)

- Compare and contrast the US and the Russian revolutions. Explore the concept of change even further by looking at "progress" in the US and the USSR since 1970. Important factors might be the US energy crunch, Reaganomics, US unemployment, Soviet economic poverty, perestroika and glasnost. (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 20)

- Discuss the impact important world leaders have had on recent world history, and East-West relations in particular. Both US President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev should be studied. Other interesting figures are: Winston Churchill, Mao Tse-Tung, Josef Tito, Joseph Stalin, Charles De Gaulle, Alexander Dubcek, Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Andrei Gromyko, Lech Walesa, Andrei Sakharov (and other dissidents). (World History, Culture, and Geography Standard 22)
- Study the histories and traditions of the various nationalities contained in the Soviet Union, and the sources of contemporary political unrest in various Soviet republics. Compare Soviet difficulties with ethnic minorities with US difficulties. Study and discuss the important contributions these minorities have had on US and Soviet cultures. (History/Social Science Framework "World Regional Geography" and "Ethnic Studies," - Grade 9 courses)
- Discuss the role of religion in the 20th century Soviet Union and neighboring Eastern European states, giving attention to the special relationship between communism and religion. (History/Social Science Framework "Comparative World Religions" - Grade 9 course)
- Examine 20th century US and Soviet cultures, paying special attention to the impact cultural exchanges have had on both societies. Attention should also be given to the following: population diversity; the status and roles of women and minority groups; emigration. (History/Social Science Framework "Area Studies: Cultures" - Grade 9 course)
- Compare/contrast the US Constitution with the Constitution of the Soviet Union. An interesting case study might be the infamous trials of communists in the US during the 1920s, and the show trials in Stalin's Soviet Union (1930s). Examine the responsibilities of citizens, and their rights to political participation in both countries. (History/Social Science Framework "Law-Related Education" - Grade 9 course and "Principles of American Democracy" - Grade 12 course)
- Study and discuss the international cooperation that followed the Chernobyl disaster in April-May 1986. Follow-up the case study by looking at the organizations which have since been established for the regulation of environmental hazards. (History/Social Science Framework "World History, Culture, and Geography: Unresolved Problems of the Modern World" - Grade 10 course)
- Analyze the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed by over 120 nations, and the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies throughout the world. China, Britain, and France make interesting case studies as nuclear powers caught in the Soviet-American relationship. What role have

these other powers played in arms control agreements? (History/Social Science Framework "World History, Culture, and Geography: Unresolved Problems of the Modern World" - Grade 10 course)

- Research Marxist ideology. (History/Social Science Framework "Principles of American Democracy" - Grade 12 course)
- Research in detail the differences between market economies and command economies. Study the approaches being taken in Eastern European countries, in particular Poland. (History/Social Science Framework "Economics" - Grade 12 course)
- Explore the way in which different philosophies influenced the US and Russian/Soviet governments in terms of economic policies, social welfare programs, and human rights practices. (History/Social Science Framework "Principles of American Democracy" - Grade 12 course)

Ideology

- Discuss the following definition of ideology, and think of the manner in which the Cold War was composed of the two elements of ideology suggested here: "Ideology can be defined as a systematic statement of the highest values and ideals of a particular group. This includes a description of the real world that purports to explain the necessity of those values and ideals. As we define it, then, ideology has two distinct features: a set of beliefs about the real world and a complex of attitudes and values (in the language of social science, "cognitive" and "affective" components). Most ideologies are critiques of the world of their times. They either contain or are associated with radical programs for the transformation of society. This distinction between beliefs about reality and attitudes is important because it helps us understand why adherents to an ideology remain "true believers" even after its propositions about reality have been objectively demonstrated to be false." Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, 1988, p. 14.
- Analyze the implications of the following. For example, if the word "ideology" has too many connotations for American audiences, what could be its substitute? In what way is the word "ideology" ideological? What other words are ideological and why? "American reluctance to admit the existence of a ruling ideology stemmed in part from the bad odor of the word. For it was associated with Marxism, a tainted commodity from which U.S. intellectuals recoiled. Just as propaganda appeared more innocent and honorable if called "information," so ideology could be rebaptized as "value system" or "political beliefs." Definitions followed suit. Ideology was identified with revolutionary or action-oriented belief systems. Put baldly, ideas of radical change, and particularly those espousing the replacement of the capitalist order by socialism and communism, were called ideological; ideas serving to

justify and preserve the status quo, or to validate only incremental change, were said to be nonideological." Quoted from Soviet-American Rivalry, Thomas B. Larson, 1978, p. 117.

- Consider the role of ideology in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Is it true that without anti-capitalist ideology, Soviet society would break apart or decay? What reasons do you see for this not being or not being the case? Does ideology have a similar effect on citizens within the US and Western Europe?

- Both the Soviet Union and the United States lay claim to democracy and democratic principles. According to traditional Soviet views, the American political system is undemocratic because rulership is in the hands of a political and economic elite. American democracy, they say, is a dictatorship of the ruling class over exploited workers. According to American interpretations, the Soviet Union fails to be a democracy because it lacks any signs of political pluralism or party diversity. Research and then discuss their different interpretations of democracy.

- The use of the term "totalitarian" in US descriptions of the Soviet Union did not begin until 1939, and almost disappeared during World War II. Discuss the function this label has played in the ideological conflict between the US and the USSR. Examine why it was adopted after Stalin's purges were over, and in spite of the fact that "terror" and "totalitarianism" were ordinarily associated with fascist Germany and Italy.

- Research and discuss the meaning of the terms "totalitarian" and "authoritarian." In Soviet-American Rivalry Thomas Larson cites the following quotation from Friedrich and Brezinski's Totalitarian Dictatorship, p. 20: "The 'syndrome,' or pattern of interrelated traits, of the totalitarian dictatorship consists of an ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic policy, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed economy." (p. 150.) Which is used, "totalitarian" or "authoritarian" when this describes a non-communist government?

- Ask students what they think the international system is all about. Both Soviet and American ideologies have viewed their past relations as being "zero sum," that is, one's gain was the other's loss, and vice-versa. "New Thinking" in the Soviet Union represented a shift away from this view, and following the first Soviet-American summit, US President Bush seemed willing to assist the Soviet Union. Is this a change taking place in American perceptions of Soviet-American relations? What are the connections between this perception of international relations and possibilities for actual Soviet-American cooperation? Which comes first, a country's interpretations and perceptions of the way the international system works, or its experiences and lessons from actual events?

- Have students collect speeches made by Soviet and American leaders reprinted in recent newspapers. What is the language used in these speeches? Are any of the phrases which students studied in lesson one to be found in these speeches? What kind of tone, audience, and content do students see in these speeches? Are they positive or negative, complimentary or critical?

- Using Soviet journals, study examples of the media's impact on Soviet society. Who is the media governed by? What kinds of images do they present? How has the Soviet media been used by various leaders to "re-write" history? How is glasnost affecting change? Even in Russian, Soviet journals such as Ogonek, Krokodil, and Soviet Life can be extremely illuminating.

National Sovereignty

- Discuss national sovereignty in terms of the international system. What kinds of sacrifices must be made by states when they cooperate with one another? Do the benefits of cooperation make the loss of national autonomy worthwhile? Why do nations often obey international laws and agreements even when there is no "superior authority?" Use the following passage from Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, 1988, p.10. Looking at the last sentence, agree or disagree with the implication that nations cannot afford to pursue projects that run contrary to their own survival: "Global politics lack a central political authority like a world government. Ultimately, each nation is free in principle to determine the range of policies it will pursue for itself. This is the idea expressed by the principle of national sovereignty, a concept that rejects the right of any external political authority to control the policies of the state. National sovereignty in effect gives to international politics an anarchic character. . . . Even more than in the case of the individual, the ultimate value for the nation-state is survival. But unlike the individual within society, the state is unprotected by legal institutions, so the state must look to its own devices—diplomacy, armaments, military alliances, for example—for self-protection. The quest for survival is one of the hallmarks of international politics."

Regional Conflicts

- Discuss regional conflicts between US and Soviet supported groups. Case studies might be: Vietnam; Nicaragua; El Salvador; Angola.

- Supplement a discussion of regional conflict by looking at the ways of managing and resolving these conflicts. Soviet-American cooperation (1988) in the resolution of the Afghanistan war and the strife in Angola was a notable achievement for the countries involved. Should regional conflicts be solved according to the interests of all of those involved? In the case of the Middle East, for example, how important was the

American decision to involve the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the Middle East peace process? What are the chances for progress in Central America without Soviet participation; without US participation?

- Discuss the regions which are likely to experience tension and perhaps conflict in the future. What are they and why? How can the international community mediate them?

- Consider the role of international organizations such as the UN in mediating and eventually resolving regional conflicts. Why are international organizations important?

- Examine the interventions carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union in regions which the two countries considered critical. Recent examples might be: Grenada (US), Panama (US), the Persian Gulf (US), Afghanistan (USSR), Azerbaijan (USSR), Poland (USSR).

- In the context of a discussion of Central America, and alleged American interests in Nicaraguan and Salvadorian affairs, consider the implications for improved Soviet-American relations in this region. Are there connections? Look at official US statements on the Contra war; do they contain strong references to the Soviet Union? What has been the result of the USSR's curtailed support of the Sandinistas?

The Blocs: East and West

- Examine the realities of Cold War events used by each side as cause for interference: communism in Greece—was this a pretense for an expansion of the western sphere of influence?; the danger of Soviet expansion into the Middle East through Iran—was the USSR at all capable of doing so?; "Titoism" in Yugoslavia—what was the appeal of Tito's own brand of communism, and why was Stalin afraid of it?; German rearmament—was this an excuse for the Soviet Union to form the Warsaw Pact and increase its military presence in Eastern Europe?

- Study Stalin's proposals in the 1950s to reunite Germany, and consider why this might or might not have been possible.

- The Soviet Union ordinarily receives the blame for the division of Europe. Examine British Prime Minister Churchill's role in the creation of "spheres of influence," and US President Roosevelt's reactions. Discuss the validity and implications of the following statement, recorded at the Conference of Teheran, 1943: "It was important that the nations who would govern the world after the war should be satisfied and have no territorial or other ambitions. If that question could be settled in a manner agreeable to the great powers, he [Churchill] felt then that the world might indeed remain at peace. He said that hungry and ambitious nations are dangerous, and he would like to see the leading nations of the world in the position of rich, happy men. The

© SPICE

President [Roosevelt] and Marshal Stalin agreed." Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943, U.S. Department of State, 1961. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 567-568.

- Compare and contrast the two most common historical interpretations of the Cold War: did, as argued by "orthodox" historians, the USSR have a blue-print for expansion, or did, as contested by "revisionist" historians, US President Truman make the mistake of acting provocatively towards the Soviet government? Consider similar debates surrounding Soviet interest in Latin America and US interest in the Pacific.

- Ask students if they think the existence of blocs has *militarized* Soviet-American relations. Is the focus on the military security of the two alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact) artificial? What is its impact on cultural exchanges and other forms of cooperation?

- Discuss both the merits and drawbacks of a bipolar world and a multipolar world. Which do students feel would be safer, and which do students feel best describes the present situation? What are the newest world powers, and what makes them powerful? What role, if any, do nuclear weapons have on the stability of the bi- or multipolar world?

- Read a history of the Berlin wall or the Berlin airlift. How do these two events typify the Cold War? Was the Berlin wall a necessary piece of architecture? What happened when East Germany tore it down? Was it fair for the United States to challenge East Germany and the Soviet Union to tear down the Berlin wall as an act of human rights?

- Study the details of the construction of the Berlin wall. Using the following passages, discuss East Germany's reasons for building the wall, and the Allies' reasons for not making any extreme responses: "Imagine what might have happened if we had sent in tanks to flatten the barbed wire. Suppose the *Vopos* [East German military police] then built a second barbed wire barrier ten yards farther east. Should we have flattened that too? What about a third barrier, put up fifty yards inside East Berlin? The Soviets would no more countenance our invasion of their sector than we would stand for their rolling into West Berlin. It might have meant war."—Interview with a US Army officer, The Berliners, Walter Henry Nelson, 1969, p. 172. "What was I supposed to do? More than thirty thousand people—and, mind you, among them the best and most capable people from the G.D.R.—left their country in the month of July. It isn't hard to figure out how soon the East German economy would have collapsed had we not taken steps against this mass flight."—N. Khrushchev, quoted in ibid, pp. 172-173.

- In a famous visit to West Berlin in 1963, American President John F. Kennedy said on arrival that "We come to a city which is three thousand five hundred miles from the United States but we come to a city which we feel to be a part of us." Later that day he announced to an ecstatic crowd: "All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words, *Ich bin ein Berliner*."—Cited in The Berliners, Walter Henry Nelson, 1969, pp. 179-182. What did Kennedy mean, and how does this fit your understanding of the Cold War and bipolarism?

Crisis Management

- Discuss various crises in Soviet-American relations. Negotiation exercises or role-playing are particularly well-suited to understanding crisis management. Case studies might be: Cuban Missile Crisis; "Bay of Pigs" Invasion; Berlin Blockade and Airlift; Berlin Wall; KAL 007 Airliner Incident; the US and Soviet Olympic Games Boycott.

Arms Buildup and Nuclear Strategies

- Study and analyze the evolution of US and Soviet nuclear strategies. Examine the differences between offensive and defensive strategies, and the differences between nuclear and conventional forces. Case studies might be: "massive retaliation," early 1950s; "flexible response," early-mid 1960s; SDI.

- Upper level classes should read "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance" and "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," reprinted in The Nuclear Arms Race Debated (see Appendix D). What are the principal disagreements between the authors of the two articles? What impact would a "no first use" strategy have on Soviet-American relations?

- With one student-team of Americans, and one student-team of Western Europeans, research and debate Western European complaints that US military commitment to Western Europe is not credible.

- Research and discuss the Soviet Union's monopoly of nuclear weapons in the Warsaw Pact. Why are no Eastern European countries permitted to manufacture nuclear weapons?

Arms Control

- Analyze and discuss the constraints the US Senate has placed on previous arms control treaties. Case studies might be: SALT I; SALT II; INF.

- Examine the history of negotiations on the threshold and comprehensive test ban, and on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe (MBFR). Why have these negotiations failed? What are the chances for successful conventional reductions in the talks organized by the CSCE which began in 1989? Follow these developments closely with your class.

- With the class divided into "For" and "Against," read and debate the articles "Why Arms Control Is Harmful" by George F. Will and "Why We Need Arms Control" by William Proxmire included in The Nuclear Arms Race Debated (see Appendix D). The book includes discussion questions which can serve as guidelines for the debate.

Detente and Soviet-American Cooperation

- Study the history and achievements of Soviet-American summit meetings.

- Discuss and analyze the accomplishments of the Helsinki Accords (1975) and the Conference on Security and Disarmament in Europe (CSCE). Points of interest might be: human rights; border recognition; confidence-building measures.

Contemporary Concerns

- As the late 1980s have made clear, the distinction between western capitalism and Soviet communism is not as profound in reality as it is in theory. Discuss the changes that have occurred in the Soviet economy. What reasons could you and your class cite for describing the Soviet and most Eastern European economies as "state capitalist?" You may also want to examine theories of communism not provided here. See Appendix D for related materials.

- List and then discuss elements of American and Western European economies (or societies) which you might consider to be "socialist." What are their merits, and why do your students like or dislike them? Use Robert L. Heilbroner's Marxism: For and Against.

- Research and discuss contemporary Western European views of the Soviet Union. What political breakthroughs do they perceive as being possible? Why?

Connections to Textbooks

Major Concepts/Events in Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking may be easily and appropriately used in conjunction with US history and world history textbooks. Suggestions for use of this supplementary unit follow.

This unit may also be adapted in many ways to be used in conjunction with a variety of textbooks and other teaching materials in social studies. Suggestions for adaptation are found in Appendix A (Related Activities).

Social Science

This unit may be integrated into discussions of the following textbooks topics: The Cold War, the division of Europe, the Marshall plan, the Truman doctrine, the Korean War, detente, the arms buildup, national security, Sputnik, the Cuban Missile Crisis, arms control and disarmament, US-China relations, Latin America, the peace movement, Eastern Europe and democratization, and Soviet-American summitry.

Science

This unit may be integrated into discussions of the following textbooks topics: technological developments in weaponry, the dynamics of technological progress, technology and society, technology and international relations, the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, Sputnik and rocketry, land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, bomber-based missiles, the cruise missile, the MIRV, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and defensive vs. offensive weapons systems.

© SPICE

Connections to California's History/Social Science Framework and Model Curriculum Standards

As a service to California educators, we have described below the ways in which **Major Concepts/Events in Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking** ties into the History/Social Science Framework and the History/Social Science Model Curriculum Standards.

History/Social Science Framework

This unit can be utilized in the following history/social science goal and curriculum strands:

Knowledge and Cultural Understanding: cultural literacy, ethical literacy, geographic literacy, and sociopolitical literacy.

Skills Attainment and Social Participation: basic study skills and critical thinking skills.

This curriculum unit, in its entirety or in separate lessons, can be used as is or adapted to supplement textbooks and other teaching materials in these courses:

The adaptations are listed in detail in the social studies section of Appendix A (Related Activities). Listed below are some ways in which this curriculum unit directly supports the Framework:

World History, Culture, and Geography: The Modern World (Grade 10), United States History and Geography: Continuity and Change in the Twentieth Century (Grade 11); Principles of American Democracy (Grade 12).

World History, Culture, and Geography: This course recommends the study of World War II and its consequences, including the unresolved problems the modern world.

US History and Geography: This course recommends that students study the origins of the cold war and early US containment strategies. The course should continue also present the cold war under Eisenhower and Kennedy, the doctrine of massive retaliation, the birth of the nuclear age, and effects on Soviet-American relations. Study of the cold war era is used as a springboard for analysis of modern military concerns.

Comparative Governments, with Emphasis on Communism in the World Today: This unit should compare capitalism and communism, both in theory and in fact. Students should be aware of the post-war expansion of global communism under Soviet initiative. Political crises such as the Berlin blockade and wall, or the invasion of Afghanistan should be noted.

History/Social Science Model Curriculum Standards

Adaptations of this curriculum unit to meet the History/Social Science Model Curriculum Standards are described in Appendix A (Related Activities). Listed below are some ways in which this unit directly supports the Model Curriculum Standards.

United States History and Geography

Standard 1: "A course should enable students to understand the chronological flow of events, the dynamics of change, and the critical links between past and present." Each lesson examines the policies of American administrations towards the Soviet Union, underscoring continuities or pointing out changes. The unit attempts to present cooperative and antagonistic attitudes towards the Soviet Union within their historical contexts.

Standard 8: "A course should help students evaluate the causes and effects of American military involvements." Lessons one, two, four and five examine US foreign policy and particular instances of interventionism such as were common during the Cold War. Lesson five, on regional conflicts, includes a mapping activity.

Standard 9: "A course should evaluate American foreign policy in the light of internationalist/isolationist cycles." Lessons one, two, and five pay close attention to US interventionism first in the bipolar world and then in an increasingly multipolar world. In lesson four, the unit contrasts interventionism with cooperation and East-West detente.

Standard 22: "A course should devote attention to the role of the United States in the technology and politics of the nuclear age." Lesson two portrays the arms buildup not only as an expression of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, but as a product of technological discovery also. Students are asked to think about the impact technological breakthroughs have had on the nuclear age. Lessons two through five raise the political issues of the nuclear era, and examine the decisions made on a variety of central issues.

Standard 36: "A course should recognize the importance of individual leadership, creativity, and genius of political power in shaping the American tradition, as well as the impact of the efforts of significant men and women." Important political figures are present throughout the unit. Each lesson seeks to link the history of Soviet-American relations to the actors involved, and homework readings introduce a number of significant commentators and observers.

Standard 37: "A course should provide opportunities for students to develop basic, creative and critical thinking, and inter-personal or social participation skills." Every lesson contained in this unit does at least one of the above. In addition to group writing exercises and presentations, lesson plans include a number of games and simulations requiring all of the above skills.

World History, Culture, and Geography

Standard 1: "A course should enable students to understand the chronological flow of events, the dynamics of change, and the critical links between past and present." Each lesson traces the evolution of Soviet-American relations within the context of the Cold War, pinpointing moments of change and highlighting continuity. In lesson five, students focus on the transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Standard 2: "A course should be worldwide in scope, including Western, Middle Eastern, Asian, African, and Native American cultures and civilizations. This is essential to allow students to grasp the deep historical roots of contemporary global interdependence." In lessons one, four, and five, the involvement of Korea, China, and Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War and general Soviet-American relations grants students insight into the scale and scope of world events, and the degree to which the East-West conflict took place on a global level.

Standard 5: "A course should introduce students to the discipline of history and the social sciences. It should show how historians and social scientists sift evidence to arrive at an approximation of truth; and it should give students an understanding of analytical concepts with which they can more effectively interpret, compare, criticize, and question the important issues of both the past and the present. The analytical and comparative study of selected primary documents should be an important part of this process." In lesson one, students read the historical observations of two important American commentators, and as a result, gain access to the reasons for which each writer held differing opinions.

Standard 6: "A course should develop the student's knowledge of physical and place-name geography and encourage relation of that knowledge to specific historical or contemporary events and conditions." Lesson five makes use of map overlays to show the relations between regional conflicts and geography.

Bibliography

This bibliography is divided into the following categories: Materials Used to Prepare **Major Concepts/Events in Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking**; Related Reference Materials on the US, USSR, Soviet-American Relations, and Nuclear Issues; Related Reference Materials on; and Related Classroom Materials.

Materials Used to Prepare this Unit

America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984, fifth edition, Walter LaFeber, 1985. Newberry Award Records, Inc., New York City, NY.

American Diplomacy, expanded edition, George F. Kennan, 1984. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

The Anatomy of Conflict, Robin Riddle, et al, Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, 1987. International Security and Arms Control Project, Stanford, CA.

Beyond Containment: Alternative American Policies Toward the Soviet Union, Aaron Wildavsky, ed., 1983. ICS Press, San Francisco, CA.

Brassey's Soviet and Communist Quotations, compiled and edited by Albert Weeks, 1987. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Washington, D.C.

Breakthrough/Proriv: Emerging New Thinking, edited by Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman, 1988. Walker Publishing Company, Inc., New York City, NY.

The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, David Detzer, 1979. Thomas Y. Crowell, Publishers, New York City, NY.

A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy Since World War I, by the editors of the Foreign Policy Association, 1967. Random House, New York City, NY.

A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy, 1776-1976, by the editors of the Foreign Policy Association, 1975. William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York City, NY.

Cold War or Detente? The Soviet Viewpoint, Georgi Arbatov, 1983. Zed Books, Ltd., London, Great Britain.

The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., 1980. Aldine Publishing Co., New York City, NY.

Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, David S. McLellan, 1976. Dodd, Mead and Company, New York City, NY.

Detente and Confrontation, Raymond L. Garthoff, 1985. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C..

"El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited," Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, in Low Intensity Warfare, Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluth, eds. 1988. Pantheon Books, New York City, NY.

Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham T. Allison, 1971. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, MA.

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman, 1983. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, England.

Expansion and Coexistence, Adam B. Ulam, 1968. Praeger Publishers, New York City, NY.

The Gorbachev Era, edited by Alexander Dallin and Condoleezza Rice, 1986. The Stanford Alumni Association, Stanford, CA.

History-Social Science Framework, California State Dept. of Education, 1988. Sacramento, CA.

International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements, second edition, edited by Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, 1984. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

Inside the Cold War, John Sharnik, 1987. Arbor House, New York City, NY.

Khrushchev: A Career, Edward Crankshaw, 1966. The Viking Press, New York City, NY.

The Long Peace, John Lewis Gaddis, 1987. Oxford University Press, New York City, NY.

The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962, Herbert S. Dinerstein, 1976. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.

Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, Alexander George, 1983. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

Model Curriculum Standards: Grades 9-12, 1st edition, California State Dept. of Education, 1985. Sacramento, CA.

"NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, edited by Thomas H. Etzold and John L. Gaddis, 1978. Columbia University Press, New York City, NY.

Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, 1985. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

The Nuclear Delusion, George F. Kennan, 1976. Pantheon Books, New York City, NY.

Nuclear Strategy and National Security Points of View, Edited by Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie, 1977. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

The Other Side, Robert D. English and Jonathan J. Halperin, 1987. Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ.

Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987. Harper and Row Publishers, New York City, NY.

Prisoners of Insecurity, Bruce Russett, 1983. W.H. Freeman and Company, New York City, NY.

Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s, Christoph Bertram, ed., 1979, 1980. The MacMillan Press, Ltd, London, England.

Reagan and Gorbachev, Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, 1987. Vintage Books, New York City, NY.

The Reagan Foreign Policy, edited by William G. Hyland, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987. Meridian Books, New York City, NY.

Reluctant Warriors: The Soviet Union and Arms Control, Coit D. Blacker, 1987. W.H. Freeman and Company, New York City, NY.

The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II, Adam B. Ulam, 1971. Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, the United Kingdom.

"Rollback or Containment," William LeoGrande, in International Security, Fall 1986.

Russia, revised edition, Hyman Kublin, 1974. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA.

Shared Destiny, Mark Garrison and Abbott Gleason, eds., 1985. Beacon Press Books, Boston, MA.

Soviet-American Rivalry, Thomas B. Larson, 1978. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York City, NY.

Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, second edition, Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, 1984. Pergamon Press, Inc., New York City, NY.

Soviet Foreign Propaganda, Frederick C. Barghoorn, 1964. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Soviet Perceptions of the United States, Morton Schwartz, 1978. The University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.

Soviet Political Society, Leon P. Baradat, 1986. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Soviet Power, Jonathan Steele, 1983. Simon and Schuster, New York City, NY.

The Soviet Union: History, Culture, Geography, Michael Kort, 1988. Globe Book Company, New York City, NY.

The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, David Holloway, 1983. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

Stalin, Adam B. Ulam, 1973. The Viking Press, New York City, NY.

Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, 1982. Oxford University Press, New York City, NY.

They Mean What They Say, Ian Greig, 1981. Foreign Affairs Research Institute, Anglia County Press, Cambridge, England.

Thirteen Days, Robert F. Kennedy, 1971. W. W. Norton and Company, New York City, NY.

U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase, Arnold L. Horelick, ed.. 1986. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

Related Reference Materials on the US

U.S. National Security, Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKitrick, and Thomas J. Leney, 1985, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.

The Anti-Communist Impulse, Michael Parenti, 1969. Random House, New York City, NY.

Related Reference Materials on the USSR

The Armed Forces of the USSR, Harriest Fast Scott and William F. Scott, 1979. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

© SPICE

Cultural Atlas of Russia and the Soviet Union, Gulland R. Milner, 1989. Facts on File, New York City, NY.

A Day in the Life of the Soviet Union, Rick Smolan and David Cohen, 1987. Collins Publishers, San Francisco, CA.

Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, J.F. Brown, 1988. Duke University Press, Durham, NC.

Illustrated History of the USSR, Konstantin Tarnovsky. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

Marxism: For and Against, Robert L. Heilbroner, 1980. W. W. Norton and Company, New York City, NY.

Modern Soviet Society, Basile Kerblay, 1983. Pantheon Books, New York City, NY.

Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union, Gerhard Simon, 1988. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

Peoples of the Soviet Union, Viktor Kozlov, 1988. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.

Politics, Society and Nationality in Gorbachev's Soviet Union, Seweryn Bialer, 1989. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

Rethinking the Soviet Experience, Stephen F. Cohen, 1985. Oxford University Press, New York City, NY.

Russia, David K. Shipler, 1984. Penguin Books, New York City, NY.

Russia, Edward Acton, 1986. Longman, White Plains, NY.

The Russians, Hedrick Smith, revised edition, 1984. Ballantine Books, New York City, NY.

Sixth Continent: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, Mark Frankland, 1987. Harper & Row General Books, New York City, NY.

The Soviet Union Today, James Cracraft, ed., second edition, 1988. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

The Soviet Union, Vadim Medish, third edition, 1987. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Martin McCauley, 1988. St Martins Press, Inc., New York City, NY.

The USSR Today: Perspective from the Soviet Press, compiled by Gordon Livermore and Fred Schultz, 1981. The Soviet Press.

Utopia in Power, Mickail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, 1986. Summit Books, New York City, NY.

Related Reference Materials on Soviet-American Relations

The Ides of August: The Berlin Wall Crisis, 1961, Curtis Cate, 1978. M. Evans and Company, Inc., New York City, NY.

The Missile Crisis, Elie Abel, 1966. Bantam Books, New York City, NY.

Peace, Detente, and Soviet-American Relations, Leonid Brezhnev, 1979. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York City, NY.

The Soviet Union and the United States: A New Look at the Cold War, Linda R. Killen, 1989. Hall, G.K., & Co., Boston, MA.

Rethinking US-Soviet Relations, George Liska, 1987. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, England.

Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States, John Lewis Gaddis, 1978, 1989. McGraw Hill, New York City, NY.

Soviet Foreign Policy, George F. Kennan. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, NJ.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Minton F. Goldman, ed., 1986. Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., Guilford, CT.

The Soviets in World Affairs, Louis Fischer, 1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Related Reference Materials on Nuclear Issues

The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, Gregg Herken, 1980. Alfred A. Knopf, New York City, NY.

The Nuclear Arms Race Debated, Herbert M. Levine and David Carlton, eds., 1986. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York City, NY.

Related Classroom Materials

Most of the following materials are described fully in the Bibliography of Nuclear Age Educational Resources (third edition, 1988) distributed by the International Security and Arms Control Project.

From Russia to USSR: A Narrative and Documentary History, Janet Vaillant and John Richards, 1985. Independent School Press, Wellesley, MA.

Major Concepts/Events in United States-Soviet Union Relations: From the Origins to Recognition, Robin Riddle, Carlton Hayes Tucker, and Adrian Chan, The Stanford Program on International and Cross-cultural Education, 1988. Stanford, CA.

Nuclear Peacekeeping, Keith Payne, 1990. McDougal, Littell, & Co., Evanston, IL.

The Other Side: How Soviets and Americans Perceive Each Other, Robert English and Jonathan J. Halperin, Committee for National Security, 1987. Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ.

Russia, revised edition, Hyman Kublin, 1974. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA.

The Soviet Union: History, Culture, Geography, Michael Kort, 1988. The Globe Book Company, Inc., New York, NY.

The Soviet Union, second edition, 1986. The Congressional Quarterly, Incl, Washington, D.C.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1984, 1984. Stryker-Post Publications, Washington, D.C.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Global Studies, 1986. The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., Guildford, CT.

US-Soviet Relations, second edition, Close-Up Foundation, 1986. Washington, D.C.

Films

"Chernobyl and Three-Mile Island: A Spacebridge," VHS, color, 30 min. Search for Common Ground, 2005 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington D.C. 20036.

"Dr. Strangelove," 1963.

"Inside the USSR," and others. Available through: PBS Video, 1320 Braddock Place, Alexandria, VA 22314. (800) 424-7963.

"First Fifty Years: Reflections on US-Soviet Relations."

"Khrushchev: The Bear's Hug," 1980.

"My Russian Friends," produced by Stephen Schecter, 1988. VHS, color, 58 min. Available through: The Video Project, 5332 College Ave., Suite 101, Oakland, CA 94618. (415) 655-9050.

"Red Nightmare," 1953.

"Red Star—the Soviet Union, 1941-1943," 1973. Available through: The Media Guild, 11722 Sorrento Valley Road, Suite E, San Diego, CA 92121.

"Religion in the Soviet Union: Another Look," 1984. NBC Religious Unit, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, Rm. 4130B, New York, NY 10020. (212) 664-3554.

"Soviet TV: Fact and Fiction," and others. VHS. Available through: Films Incorporated, 5547 N. Ravenswood Ave., Chicago, IL 60640-9979. (800) 323-4222, ext.43.

"Soviet Union: Changing Times," 1989. VHS or 16mm, color, 22 min. Churchill Films, 12210 Nebraska Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90025-9816. (800) 334-7830.

"Stalin: Man and Image," 1980.

"The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security," and

"The Soviets, what is the conflict about?" Available through: National Issues Forums, 100 Commons Road, Dayton, OH 45459-2777.

"Styles in Soviet Education," VHS. US-USSR Youth Exchange Program, 3103 Washington St., San Francisco, CA 9411. (415) 346-4234.

"What about the Russians?" 1982. VHS, color, 26 min. Educational Film and Video Project, 1725B Seabright Ave., Santa Cruz, CA 95062. (415) 849-1649.

Educational Philosophy

Major Concepts/Events in Soviet-American Relations: From the Cold War to New Thinking is part of a series of units being developed by the International Security and Arms Control Project of the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education. After a September 1984 review of available curricula for elementary and secondary teachers in the international security and conflict field, the project discovered a need for classroom materials with more balance, a wider range of perspectives, and greater use of critical thinking skills. (These findings were confirmed in January 1987 and April 1988 reviews.) Other needs include materials which meet teachers' goals for greater flexibility of use, shorter time frames, and sensitivity in the treatment of controversial issues.

Curriculum Development. Teachers and international security experts were recruited to assist the project in determining the key issues in this field and in outlining a strategy to insure that the qualities listed above are evident in each new unit. Key social studies-related topics were identified; the plan was to develop a four- to eight-day social studies curriculum unit on each of the topics.

This topical approach was selected because it maintains flexibility for the teachers. Each of the units is designed to stand alone. A teacher who doesn't have the luxury of a separate course on international security issues or even several weeks to use the entire set of units could insert one or more of the units into an existing course when appropriate. (Some suggestions of when the units may be integrated among themes or events covered in standard textbooks are an element of each unit.)

Some of the titles currently under development or already published include:

The Anatomy of Conflict
Choices in International Conflict
The Evolution of the Methods and Rules of War
Major Concepts/Events in United States-Soviet Union Relations: From the Origins to Recognition
Major Concepts/Events in Soviet-American Relations: Cold War to New Thinking

While all of the materials being developed are designed for use primarily in social studies classrooms, many of the units are applicable to science and language arts classrooms. (Other curriculum units primarily for literature classrooms are being developed as well as social studies units on current events.)

Educational Philosophy. The ISAAC Project believes it is appropriate for the project to hold opinions about educational issues, particularly since topics covered within international security education can be controversial. Since the project believes it is inappropriate for an educational organization to take stands on political issues, it has not advocated any political viewpoint in its curricula. (Advocacy in the classroom is not education — it is indoctrination.) The project's educational convictions are described below:

- Balance and Multiple Perspectives: The project believes that balanced instruction is a realistic and desirable goal. Balanced instruction has two major elements: first, determining what views exist on a topic and which should be presented; and second, presenting those views. On a given subject, many people are aware of only one or two viewpoints whereas many more may actually exist. Although it is the project's goal that teachers go out of their way to seek as many viewpoints as there are on an issue, the project recognizes that this is difficult because the media usually concentrates on the "major" views and organizational resources in many areas may lack diversity.

  In determining what views to present in a classroom, the ISAAC Project encourages teachers to present a continuum of views, not to polarize stands in pro-con format (which tends to oversimplify the debate). Complexity should not be routinely avoided.

  The project encourages the presentation of multiple perspectives on an issue. Beyond this, such presentation should be equally fair and thorough on all perspectives. Perspectives should be introduced and analyzed without teacher advocacy. The project recognizes that many teachers believe stating their own viewpoint to the classroom to be essential; it asks such teachers to provide ample opportunity for student or other teacher viewpoints to be heard so that one advocacy position is not presented to the exclusion of others. Balanced presentation of historical and contemporary issues is an integral part of citizenship education.

- Critical and Creative Thinking: Given that achieving this goal of balanced instruction will ensure the utilization of a framework for comparing conflicting ideas and competing ideologies, it is essential that classroom materials encourage the development and expansion of students' critical and creative thinking skills so that they may compare, analyze, and evaluate multiple perspectives. After identifying values and assumptions of particular perspectives, students must learn how to seek further information and analyze this information. Students should be encouraged to take and defend positions on historical and contemporary issues. If students are to become responsible citizens, they must be able to define a problem or issue, judge relevant information, draw connections and conclusions, and solve problems. The ISAAC project has developed multi-modal, non-lecture-based activities which will enhance students' abilities to think analytically about complex issues, distinguish fact from opinion, and recognize bias and propaganda.

© SPICE

- Historical and Geographic Context: In analyzing the issues of international security, students must be provided with a historical and geographic context. Such context-setting will contribute to the identification of key actors involved in a contemporary issue; some actions the actors might undertake and their likely consequences; the differing values, assumptions, and perceptions which seem to motivate the actors; and ways the issue affects or is affected by other issues.

- Age-appropriateness: Topics within international security and conflict education are not appropriate for all levels. Teachers must determine what materials are appropriate for their own classes. Each of the ISAAC Project units is developed and tested for grade levels at which the content is appropriate and pre-requisite knowledge is met by students.

- Values and Ethical Issues: The study of these topics inevitably raises issues of an ethical or value-related nature. In the project's materials, specific value positions have not been endorsed. Nevertheless, some would judge the decision even to teach these issues a value choice. What is crucial from the project's perspective is the context and process in which such issues are discussed. Teachers face the difficult task of encouraging the kind of free expression which is at the core of our democratic values while at the same time meeting the norms of sound educational practice, including political balance. The project encourages teachers embarking on the study of these issues to engage in a dialogue within the educational and larger community about the ethical and value questions raised in teaching these topics.

- Other Features: Whenever possible, ISAAC curricula include interactive, student-centered activities (such as debates, simulations, role-plays, group discussions, dramatic presentations, and cooperative group projects); primary source materials; and visuals. Materials have a high degree of respect for teachers and students and set high aims for student outcomes.

- Curriculum Testing and Review: In order to ensure that ISAAC Project curricula contain and emphasize these elements of sound education, the project submits its materials for rigorous pilot-testing by elementary and secondary teachers not directly involved in a unit's development and review by faculty members at Stanford University. If an issue analyzed in a unit is particularly controversial, the review process is expanded to include educational leaders, scholars, and political leaders nationwide. Revisions of the units are based upon pilot-testing results and reviews.

It is the teacher's responsibility and privilege to use the curricula wisely and with sound educational goals in mind. Of course teachers know best their classrooms' dynamics and may adapt ISAAC materials as necessary; the project asks that these teachers keep in mind our project's educational philosophy. The ISAAC Project hopes that these materials will be useful in providing students experiences to learn and think about integral issues in the international security and conflict field. The project encourages comments from teachers who use the materials.